Narrative:

In operations we considered the WX, inoperative ILS, and the forecast and decided the cleared fuel of 27.2 was good. When we released the airplane, the cleared fuel was 31.9. We thought 'good, more is better.' usually I then write the new cleared fuel in both spots on the fuel plan form, but this time I didn't. We couldn't leave ord until our arrival time WX was forecast good enough to land. We delayed for an hour while we watched the WX and talked with dispatch. The dispatcher kept us up to date on the WX. At our new departure time, operations asked us what our fuel was and we replied 27.2 with 28.0 on board which was the fuel plan form fuel and not the release fuel of 31.9. Their reply was ok, and we went. Our dispatcher kept us up to date on mht as they don't participate in ATIS over ACARS. In our ACARS conversations with the dispatcher, we all realized we had left with less than release fuel. We still had required FAA fuel, but had less hold fuel than planned. The WX came up as anticipated and we landed uneventfully. We had successfully considered the surrounding WX a forecast for extreme winds later, the new cdap WX minimums which could have hurt us as the primary runway ILS was inoperative the non precision approach had minimum way below ours. There was an ILS to a shorter runway, but until the WX lifted, that too was below minimums. Overall, the leg was always safe but many of us missed the chance to catch the discrepancy. The fueler had an old sheet showing the original fuel load. We didn't correct our fuel plan form, and checking fuel against the fuel plan form instead of the release was another chance missed. The verbal questions from operations were another clue, and they didn't tell us what they had for cleared fuel. Finally, I think our dispatcher looked at the ACARS fuel we inputted and caught the discrepancy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 FLT CREW DEPARTED WITH LESS FUEL THAN WHAT WAS ON THE RELEASE.

Narrative: IN OPS WE CONSIDERED THE WX, INOP ILS, AND THE FORECAST AND DECIDED THE CLRED FUEL OF 27.2 WAS GOOD. WHEN WE RELEASED THE AIRPLANE, THE CLRED FUEL WAS 31.9. WE THOUGHT 'GOOD, MORE IS BETTER.' USUALLY I THEN WRITE THE NEW CLRED FUEL IN BOTH SPOTS ON THE FUEL PLAN FORM, BUT THIS TIME I DIDN'T. WE COULDN'T LEAVE ORD UNTIL OUR ARR TIME WX WAS FORECAST GOOD ENOUGH TO LAND. WE DELAYED FOR AN HR WHILE WE WATCHED THE WX AND TALKED WITH DISPATCH. THE DISPATCHER KEPT US UP TO DATE ON THE WX. AT OUR NEW DEP TIME, OPS ASKED US WHAT OUR FUEL WAS AND WE REPLIED 27.2 WITH 28.0 ON BOARD WHICH WAS THE FUEL PLAN FORM FUEL AND NOT THE RELEASE FUEL OF 31.9. THEIR REPLY WAS OK, AND WE WENT. OUR DISPATCHER KEPT US UP TO DATE ON MHT AS THEY DON'T PARTICIPATE IN ATIS OVER ACARS. IN OUR ACARS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DISPATCHER, WE ALL REALIZED WE HAD LEFT WITH LESS THAN RELEASE FUEL. WE STILL HAD REQUIRED FAA FUEL, BUT HAD LESS HOLD FUEL THAN PLANNED. THE WX CAME UP AS ANTICIPATED AND WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. WE HAD SUCCESSFULLY CONSIDERED THE SURROUNDING WX A FORECAST FOR EXTREME WINDS LATER, THE NEW CDAP WX MINIMUMS WHICH COULD HAVE HURT US AS THE PRIMARY RWY ILS WAS INOP THE NON PRECISION APCH HAD MINIMUM WAY BELOW OURS. THERE WAS AN ILS TO A SHORTER RWY, BUT UNTIL THE WX LIFTED, THAT TOO WAS BELOW MINIMUMS. OVERALL, THE LEG WAS ALWAYS SAFE BUT MANY OF US MISSED THE CHANCE TO CATCH THE DISCREPANCY. THE FUELER HAD AN OLD SHEET SHOWING THE ORIGINAL FUEL LOAD. WE DIDN'T CORRECT OUR FUEL PLAN FORM, AND CHKING FUEL AGAINST THE FUEL PLAN FORM INSTEAD OF THE RELEASE WAS ANOTHER CHANCE MISSED. THE VERBAL QUESTIONS FROM OPS WERE ANOTHER CLUE, AND THEY DIDN'T TELL US WHAT THEY HAD FOR CLRED FUEL. FINALLY, I THINK OUR DISPATCHER LOOKED AT THE ACARS FUEL WE INPUTTED AND CAUGHT THE DISCREPANCY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.