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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 601147 |
Time | |
Date | 200312 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : aex.airport |
State Reference | LA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : aex.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | SF 340A |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : aex.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 1900 flight time type : 120 |
ASRS Report | 601147 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe incursion : runway non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : became reoriented |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airport FAA ATC Human Performance Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Our taxi clearance was 'taxi to runway 18 on taxiway a.' this instruction was confusing because of the need to back taxi on runway 18 from the intersection at taxiway a. I repeated this back to the ground controller (who was in training at the time) and the captain verified this information with me. The captain began to taxi and I proceeded with the before-takeoff checklist so my attention was inside the aircraft. For some reason the captain started to taxi toward runway 36 and I was too busy to realize this, plus I was new in my position and unfamiliar with the airport. The next thing I remember is the captain calling 'clear left' to which I need to say 'clear right' when crossing a runway while taxiing. I looked up, saw that we were crossing a hold short line, looked right and said 'not clear, stop.' there was an aircraft on short final for the opposite end of the runway we were crossing. Our aircraft was halfway over the hold short line and I looked over to the runway sign and noticed we were at runway 36 on the wrong side of the airport entirely. There was then some confusion with the ground controllers once they realized where we were. They told us to just pull clear of the runway and hold short for takeoff on runway 32. We did so and took off uneventfully. During the entire incident an FAA inspector was in our jumpseat and did nothing to prevent the incident. This was a big factor in the incident, focusing our attention on the inspector. The aircraft on short final did not have to go around and there was no 'near miss.' this whole situation could have been prevented with more strict requirements for FAA inspectors to have current charts/airport diagrams out and available during flight deck observation. Also, improvements to ATC instructions can be made. All runways that must be crossed en route to the takeoff runway should be mentioned in every taxi clearance. Also a requirement to state 'you are not cleared to cross runway 14/32' could be added to any taxi clearance issued when more than one runway is active. The use of left turn/right turn might have helped as well. A restr on when checklists can be performed would have focused my attention outside more as well.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: NEAR RWY ENTRY AS SF340 PIC TAXIES OVER HOLD SHORT LINE FOR WRONG RWY 32 AT AEX, LA.
Narrative: OUR TAXI CLRNC WAS 'TAXI TO RWY 18 ON TXWY A.' THIS INSTRUCTION WAS CONFUSING BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO BACK TAXI ON RWY 18 FROM THE INTXN AT TXWY A. I REPEATED THIS BACK TO THE GND CTLR (WHO WAS IN TRAINING AT THE TIME) AND THE CAPT VERIFIED THIS INFO WITH ME. THE CAPT BEGAN TO TAXI AND I PROCEEDED WITH THE BEFORE-TKOF CHKLIST SO MY ATTN WAS INSIDE THE ACFT. FOR SOME REASON THE CAPT STARTED TO TAXI TOWARD RWY 36 AND I WAS TOO BUSY TO REALIZE THIS, PLUS I WAS NEW IN MY POS AND UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. THE NEXT THING I REMEMBER IS THE CAPT CALLING 'CLR L' TO WHICH I NEED TO SAY 'CLR R' WHEN XING A RWY WHILE TAXIING. I LOOKED UP, SAW THAT WE WERE XING A HOLD SHORT LINE, LOOKED R AND SAID 'NOT CLR, STOP.' THERE WAS AN ACFT ON SHORT FINAL FOR THE OPPOSITE END OF THE RWY WE WERE XING. OUR ACFT WAS HALFWAY OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND I LOOKED OVER TO THE RWY SIGN AND NOTICED WE WERE AT RWY 36 ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE ARPT ENTIRELY. THERE WAS THEN SOME CONFUSION WITH THE GND CTLRS ONCE THEY REALIZED WHERE WE WERE. THEY TOLD US TO JUST PULL CLR OF THE RWY AND HOLD SHORT FOR TKOF ON RWY 32. WE DID SO AND TOOK OFF UNEVENTFULLY. DURING THE ENTIRE INCIDENT AN FAA INSPECTOR WAS IN OUR JUMPSEAT AND DID NOTHING TO PREVENT THE INCIDENT. THIS WAS A BIG FACTOR IN THE INCIDENT, FOCUSING OUR ATTN ON THE INSPECTOR. THE ACFT ON SHORT FINAL DID NOT HAVE TO GO AROUND AND THERE WAS NO 'NEAR MISS.' THIS WHOLE SIT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED WITH MORE STRICT REQUIREMENTS FOR FAA INSPECTORS TO HAVE CURRENT CHARTS/ARPT DIAGRAMS OUT AND AVAILABLE DURING FLT DECK OBSERVATION. ALSO, IMPROVEMENTS TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS CAN BE MADE. ALL RWYS THAT MUST BE CROSSED ENRTE TO THE TKOF RWY SHOULD BE MENTIONED IN EVERY TAXI CLRNC. ALSO A REQUIREMENT TO STATE 'YOU ARE NOT CLRED TO CROSS RWY 14/32' COULD BE ADDED TO ANY TAXI CLRNC ISSUED WHEN MORE THAN ONE RWY IS ACTIVE. THE USE OF L TURN/R TURN MIGHT HAVE HELPED AS WELL. A RESTR ON WHEN CHKLISTS CAN BE PERFORMED WOULD HAVE FOCUSED MY ATTN OUTSIDE MORE AS WELL.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.