Narrative:

Upon our initial check-in with phx approach, we were assigned 210 KTS. We held 210 KTS from downwind until midway through our base turn for runway 26. Because we felt that we were uncomfortably positioned to complete a visual approach from 6000 ft at 210 KTS, we decided to slow and select flaps 5 degrees. The controller was busy, so it was entirely conceivable to us that he had forgotten our earlier speed restr. Upon arriving at 180 KTS, the controller asked our speed and we replied with '180 KTS.' obviously upset with our decision, the controller let us know that we had been assigned 210 KTS and should advise of any changes. He then cleared us for the visual approach. Even at 180 KTS and 30 degrees of bank, we overshot the final. As the captain configured for landing, it became even more apparent that slowing was not only prudent, it was necessary in order to accomplish our approach in accordance with the requirements of the fom. Considering previous incidents in which pilots have continued an approach after satisfying an earlier, unreasonable speed restr, the decision to slow was good if a missed approach was to be avoided. Considering the response this controller gave us, I would consider maintaining the speed and simply going around when the parameters aren't met. Either way, I stand by the decision to fly the airplane first and not let other constraints compromise safety. In his defense, the controller has probably issued the same clearance to other aircraft that have completed the approach, probably even other company aircraft. However, with our renewed focus on stabilized approachs, perhaps an informative memo to approach controllers would be appropriate. Supplemental information from acn 601151: abeam the power plant at approximately 6500 ft, approach advised us to 'turn left heading 040 degrees. Continue descent to 5000 ft.' at that point we were very high for a close-in base leg so at 6000 ft I set the vertical speed wheel to 500 FPM descent and called for flaps 5 degrees and slowed to 180 KTS. Passing abeam the power plant over the north/south freeway at approximately 5500 ft, approach asked for our airspeed and we replied 180 KTS. He replied something to this effect,' if you change your assigned airspeed, we need to know!' given my position relative to runway 26 and my altitude assigned, I was shocked by this statement, although technically I admit my error. If we had been at 210 KTS, clearly we could not have landed without violating the fom.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-500 FLT CREW INITIATE UNCOORD SPD REDUCTION AS P50 TURNS AND CLRS ACFT FOR VISUAL APCH. PIC CLAIMS SLOWING NECESSITY FOR STABILIZED APCH, CTLRS CLAIMS 210 KTS NEEDED FOR SPACING.

Narrative: UPON OUR INITIAL CHK-IN WITH PHX APCH, WE WERE ASSIGNED 210 KTS. WE HELD 210 KTS FROM DOWNWIND UNTIL MIDWAY THROUGH OUR BASE TURN FOR RWY 26. BECAUSE WE FELT THAT WE WERE UNCOMFORTABLY POSITIONED TO COMPLETE A VISUAL APCH FROM 6000 FT AT 210 KTS, WE DECIDED TO SLOW AND SELECT FLAPS 5 DEGS. THE CTLR WAS BUSY, SO IT WAS ENTIRELY CONCEIVABLE TO US THAT HE HAD FORGOTTEN OUR EARLIER SPD RESTR. UPON ARRIVING AT 180 KTS, THE CTLR ASKED OUR SPD AND WE REPLIED WITH '180 KTS.' OBVIOUSLY UPSET WITH OUR DECISION, THE CTLR LET US KNOW THAT WE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED 210 KTS AND SHOULD ADVISE OF ANY CHANGES. HE THEN CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH. EVEN AT 180 KTS AND 30 DEGS OF BANK, WE OVERSHOT THE FINAL. AS THE CAPT CONFIGURED FOR LNDG, IT BECAME EVEN MORE APPARENT THAT SLOWING WAS NOT ONLY PRUDENT, IT WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH OUR APCH IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOM. CONSIDERING PREVIOUS INCIDENTS IN WHICH PLTS HAVE CONTINUED AN APCH AFTER SATISFYING AN EARLIER, UNREASONABLE SPD RESTR, THE DECISION TO SLOW WAS GOOD IF A MISSED APCH WAS TO BE AVOIDED. CONSIDERING THE RESPONSE THIS CTLR GAVE US, I WOULD CONSIDER MAINTAINING THE SPD AND SIMPLY GOING AROUND WHEN THE PARAMETERS AREN'T MET. EITHER WAY, I STAND BY THE DECISION TO FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST AND NOT LET OTHER CONSTRAINTS COMPROMISE SAFETY. IN HIS DEFENSE, THE CTLR HAS PROBABLY ISSUED THE SAME CLRNC TO OTHER ACFT THAT HAVE COMPLETED THE APCH, PROBABLY EVEN OTHER COMPANY ACFT. HOWEVER, WITH OUR RENEWED FOCUS ON STABILIZED APCHS, PERHAPS AN INFORMATIVE MEMO TO APCH CTLRS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 601151: ABEAM THE PWR PLANT AT APPROX 6500 FT, APCH ADVISED US TO 'TURN L HDG 040 DEGS. CONTINUE DSCNT TO 5000 FT.' AT THAT POINT WE WERE VERY HIGH FOR A CLOSE-IN BASE LEG SO AT 6000 FT I SET THE VERT SPD WHEEL TO 500 FPM DSCNT AND CALLED FOR FLAPS 5 DEGS AND SLOWED TO 180 KTS. PASSING ABEAM THE PWR PLANT OVER THE N/S FREEWAY AT APPROX 5500 FT, APCH ASKED FOR OUR AIRSPD AND WE REPLIED 180 KTS. HE REPLIED SOMETHING TO THIS EFFECT,' IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ASSIGNED AIRSPD, WE NEED TO KNOW!' GIVEN MY POS RELATIVE TO RWY 26 AND MY ALT ASSIGNED, I WAS SHOCKED BY THIS STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY I ADMIT MY ERROR. IF WE HAD BEEN AT 210 KTS, CLRLY WE COULD NOT HAVE LANDED WITHOUT VIOLATING THE FOM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.