Narrative:

I (captain) had my first officer call for and receive a pushback clearance for our flight to ord. All checklists were properly completed and all SOP's complied with prior to the request for pushback, including selecting the bscu (brake system control unit) to the off position. All normal ECAM messages associated with the movement of this switch were noted and the ECAM screens cleared. We then received a clearance from ground control to push the aircraft back onto taxiway Z. I established communications with the person in the push tractor and coordinated a brake release. This was a standard brake release and not an early brake release. The pushback was then initiated in a timely manner. During the pushback with the aircraft facing east in the alley, we were given the clearance to start engines. I gave the first officer the order to start both engines, as the taxi out of sjc is relatively short. By the time the aircraft was out on taxiway Z, the #1 engine was running and the process for starting #2 engine had begun. During this time, the aircraft's movement aft was stopped and I expected to get a call to set the brakes, however, the person in the push tractor said that she was going to pull us forward slightly since the airplane was off the taxiway centerline at an angle. I responded to this and then began to observe the starting of the engine. Shortly after this, I began to feel the airplane slow slightly as to signal that the tow tractor was coming to a stop and I was ready to communicate with the ground crew to set the brakes when they were ready. It was immediately after this that we felt a series of very hard bangs against the nosewheel of the airplane. Initially, I just thought that maybe the tractor was going in and out of gear and we were just getting jerked about. But I realized very quickly that something else was wrong and immediately began telling the person in the tractor to stop the push. I made this request several times and received no answer. At this point, the aircraft had come to a stop with both engines running and the parking brake off. I, of course at this time, have absolutely no idea what has happened, and I continued to try and make contact with the ground crew to no avail. I then made the decision to set the parking brake and continued to try and contact the ground crew to figure out what was going on. I was still not able to contact the ground crew and decided to shut both engines down while we worked on the problem. I then began to try again to communicate with the ground crew to find out what was happening. I used the buzzer. I turned the lights on in the cockpit to establish a visual, pointing to my headset but no one was talking to me. I found out later the reason that communications were disrupted was because during the incident, the headset cord was ripped from the outlet on the communications panel downstairs. This process was taking several mins and I was so busy trying to figure out what was going on that I realized we had not spoken to ATC or the people and had the first officer handle those communications for me. At no time did I feel the airplane was in danger, but I figured that there was probably damage to the nosewheel. I was finally able to establish communication with the ground crew, and found out that the towbar had broken and that was the reason for the banging and jerking we experienced. However, the real story was yet to unfold. I had the first officer establish a phone patch for me to company maintenance using the rdi feature and I began a dialogue with company maintenance about our problem. Through a series of questions from company maintenance and continued talks with the ground crew, I discovered that the aircraft had actually impacted the tow tractor. During these initial discussions, a couple of events took place that really disturbed me. As I was trying to talk with company maintenance and the ground crew, I noticed airstairs pull up to the side of the airplane, and I see that doors 1L and 1R are disarmed. I do not fault the flight attendant for this, as she was doing what she was trained for. I immediately had the first officer call back to her and told her to rearm the doors, as no one was going to be opening any doors on the airplane. About this time, I also noticed that both forward and aft cargo doors are being opened. I called downstairs to the ground and asked them what was going on, and she told me she was screaming at people to not do anything, but they continued anyway. At that point, I told her to tell everyone to get away from the airplane per captain's orders and not to touch anything until such time that I gave them specific instructions. This made for a big mess as I was trying to juggle about 5 balls at one time. After we were able to stabilize the situation, I continued to discuss potential solutions with company maintenance and the decision was made to bring a contract mechanic into the mix to better determine the status of the airplane. When the mechanic arrived, I began to get a better picture of what had occurred and the extent to which the airplane had actually been damaged. I had lengthy discussions with the company maintenance controller to determine if we could actually move the tractor without doing too much additional damage to the airplane, and whether or not the entire weight of the airplane could be supported by the gear. The mechanic looked at the nose gear and told me that he did not see any damage and that the damage appeared to be confined to the fuselage of the airplane. As a precaution, the company maintenance controller suggested that we use gear pins to help support the gear in the event there was damage that we were not able to see. It was ultimately decided that we would not do anything until the company mechanics arrived on the scene. At this point, the decision was then made that we would not do anything with the passenger on board the airplane and arrangements were made with sjc operations to remove the passenger and crew. At the time that we left the airplane, the company mechanics had not arrived. Prior to this, we completed a parking checklist and left the adirs (air data inertial reference system) aligned for the movement of the airplane that would eventually take place. At no time during this event was the bscu switch selected to the 'on' position after it had been turned 'off' according to normal pushback SOP. As I exited the airplane, I was finally able to see exactly what had happened. I was amazed at the damage to the towbar and was equally amazed at how the tow tractor could get to the position that it was in. I am so thankful that no one was hurt, because looking at the damage, I think it had the potential to be much worse. I give my crew high marks for their performance during this event particularly my first officer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 FLT CREW HAS TOWBAR FAIL DURING PUSHBACK AT SJC.

Narrative: I (CAPT) HAD MY FO CALL FOR AND RECEIVE A PUSHBACK CLRNC FOR OUR FLT TO ORD. ALL CHKLISTS WERE PROPERLY COMPLETED AND ALL SOP'S COMPLIED WITH PRIOR TO THE REQUEST FOR PUSHBACK, INCLUDING SELECTING THE BSCU (BRAKE SYS CTL UNIT) TO THE OFF POS. ALL NORMAL ECAM MESSAGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THIS SWITCH WERE NOTED AND THE ECAM SCREENS CLRED. WE THEN RECEIVED A CLRNC FROM GND CTL TO PUSH THE ACFT BACK ONTO TXWY Z. I ESTABLISHED COMS WITH THE PERSON IN THE PUSH TRACTOR AND COORDINATED A BRAKE RELEASE. THIS WAS A STANDARD BRAKE RELEASE AND NOT AN EARLY BRAKE RELEASE. THE PUSHBACK WAS THEN INITIATED IN A TIMELY MANNER. DURING THE PUSHBACK WITH THE ACFT FACING E IN THE ALLEY, WE WERE GIVEN THE CLRNC TO START ENGS. I GAVE THE FO THE ORDER TO START BOTH ENGS, AS THE TAXI OUT OF SJC IS RELATIVELY SHORT. BY THE TIME THE ACFT WAS OUT ON TXWY Z, THE #1 ENG WAS RUNNING AND THE PROCESS FOR STARTING #2 ENG HAD BEGUN. DURING THIS TIME, THE ACFT'S MOVEMENT AFT WAS STOPPED AND I EXPECTED TO GET A CALL TO SET THE BRAKES, HOWEVER, THE PERSON IN THE PUSH TRACTOR SAID THAT SHE WAS GOING TO PULL US FORWARD SLIGHTLY SINCE THE AIRPLANE WAS OFF THE TXWY CTRLINE AT AN ANGLE. I RESPONDED TO THIS AND THEN BEGAN TO OBSERVE THE STARTING OF THE ENG. SHORTLY AFTER THIS, I BEGAN TO FEEL THE AIRPLANE SLOW SLIGHTLY AS TO SIGNAL THAT THE TOW TRACTOR WAS COMING TO A STOP AND I WAS READY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE GND CREW TO SET THE BRAKES WHEN THEY WERE READY. IT WAS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS THAT WE FELT A SERIES OF VERY HARD BANGS AGAINST THE NOSEWHEEL OF THE AIRPLANE. INITIALLY, I JUST THOUGHT THAT MAYBE THE TRACTOR WAS GOING IN AND OUT OF GEAR AND WE WERE JUST GETTING JERKED ABOUT. BUT I REALIZED VERY QUICKLY THAT SOMETHING ELSE WAS WRONG AND IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TELLING THE PERSON IN THE TRACTOR TO STOP THE PUSH. I MADE THIS REQUEST SEVERAL TIMES AND RECEIVED NO ANSWER. AT THIS POINT, THE ACFT HAD COME TO A STOP WITH BOTH ENGS RUNNING AND THE PARKING BRAKE OFF. I, OF COURSE AT THIS TIME, HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA WHAT HAS HAPPENED, AND I CONTINUED TO TRY AND MAKE CONTACT WITH THE GND CREW TO NO AVAIL. I THEN MADE THE DECISION TO SET THE PARKING BRAKE AND CONTINUED TO TRY AND CONTACT THE GND CREW TO FIGURE OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. I WAS STILL NOT ABLE TO CONTACT THE GND CREW AND DECIDED TO SHUT BOTH ENGS DOWN WHILE WE WORKED ON THE PROB. I THEN BEGAN TO TRY AGAIN TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE GND CREW TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING. I USED THE BUZZER. I TURNED THE LIGHTS ON IN THE COCKPIT TO ESTABLISH A VISUAL, POINTING TO MY HEADSET BUT NO ONE WAS TALKING TO ME. I FOUND OUT LATER THE REASON THAT COMS WERE DISRUPTED WAS BECAUSE DURING THE INCIDENT, THE HEADSET CORD WAS RIPPED FROM THE OUTLET ON THE COMS PANEL DOWNSTAIRS. THIS PROCESS WAS TAKING SEVERAL MINS AND I WAS SO BUSY TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON THAT I REALIZED WE HAD NOT SPOKEN TO ATC OR THE PEOPLE AND HAD THE FO HANDLE THOSE COMS FOR ME. AT NO TIME DID I FEEL THE AIRPLANE WAS IN DANGER, BUT I FIGURED THAT THERE WAS PROBABLY DAMAGE TO THE NOSEWHEEL. I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO ESTABLISH COM WITH THE GND CREW, AND FOUND OUT THAT THE TOWBAR HAD BROKEN AND THAT WAS THE REASON FOR THE BANGING AND JERKING WE EXPERIENCED. HOWEVER, THE REAL STORY WAS YET TO UNFOLD. I HAD THE FO ESTABLISH A PHONE PATCH FOR ME TO COMPANY MAINT USING THE RDI FEATURE AND I BEGAN A DIALOGUE WITH COMPANY MAINT ABOUT OUR PROB. THROUGH A SERIES OF QUESTIONS FROM COMPANY MAINT AND CONTINUED TALKS WITH THE GND CREW, I DISCOVERED THAT THE ACFT HAD ACTUALLY IMPACTED THE TOW TRACTOR. DURING THESE INITIAL DISCUSSIONS, A COUPLE OF EVENTS TOOK PLACE THAT REALLY DISTURBED ME. AS I WAS TRYING TO TALK WITH COMPANY MAINT AND THE GND CREW, I NOTICED AIRSTAIRS PULL UP TO THE SIDE OF THE AIRPLANE, AND I SEE THAT DOORS 1L AND 1R ARE DISARMED. I DO NOT FAULT THE FLT ATTENDANT FOR THIS, AS SHE WAS DOING WHAT SHE WAS TRAINED FOR. I IMMEDIATELY HAD THE FO CALL BACK TO HER AND TOLD HER TO REARM THE DOORS, AS NO ONE WAS GOING TO BE OPENING ANY DOORS ON THE AIRPLANE. ABOUT THIS TIME, I ALSO NOTICED THAT BOTH FORWARD AND AFT CARGO DOORS ARE BEING OPENED. I CALLED DOWNSTAIRS TO THE GND AND ASKED THEM WHAT WAS GOING ON, AND SHE TOLD ME SHE WAS SCREAMING AT PEOPLE TO NOT DO ANYTHING, BUT THEY CONTINUED ANYWAY. AT THAT POINT, I TOLD HER TO TELL EVERYONE TO GET AWAY FROM THE AIRPLANE PER CAPT'S ORDERS AND NOT TO TOUCH ANYTHING UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT I GAVE THEM SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS. THIS MADE FOR A BIG MESS AS I WAS TRYING TO JUGGLE ABOUT 5 BALLS AT ONE TIME. AFTER WE WERE ABLE TO STABILIZE THE SIT, I CONTINUED TO DISCUSS POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS WITH COMPANY MAINT AND THE DECISION WAS MADE TO BRING A CONTRACT MECH INTO THE MIX TO BETTER DETERMINE THE STATUS OF THE AIRPLANE. WHEN THE MECH ARRIVED, I BEGAN TO GET A BETTER PICTURE OF WHAT HAD OCCURRED AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AIRPLANE HAD ACTUALLY BEEN DAMAGED. I HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMPANY MAINT CTLR TO DETERMINE IF WE COULD ACTUALLY MOVE THE TRACTOR WITHOUT DOING TOO MUCH ADDITIONAL DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE ENTIRE WT OF THE AIRPLANE COULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE GEAR. THE MECH LOOKED AT THE NOSE GEAR AND TOLD ME THAT HE DID NOT SEE ANY DAMAGE AND THAT THE DAMAGE APPEARED TO BE CONFINED TO THE FUSELAGE OF THE AIRPLANE. AS A PRECAUTION, THE COMPANY MAINT CTLR SUGGESTED THAT WE USE GEAR PINS TO HELP SUPPORT THE GEAR IN THE EVENT THERE WAS DAMAGE THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO SEE. IT WAS ULTIMATELY DECIDED THAT WE WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING UNTIL THE COMPANY MECHS ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. AT THIS POINT, THE DECISION WAS THEN MADE THAT WE WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING WITH THE PAX ON BOARD THE AIRPLANE AND ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE WITH SJC OPS TO REMOVE THE PAX AND CREW. AT THE TIME THAT WE LEFT THE AIRPLANE, THE COMPANY MECHS HAD NOT ARRIVED. PRIOR TO THIS, WE COMPLETED A PARKING CHKLIST AND LEFT THE ADIRS (AIR DATA INERTIAL REF SYS) ALIGNED FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THE AIRPLANE THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY TAKE PLACE. AT NO TIME DURING THIS EVENT WAS THE BSCU SWITCH SELECTED TO THE 'ON' POS AFTER IT HAD BEEN TURNED 'OFF' ACCORDING TO NORMAL PUSHBACK SOP. AS I EXITED THE AIRPLANE, I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO SEE EXACTLY WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I WAS AMAZED AT THE DAMAGE TO THE TOWBAR AND WAS EQUALLY AMAZED AT HOW THE TOW TRACTOR COULD GET TO THE POS THAT IT WAS IN. I AM SO THANKFUL THAT NO ONE WAS HURT, BECAUSE LOOKING AT THE DAMAGE, I THINK IT HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BE MUCH WORSE. I GIVE MY CREW HIGH MARKS FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE DURING THIS EVENT PARTICULARLY MY FO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.