37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 601905 |
Time | |
Date | 200311 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : las.airport |
State Reference | NV |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 25000 |
ASRS Report | 601905 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 20000 flight time type : 10000 |
ASRS Report | 602266 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper documentation maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other other : 3 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted other |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Company Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
During pushback/engine start, 'B' flight attendant called the cockpit. She informed me that the red safety strap from one of the aft doors was missing. I made the quick decision to continue, thinking that it was not a no go item, and that the aircraft would go through a maintenance base the next leg. I was informed the afternoon of dec/fri/03, that the strap is a no go item. We had pushed 10 mins late. Since engines were started, I made a quick decision to continue. This was obviously wrong. Not sure I can come up with any cause factors other than the fact that I let the delayed push affect my decision. I was in a hurry. I also know there is no excuse for that. Safety always precedes schedule and am not sure why I did not proceed that way. To prevent reoccurrences, will and should take the time to research the problem.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-300 CAPT WAS INFORMED BY THE 'B' FLT ATTENDANT THAT THE RED SAFETY STRAP WAS MISSING FROM THE AFT SVC DOOR. THE CAPT DECIDED TO IGNORE THE ISSUE.
Narrative: DURING PUSHBACK/ENG START, 'B' FLT ATTENDANT CALLED THE COCKPIT. SHE INFORMED ME THAT THE RED SAFETY STRAP FROM ONE OF THE AFT DOORS WAS MISSING. I MADE THE QUICK DECISION TO CONTINUE, THINKING THAT IT WAS NOT A NO GO ITEM, AND THAT THE ACFT WOULD GO THROUGH A MAINT BASE THE NEXT LEG. I WAS INFORMED THE AFTERNOON OF DEC/FRI/03, THAT THE STRAP IS A NO GO ITEM. WE HAD PUSHED 10 MINS LATE. SINCE ENGS WERE STARTED, I MADE A QUICK DECISION TO CONTINUE. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY WRONG. NOT SURE I CAN COME UP WITH ANY CAUSE FACTORS OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT I LET THE DELAYED PUSH AFFECT MY DECISION. I WAS IN A HURRY. I ALSO KNOW THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR THAT. SAFETY ALWAYS PRECEDES SCHEDULE AND AM NOT SURE WHY I DID NOT PROCEED THAT WAY. TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCES, WILL AND SHOULD TAKE THE TIME TO RESEARCH THE PROB.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.