Narrative:

Our flight was delayed due to WX at ord. Original passenger load of 12/67 dropped to 3/4. Aircraft gross weight of 170200 pounds, trim 3.9, flaps 5 degrees reduced takeoff EPR of 1.33. The stick felt unusually light on initial application of power, thought it was because of very light aircraft weight, but going through 60 KTS, I needed much more forward pressure on the yoke than usual. I instinctively applied some nose down trim thinking that load planning had not corrected for the reduced number of passenger. Going through 70 KTS, I had to apply yet more forward pressure on the yoke. It felt like the airplane was ready to rotate. At this point, I felt there was either a center of gravity or stabilizer problem and decided to abort. At almost the same time, the confign klaxon sounded and the 'stabilizer' warning on EICAS illuminated. I aborted. The first officer advised tower and asked the flight attendants to remain seated. We taxied off the runway, declining assistance from the tower. Advised ramp, dispatch and maintenance controller of the abort. We advised ramp that there may have been a loading/center of gravity problem, and asked them to check their figures. I realize the use of trim is not SOP. This was a first for me, but it was instinctive. I have flown the B757 for 6 yrs as captain, and 2 yrs as first officer, and have never felt an airplane want to rotate at such a low speed, and need as much forward pressure. It took about 20 KTS for me to go from the 'go' mode to the 'abort' mode. Load planning numbers checked out, so I advised maintenance. We agreed that the aircraft should be taken OTS. As far as CRM goes, I didn't have time for anything except to say 'abort' and the first officer did a great job of backing me up. The abort itself was a non-event. The training kicked in and it went smoothly -- just like in the simulator. It was my first real abort on the line. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: captain advised that the rejected takeoff occurred at 116 KIAS and was accomplished with autobrakes in the rejected takeoff mode. The aircraft was taken OTS and an inspection done mechanically and on the load planning documentation for the takeoff. All was found to be normal and the aircraft returned to service. Supplemental information from acn 602050: during initial takeoff roll captain mentioned very light control forces, nose very light. I took this for the empty airplane until 'abort' command which occurred simultaneously with the stabilizer EICAS message. We checked the trim setting having set and checked it several times before takeoff with the revised weights. It appeared to be just touching the forward edge of the 'green band' on the nose down trim (forward) side. Everyone agreed that we would not continue with this aircraft and we changed planes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B752 REJECT TKOF AT MCO DUE TO LIGHT NOSE FEEL AT LOW SPD. SUSPECT CTR OF GRAVITY IN ERROR. TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED WHEN PF UTILIZED STABILIZER TRIM NOSE DOWN IN AN ATTEMPT TO CORRECT THE PERCEIVED CONDITION.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS DELAYED DUE TO WX AT ORD. ORIGINAL PAX LOAD OF 12/67 DROPPED TO 3/4. ACFT GROSS WT OF 170200 LBS, TRIM 3.9, FLAPS 5 DEGS REDUCED TKOF EPR OF 1.33. THE STICK FELT UNUSUALLY LIGHT ON INITIAL APPLICATION OF PWR, THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE OF VERY LIGHT ACFT WT, BUT GOING THROUGH 60 KTS, I NEEDED MUCH MORE FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE YOKE THAN USUAL. I INSTINCTIVELY APPLIED SOME NOSE DOWN TRIM THINKING THAT LOAD PLANNING HAD NOT CORRECTED FOR THE REDUCED NUMBER OF PAX. GOING THROUGH 70 KTS, I HAD TO APPLY YET MORE FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE YOKE. IT FELT LIKE THE AIRPLANE WAS READY TO ROTATE. AT THIS POINT, I FELT THERE WAS EITHER A CTR OF GRAVITY OR STABILIZER PROB AND DECIDED TO ABORT. AT ALMOST THE SAME TIME, THE CONFIGN KLAXON SOUNDED AND THE 'STABILIZER' WARNING ON EICAS ILLUMINATED. I ABORTED. THE FO ADVISED TWR AND ASKED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO REMAIN SEATED. WE TAXIED OFF THE RWY, DECLINING ASSISTANCE FROM THE TWR. ADVISED RAMP, DISPATCH AND MAINT CTLR OF THE ABORT. WE ADVISED RAMP THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A LOADING/CTR OF GRAVITY PROB, AND ASKED THEM TO CHK THEIR FIGURES. I REALIZE THE USE OF TRIM IS NOT SOP. THIS WAS A FIRST FOR ME, BUT IT WAS INSTINCTIVE. I HAVE FLOWN THE B757 FOR 6 YRS AS CAPT, AND 2 YRS AS FO, AND HAVE NEVER FELT AN AIRPLANE WANT TO ROTATE AT SUCH A LOW SPD, AND NEED AS MUCH FORWARD PRESSURE. IT TOOK ABOUT 20 KTS FOR ME TO GO FROM THE 'GO' MODE TO THE 'ABORT' MODE. LOAD PLANNING NUMBERS CHKED OUT, SO I ADVISED MAINT. WE AGREED THAT THE ACFT SHOULD BE TAKEN OTS. AS FAR AS CRM GOES, I DIDN'T HAVE TIME FOR ANYTHING EXCEPT TO SAY 'ABORT' AND THE FO DID A GREAT JOB OF BACKING ME UP. THE ABORT ITSELF WAS A NON-EVENT. THE TRAINING KICKED IN AND IT WENT SMOOTHLY -- JUST LIKE IN THE SIMULATOR. IT WAS MY FIRST REAL ABORT ON THE LINE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CAPT ADVISED THAT THE REJECTED TKOF OCCURRED AT 116 KIAS AND WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH AUTOBRAKES IN THE RTO MODE. THE ACFT WAS TAKEN OTS AND AN INSPECTION DONE MECHANICALLY AND ON THE LOAD PLANNING DOCUMENTATION FOR THE TKOF. ALL WAS FOUND TO BE NORMAL AND THE ACFT RETURNED TO SVC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 602050: DURING INITIAL TKOF ROLL CAPT MENTIONED VERY LIGHT CTL FORCES, NOSE VERY LIGHT. I TOOK THIS FOR THE EMPTY AIRPLANE UNTIL 'ABORT' COMMAND WHICH OCCURRED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE STABILIZER EICAS MESSAGE. WE CHKED THE TRIM SETTING HAVING SET AND CHKED IT SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE TKOF WITH THE REVISED WTS. IT APPEARED TO BE JUST TOUCHING THE FORWARD EDGE OF THE 'GREEN BAND' ON THE NOSE DOWN TRIM (FORWARD) SIDE. EVERYONE AGREED THAT WE WOULD NOT CONTINUE WITH THIS ACFT AND WE CHANGED PLANES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.