Narrative:

While on the visual approach to runway 24R at lax, the captain took a 90 degree intercept to the localizer. He had advised me initially that he did have runway 24R in sight, so I assumed he would initiate a dogleg to final as we came closer to the localizer. As we approached the localizer, I saw that he was not initiating a turn, so I asked him again if he did have runway 24R in sight, and not runway 25R. He then looked up from the instrument panel and I could clearly see that he was looking at the correct runway, and he acknowledged that he did have runway 24R in sight. He then focused his attention back onto the heads up display, but did not initiate a turn. At this point, approach control cleared us over to tower. I acknowledged the frequency switch, but did not contact tower immediately. Instead, I let the captain know that the localizer was alive (not a required call in VMC conditions). The captain then responded by calling for final flaps and frantically turning the aircraft to intercept the localizer. At this point, we had completely flown through the localizer and we were actually lined up to the left side of the extended centerline for runway 24L. The captain initiated about a 30 degree intercept to the right to try to recapture the localizer for runway 24R. At this point, I contacted the lax tower. At this point, the tower cleared us for the option to land either on runway 24L or runway 24R. I believe they gave us this option due to the fact that we were not even close to intercepting the runway 24R localizer. The captain chose to land on runway 24L. I believe that this situation could have been avoided had the captain not been so focused on practicing with the HUD (heads up display) and losing his situational awareness. After landing at the airport, I asked the captain what happened and his response was that he misjudged the tailwind component on the base leg.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 CREW OVERSHOT RWY 24R, AND ALMOST RWY 24L, AT LAX. THE CAPT WAS FIXATED ON THE HEADS UP DISPLAY 'HUD' WHILE FLYING 90 DEG INTERCEPT TO THE RWY.

Narrative: WHILE ON THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R AT LAX, THE CAPT TOOK A 90 DEG INTERCEPT TO THE LOC. HE HAD ADVISED ME INITIALLY THAT HE DID HAVE RWY 24R IN SIGHT, SO I ASSUMED HE WOULD INITIATE A DOGLEG TO FINAL AS WE CAME CLOSER TO THE LOC. AS WE APCHED THE LOC, I SAW THAT HE WAS NOT INITIATING A TURN, SO I ASKED HIM AGAIN IF HE DID HAVE RWY 24R IN SIGHT, AND NOT RWY 25R. HE THEN LOOKED UP FROM THE INST PANEL AND I COULD CLRLY SEE THAT HE WAS LOOKING AT THE CORRECT RWY, AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE DID HAVE RWY 24R IN SIGHT. HE THEN FOCUSED HIS ATTN BACK ONTO THE HEADS UP DISPLAY, BUT DID NOT INITIATE A TURN. AT THIS POINT, APCH CTL CLRED US OVER TO TWR. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE FREQ SWITCH, BUT DID NOT CONTACT TWR IMMEDIATELY. INSTEAD, I LET THE CAPT KNOW THAT THE LOC WAS ALIVE (NOT A REQUIRED CALL IN VMC CONDITIONS). THE CAPT THEN RESPONDED BY CALLING FOR FINAL FLAPS AND FRANTICALLY TURNING THE ACFT TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. AT THIS POINT, WE HAD COMPLETELY FLOWN THROUGH THE LOC AND WE WERE ACTUALLY LINED UP TO THE L SIDE OF THE EXTENDED CTRLINE FOR RWY 24L. THE CAPT INITIATED ABOUT A 30 DEG INTERCEPT TO THE R TO TRY TO RECAPTURE THE LOC FOR RWY 24R. AT THIS POINT, I CONTACTED THE LAX TWR. AT THIS POINT, THE TWR CLRED US FOR THE OPTION TO LAND EITHER ON RWY 24L OR RWY 24R. I BELIEVE THEY GAVE US THIS OPTION DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE WERE NOT EVEN CLOSE TO INTERCEPTING THE RWY 24R LOC. THE CAPT CHOSE TO LAND ON RWY 24L. I BELIEVE THAT THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD THE CAPT NOT BEEN SO FOCUSED ON PRACTICING WITH THE HUD (HEADS UP DISPLAY) AND LOSING HIS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. AFTER LNDG AT THE ARPT, I ASKED THE CAPT WHAT HAPPENED AND HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT HE MISJUDGED THE TAILWIND COMPONENT ON THE BASE LEG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.