Narrative:

Normal pushback from gate, performance data completed for runway 26. We called for taxi with ATIS and were given the option for runway 26 or runway 21. As runway 21 was a much shorter taxi and runway aligned closer to the desired departure heading, we requested runway 21. We were given taxi instructions, 'give way to regional jet on your right and taxi to runway 21 via taxiway C, taxiway east, hold short runway 26.' this clearance was read back verbatim by the first officer. Unfortunately, during both xmissions, I failed to hear the hold short portion of the clearance. In my mind, we were cleared to cross all runways to runway 21. After locating the rj, I made a right turn out to maneuver behind the slow moving aircraft and taxied per my perceived instructions: taxiway C, taxiway east, runway 21. Meanwhile, the first officer was heads down computing performance data for runway 21. As a note, I realize the fom prohibits computing opc data while approaching/crossing a runway, but due to the slow moving rj and the maneuvering required to position behind such aircraft, I felt we had sufficient time to complete the performance data and comply with the fom. The rj continued past intersection C and I proceeded to make a right turn on taxiway C and cross runway 26 without clearance. Prior to crossing runway 26, I looked left and noted company traffic approximately 3000-4000 ft away at taxi speed and commencing a right turn off runway 26. I thus continued to be confident in my perceived clearance to cross the runway. Approximately 1/2 way across runway 25, the first officer looked up and told me we were instructed to hold short runway 26. At this point, I increased power to expedite crossing and asked the first officer to confirm our taxi clearance. We were indeed instructed to hold short. Fortunately, no conflict with any aircraft occurred. My thoughts on how this situation occurred: most significant was the first officer being heads down and computing performance for the runway change. I am confident this event would not have occurred if we were both monitoring the taxi route. The other significant cause was my misunderstanding of the clearance. I believe the fact that I was busy trying to locate and avoid hitting the rj, together with trying to determine how to navigation my unexpected taxi route while the clearance was being given caused me to hear what I wanted to hear -- taxiway C, taxiway east, taxi to runway 21. Another error I committed was not repeating the taxi clearance to the first officer, which is my usual habit. Task overload (rj, new route) precipitated this lack of action on my part. Lessons learned: I will always read back taxi clearance as I understand it to the first officer. I will, if possible, delay my taxi until new performance is calculated given a runway change. If I had followed the above, I would not be writing this report. Supplemental information from acn 603228: abq ground control issued the following clearance: 'taxi to runway 21 via taxiway C and taxiway east, hold short runway 26, give way to the regional jet off your right.' I responded with a full clearance readback. I asked the captain (who was looking at his airport diagram) if he had the rj in sight and he said, 'I got him.' as we began the slow taxi, I stated to captain, 'I am heads down' and he acknowledged. After stowing the opc, I looked up and was startled to see we were taxiing out onto active runway 26. I called out, 'stop, stop, we were told to hold short of runway 26!' captain applied the brakes, then the throttles when he realized we would be stopped in the middle of the runway, as there was an aircraft several thousand ft down on runway 26. I asked him if he saw the aircraft on the runway and captain stated, 'yes, but the aircraft was at taxi speed and it is not unusual for ground control to issue crossing clrncs under those circumstances.' we worked very well together as a team, adhering to company procedures during our trip. It is very disappointing to me that when it seemed we were doing everything right, something so important went wrong. To prevent an occurrence of this nature from happening, again, I will insist on completing opc/FMC calculations only when the aircraft is stopped. It was a judgement call, one made incorrectly. The decision to move the aircraft while one person was heads down, removed the very important second set of eyes that existsas a safety net.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION, RWY 26, BY A B737 CREW WHEN PIC MISSES A PART OF THE CLRNC FOR A HOLD SHORT AT ABQ, NM.

Narrative: NORMAL PUSHBACK FROM GATE, PERFORMANCE DATA COMPLETED FOR RWY 26. WE CALLED FOR TAXI WITH ATIS AND WERE GIVEN THE OPTION FOR RWY 26 OR RWY 21. AS RWY 21 WAS A MUCH SHORTER TAXI AND RWY ALIGNED CLOSER TO THE DESIRED DEP HEADING, WE REQUESTED RWY 21. WE WERE GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, 'GIVE WAY TO REGIONAL JET ON YOUR R AND TAXI TO RWY 21 VIA TXWY C, TXWY E, HOLD SHORT RWY 26.' THIS CLRNC WAS READ BACK VERBATIM BY THE FO. UNFORTUNATELY, DURING BOTH XMISSIONS, I FAILED TO HEAR THE HOLD SHORT PORTION OF THE CLRNC. IN MY MIND, WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS ALL RWYS TO RWY 21. AFTER LOCATING THE RJ, I MADE A R TURN OUT TO MANEUVER BEHIND THE SLOW MOVING ACFT AND TAXIED PER MY PERCEIVED INSTRUCTIONS: TXWY C, TXWY E, RWY 21. MEANWHILE, THE FO WAS HEADS DOWN COMPUTING PERFORMANCE DATA FOR RWY 21. AS A NOTE, I REALIZE THE FOM PROHIBITS COMPUTING OPC DATA WHILE APCHING/XING A RWY, BUT DUE TO THE SLOW MOVING RJ AND THE MANEUVERING REQUIRED TO POS BEHIND SUCH ACFT, I FELT WE HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLETE THE PERFORMANCE DATA AND COMPLY WITH THE FOM. THE RJ CONTINUED PAST INTXN C AND I PROCEEDED TO MAKE A R TURN ON TXWY C AND CROSS RWY 26 WITHOUT CLRNC. PRIOR TO XING RWY 26, I LOOKED L AND NOTED COMPANY TFC APPROX 3000-4000 FT AWAY AT TAXI SPD AND COMMENCING A R TURN OFF RWY 26. I THUS CONTINUED TO BE CONFIDENT IN MY PERCEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS THE RWY. APPROX 1/2 WAY ACROSS RWY 25, THE FO LOOKED UP AND TOLD ME WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT RWY 26. AT THIS POINT, I INCREASED PWR TO EXPEDITE XING AND ASKED THE FO TO CONFIRM OUR TAXI CLRNC. WE WERE INDEED INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT. FORTUNATELY, NO CONFLICT WITH ANY ACFT OCCURRED. MY THOUGHTS ON HOW THIS SIT OCCURRED: MOST SIGNIFICANT WAS THE FO BEING HEADS DOWN AND COMPUTING PERFORMANCE FOR THE RWY CHANGE. I AM CONFIDENT THIS EVENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED IF WE WERE BOTH MONITORING THE TAXI RTE. THE OTHER SIGNIFICANT CAUSE WAS MY MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE CLRNC. I BELIEVE THE FACT THAT I WAS BUSY TRYING TO LOCATE AND AVOID HITTING THE RJ, TOGETHER WITH TRYING TO DETERMINE HOW TO NAV MY UNEXPECTED TAXI RTE WHILE THE CLRNC WAS BEING GIVEN CAUSED ME TO HEAR WHAT I WANTED TO HEAR -- TXWY C, TXWY E, TAXI TO RWY 21. ANOTHER ERROR I COMMITTED WAS NOT REPEATING THE TAXI CLRNC TO THE FO, WHICH IS MY USUAL HABIT. TASK OVERLOAD (RJ, NEW RTE) PRECIPITATED THIS LACK OF ACTION ON MY PART. LESSONS LEARNED: I WILL ALWAYS READ BACK TAXI CLRNC AS I UNDERSTAND IT TO THE FO. I WILL, IF POSSIBLE, DELAY MY TAXI UNTIL NEW PERFORMANCE IS CALCULATED GIVEN A RWY CHANGE. IF I HAD FOLLOWED THE ABOVE, I WOULD NOT BE WRITING THIS RPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 603228: ABQ GND CTL ISSUED THE FOLLOWING CLRNC: 'TAXI TO RWY 21 VIA TXWY C AND TXWY E, HOLD SHORT RWY 26, GIVE WAY TO THE REGIONAL JET OFF YOUR R.' I RESPONDED WITH A FULL CLRNC READBACK. I ASKED THE CAPT (WHO WAS LOOKING AT HIS ARPT DIAGRAM) IF HE HAD THE RJ IN SIGHT AND HE SAID, 'I GOT HIM.' AS WE BEGAN THE SLOW TAXI, I STATED TO CAPT, 'I AM HEADS DOWN' AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED. AFTER STOWING THE OPC, I LOOKED UP AND WAS STARTLED TO SEE WE WERE TAXIING OUT ONTO ACTIVE RWY 26. I CALLED OUT, 'STOP, STOP, WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 26!' CAPT APPLIED THE BRAKES, THEN THE THROTTLES WHEN HE REALIZED WE WOULD BE STOPPED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RWY, AS THERE WAS AN ACFT SEVERAL THOUSAND FT DOWN ON RWY 26. I ASKED HIM IF HE SAW THE ACFT ON THE RWY AND CAPT STATED, 'YES, BUT THE ACFT WAS AT TAXI SPD AND IT IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR GND CTL TO ISSUE XING CLRNCS UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.' WE WORKED VERY WELL TOGETHER AS A TEAM, ADHERING TO COMPANY PROCS DURING OUR TRIP. IT IS VERY DISAPPOINTING TO ME THAT WHEN IT SEEMED WE WERE DOING EVERYTHING RIGHT, SOMETHING SO IMPORTANT WENT WRONG. TO PREVENT AN OCCURRENCE OF THIS NATURE FROM HAPPENING, AGAIN, I WILL INSIST ON COMPLETING OPC/FMC CALCULATIONS ONLY WHEN THE ACFT IS STOPPED. IT WAS A JUDGEMENT CALL, ONE MADE INCORRECTLY. THE DECISION TO MOVE THE ACFT WHILE ONE PERSON WAS HEADS DOWN, REMOVED THE VERY IMPORTANT SECOND SET OF EYES THAT EXISTSAS A SAFETY NET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.