Narrative:

While descending through 16000 ft for arrival into mco, we were told by approach to expect runway 17R. The winds were 350 degrees at 9 KTS so we asked approach why runway 17 when the wind component was only 1 KT from maximum tailwind component. Approach stated that it was for noise abatement. Less than 2 mins later, approach control told us they were switching runways and asked if we wanted to be last for runway 17R or first for runway 35L. We answered 'first for runway 35L.' he then told us to fly heading 360 degrees, slow to 210 KTS and descend and maintain 9000 ft. We flew the assigned heading and altitude and started to configure. I called for landing gear down with the speed brake deployed and maintained that confign to slow to 210 KTS. The captain was working the radios and I was anxious for him to finish the call. I had stowed the speed brake and was anxiously waiting for him to finish the current radio exchange so I could call for flaps 5 degrees. I heard approach say 'visual runway 35L,' but do not recall hearing either 'expect' or 'cleared' preceding the call. The captain answered with 'cleared for the visual runway 35L.' approach control did not respond at all to the captain's call so I assumed we were cleared. I fully configured and started the descent and a turn to 260 degrees. Descending through 7300 ft, approach called and asked what our heading was. We responded, '270 degrees and turning right.' approach then said 'ok, turn left 020 degrees and climb to 9000 ft.' the captain answered with 'right 020 degrees, 9000 ft, thought we were cleared for the visual.' approach responded, 'no sir, still working a departure off runway 17.' he never changed his tone or got nasty and we did not either. We simply complied with his instructions as he vectored us around for a 360 degree turn and back for an uneventful visual approach to runway 35L. Aside from our exchange with approach, the radios were quiet and there were no other aircraft on TCASII. To prevent this, approach must respond to an incorrect readback! Also, as the PF, I should have asked the captain if he was sure about what he heard since I did not hear the entire approach clearance. I could have also asked the captain to ask approach to repeat the clearance. This was an unfortunate incident that might have been prevented with better communication between all 3 of us -- approach, the captain, and I.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 LNDG MCO INITIATES VISUAL APCH AND IS QUESTIONED BY ATC.

Narrative: WHILE DSNDING THROUGH 16000 FT FOR ARR INTO MCO, WE WERE TOLD BY APCH TO EXPECT RWY 17R. THE WINDS WERE 350 DEGS AT 9 KTS SO WE ASKED APCH WHY RWY 17 WHEN THE WIND COMPONENT WAS ONLY 1 KT FROM MAX TAILWIND COMPONENT. APCH STATED THAT IT WAS FOR NOISE ABATEMENT. LESS THAN 2 MINS LATER, APCH CTL TOLD US THEY WERE SWITCHING RWYS AND ASKED IF WE WANTED TO BE LAST FOR RWY 17R OR FIRST FOR RWY 35L. WE ANSWERED 'FIRST FOR RWY 35L.' HE THEN TOLD US TO FLY HDG 360 DEGS, SLOW TO 210 KTS AND DSND AND MAINTAIN 9000 FT. WE FLEW THE ASSIGNED HDG AND ALT AND STARTED TO CONFIGURE. I CALLED FOR LNDG GEAR DOWN WITH THE SPD BRAKE DEPLOYED AND MAINTAINED THAT CONFIGN TO SLOW TO 210 KTS. THE CAPT WAS WORKING THE RADIOS AND I WAS ANXIOUS FOR HIM TO FINISH THE CALL. I HAD STOWED THE SPD BRAKE AND WAS ANXIOUSLY WAITING FOR HIM TO FINISH THE CURRENT RADIO EXCHANGE SO I COULD CALL FOR FLAPS 5 DEGS. I HEARD APCH SAY 'VISUAL RWY 35L,' BUT DO NOT RECALL HEARING EITHER 'EXPECT' OR 'CLRED' PRECEDING THE CALL. THE CAPT ANSWERED WITH 'CLRED FOR THE VISUAL RWY 35L.' APCH CTL DID NOT RESPOND AT ALL TO THE CAPT'S CALL SO I ASSUMED WE WERE CLRED. I FULLY CONFIGURED AND STARTED THE DSCNT AND A TURN TO 260 DEGS. DSNDING THROUGH 7300 FT, APCH CALLED AND ASKED WHAT OUR HDG WAS. WE RESPONDED, '270 DEGS AND TURNING R.' APCH THEN SAID 'OK, TURN L 020 DEGS AND CLB TO 9000 FT.' THE CAPT ANSWERED WITH 'R 020 DEGS, 9000 FT, THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL.' APCH RESPONDED, 'NO SIR, STILL WORKING A DEP OFF RWY 17.' HE NEVER CHANGED HIS TONE OR GOT NASTY AND WE DID NOT EITHER. WE SIMPLY COMPLIED WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS AS HE VECTORED US AROUND FOR A 360 DEG TURN AND BACK FOR AN UNEVENTFUL VISUAL APCH TO RWY 35L. ASIDE FROM OUR EXCHANGE WITH APCH, THE RADIOS WERE QUIET AND THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT ON TCASII. TO PREVENT THIS, APCH MUST RESPOND TO AN INCORRECT READBACK! ALSO, AS THE PF, I SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WAS SURE ABOUT WHAT HE HEARD SINCE I DID NOT HEAR THE ENTIRE APCH CLRNC. I COULD HAVE ALSO ASKED THE CAPT TO ASK APCH TO REPEAT THE CLRNC. THIS WAS AN UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED WITH BETTER COM BTWN ALL 3 OF US -- APCH, THE CAPT, AND I.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.