Narrative:

During cruise, 'ECAM smoke -- lavatory and crg detection' fault with chime. No ECAM action items. Went to 'flight manual irregular.' discussed loss of fire detection in lavatories and more importantly, cargo pits. We then consulted additional information. Since that page only authority/authorized circuit breakers C-6 and T-18 to be cycled on the ground, we consulted maintenance controller (link). He advised that we could cycle those circuit breakers with captain's concurrence. Initially, we were hesitant because company page says, 'on the ground only.' believing that cargo fire detection was, in our judgement, a critical item as discussed in flight manual, we continued to seek additional assistance from dispatch. He supported our plan to cycle the circuit breakers. So after 30 mins of coordination, we cycled circuit breakers and system returned to normal. I offer 3 ideas to help in the future: 1) revisit company page X. Those circuit breakers are critical, and should be able to reset in-flight, without pilot/fsap reporting. 2)include circuit breaker procedures information at the bottom of irregular procedures in flight manual. This is the 'one stop shopping concept.' 3) finally, continue to advocate to the FAA that these are 'system fault resets' on the airbus. I don't think a reset raises the 'captain's emergency authority/authorized' to the intent of far 121.557(a). On this flight, the cargo compartments were without detection for 30 mins, while we 'cleared' a reset with everybody.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 CREW USED THE CAPT'S EMER AUTH TO PULL AND RESET CIRCUIT BREAKERS THAT THE MAINT CTLR ADVISED SHOULD BE PULLED AND RESET. COMPANY POLICY WAS TO HAVE THIS ACTION CONDUCTED ON THE GND.

Narrative: DURING CRUISE, 'ECAM SMOKE -- LAVATORY AND CRG DETECTION' FAULT WITH CHIME. NO ECAM ACTION ITEMS. WENT TO 'FLT MANUAL IRREGULAR.' DISCUSSED LOSS OF FIRE DETECTION IN LAVATORIES AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, CARGO PITS. WE THEN CONSULTED ADDITIONAL INFO. SINCE THAT PAGE ONLY AUTH CIRCUIT BREAKERS C-6 AND T-18 TO BE CYCLED ON THE GND, WE CONSULTED MAINT CTLR (LINK). HE ADVISED THAT WE COULD CYCLE THOSE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITH CAPT'S CONCURRENCE. INITIALLY, WE WERE HESITANT BECAUSE COMPANY PAGE SAYS, 'ON THE GND ONLY.' BELIEVING THAT CARGO FIRE DETECTION WAS, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, A CRITICAL ITEM AS DISCUSSED IN FLT MANUAL, WE CONTINUED TO SEEK ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM DISPATCH. HE SUPPORTED OUR PLAN TO CYCLE THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. SO AFTER 30 MINS OF COORD, WE CYCLED CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND SYS RETURNED TO NORMAL. I OFFER 3 IDEAS TO HELP IN THE FUTURE: 1) REVISIT COMPANY PAGE X. THOSE CIRCUIT BREAKERS ARE CRITICAL, AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO RESET INFLT, WITHOUT PLT/FSAP RPTING. 2)INCLUDE CIRCUIT BREAKER PROCS INFO AT THE BOTTOM OF IRREGULAR PROCS IN FLT MANUAL. THIS IS THE 'ONE STOP SHOPPING CONCEPT.' 3) FINALLY, CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE TO THE FAA THAT THESE ARE 'SYS FAULT RESETS' ON THE AIRBUS. I DON'T THINK A RESET RAISES THE 'CAPT'S EMER AUTH' TO THE INTENT OF FAR 121.557(A). ON THIS FLT, THE CARGO COMPARTMENTS WERE WITHOUT DETECTION FOR 30 MINS, WHILE WE 'CLRED' A RESET WITH EVERYBODY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.