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Attributes | |
ACN | 605346 |
Time | |
Date | 200401 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sfo.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi ground : holding |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : multi engine |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 156 flight time total : 9800 flight time type : 1733 |
ASRS Report | 605346 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 230 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 1500 |
ASRS Report | 606787 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : tkof warning horn other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : rejected takeoff |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Chart Or Publication Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
We aborted takeoff at low speed due to a takeoff warning horn. We cleared the runway and then noticed the flaps were still in the up position. Apparently, I had failed to drop the flaps and they were not checked by the captain as per the checklist, to be in position during the before takeoff checklist. There are 3 factors that contributed to this event: 1) as we began to move under our own power and as per company SOP, I was to drop the flaps into desired takeoff position, at which point the captain said 'wait a min, we don't have enough oil pressure' and she quickly closed the throttles. My reaction to this action by the captain was to take my hands off the flap lever leaving the flaps positioned up. After a brief discussion about unregulated oil pressure and the fact that it varies with N2, we resumed the taxi out. 2) as I read the before takeoff checklist, the glare from the sun made the flap indicator and leading edge flaps extinguish light difficult to see. 3) I believe fatigue may have contributed to my performance, due to the fact that I had flown 93 hours in the last 30 days. In order to prevent this situation from recurring, I believe if it were not SOP to wait until we taxi under our own power before dropping the flaps, this never would have happened. If positioning the flaps were part of the initial flow after the salute and release from guidance, again, this would not have occurred. Also, I recommend a change in the before takeoff checklist as follows: the challenges of 'flaps' should have a response by both captain and first officer. Supplemental information from acn 606787: we ran the before takeoff checklist but, for some reason, missed the flaps. The copilot and I discussed the incident. One reason may be that he is an 'ffdo' and was putting on his weapon after pushback and we got distraction. He either didn't read the item on the checklist or I missed it or both.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-300 FLT CREW ABORTS TKOF DUE TO TKOF WARNING HORN CAUSED BY FAILURE TO LOWER THE FLAPS.
Narrative: WE ABORTED TKOF AT LOW SPD DUE TO A TKOF WARNING HORN. WE CLRED THE RWY AND THEN NOTICED THE FLAPS WERE STILL IN THE UP POS. APPARENTLY, I HAD FAILED TO DROP THE FLAPS AND THEY WERE NOT CHKED BY THE CAPT AS PER THE CHKLIST, TO BE IN POS DURING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. THERE ARE 3 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT: 1) AS WE BEGAN TO MOVE UNDER OUR OWN PWR AND AS PER COMPANY SOP, I WAS TO DROP THE FLAPS INTO DESIRED TKOF POS, AT WHICH POINT THE CAPT SAID 'WAIT A MIN, WE DON'T HAVE ENOUGH OIL PRESSURE' AND SHE QUICKLY CLOSED THE THROTTLES. MY REACTION TO THIS ACTION BY THE CAPT WAS TO TAKE MY HANDS OFF THE FLAP LEVER LEAVING THE FLAPS POSITIONED UP. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT UNREGULATED OIL PRESSURE AND THE FACT THAT IT VARIES WITH N2, WE RESUMED THE TAXI OUT. 2) AS I READ THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, THE GLARE FROM THE SUN MADE THE FLAP INDICATOR AND LEADING EDGE FLAPS EXTINGUISH LIGHT DIFFICULT TO SEE. 3) I BELIEVE FATIGUE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO MY PERFORMANCE, DUE TO THE FACT THAT I HAD FLOWN 93 HRS IN THE LAST 30 DAYS. IN ORDER TO PREVENT THIS SIT FROM RECURRING, I BELIEVE IF IT WERE NOT SOP TO WAIT UNTIL WE TAXI UNDER OUR OWN PWR BEFORE DROPPING THE FLAPS, THIS NEVER WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. IF POSITIONING THE FLAPS WERE PART OF THE INITIAL FLOW AFTER THE SALUTE AND RELEASE FROM GUIDANCE, AGAIN, THIS WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. ALSO, I RECOMMEND A CHANGE IN THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AS FOLLOWS: THE CHALLENGES OF 'FLAPS' SHOULD HAVE A RESPONSE BY BOTH CAPT AND FO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 606787: WE RAN THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST BUT, FOR SOME REASON, MISSED THE FLAPS. THE COPLT AND I DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT. ONE REASON MAY BE THAT HE IS AN 'FFDO' AND WAS PUTTING ON HIS WEAPON AFTER PUSHBACK AND WE GOT DISTR. HE EITHER DIDN'T READ THE ITEM ON THE CHKLIST OR I MISSED IT OR BOTH.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.