Narrative:

After airborne closing of IFR flight plan from eyw to pie for diversion to clw, ATC (pie tower) kept my aircraft on frequency and under radar control at 2100 ft MSL (2050+ ft AGL) until within 2 NM of clw (glass G airspace) on a heading of 350 degrees. Winds favored runway 34 at clw and, upon receiving frequency change approval (for which I had to make 2 requests, the first denied), changed to advisory frequency (123.0), reported position and altitude, and asked for airport advisory and traffic. Actions of pilot immediately prior to and surrounding the incident: during this time, I turned east of the field for position to enter into either right downwind for runway 34 (expected and most likely) or left downwind for runway 16 (traffic advisory dependent) and began my descent. After no response on CTAF regarding favored runway, I chose to continue my right traffic approach to runway 34 (right traffic is the correct traffic pattern for clw runway 34 from current afm). In a complete power off downwind base and final, I configured the aircraft for landing (with the exception of gear down). The aircraft was subsequently landed approximately 1100 ft down runway 34, 2 ft left of centerline and in a controled descent. Impact of propeller and fuselage occurred nearly simultaneously. The fuselage settled gently onto the runway and directional control was easily maintained with rudder authority/authorized. The aircraft came to rest 3 ft left of centerline after traveling approximately 800 ft. I immediately made a radio call to another aircraft (which reported inbound for landing as I was on final) to inform them that clearwater airpark was closed, repeating that runway 16/34 was closed. I then performed a standard emergency shutdown (from lear training) -- all electrical off and fuel off, cabin secured, no fire, exit aircraft. After alerting ground personnel that there were no injuries, I located a handheld VHF radio to ascertain that the aircraft ELT had not gone off (it had not). There were no injuries, the aircraft damage was minor (including propeller and sudden engine stoppage) and not sufficient to be categorized as 'accident.' causation: 1) failure to gain enough time to adequately perform a before landing checklist resulting in B) failure to select gear down and C) to verify gear down. Corrective actions: while not directly placing the blame on pie tower, the delayed handoff placed me in a position which made it improbable that I would have enough time to run a thorough before landing checklist and from which I needed to take corrective action (completely departing and re-entering the clw traffic area at lower altitude and airspeed). Further, if other traffic had been in the pattern, the late frequency change would have made it impossible for a pilot who was not monitoring CTAF on a second radio (as I was) to have been adequately informed of airport traffic prior to entering airspace. As a somewhat related issue from my gear up landing: I believe it is important for controllers to understand that time and space are needed to transition into a class G airfield. The proximity of clw to pie does not allow for a standard 5 SM minimum transition from the south after clearing pie airspace.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GEAR UP LNDG PERFORMED BY THE PLT OF A BE35 WHEN MAKING A TIGHT APCH TO RWY 34 AT CLW, FL.

Narrative: AFTER AIRBORNE CLOSING OF IFR FLT PLAN FROM EYW TO PIE FOR DIVERSION TO CLW, ATC (PIE TWR) KEPT MY ACFT ON FREQ AND UNDER RADAR CTL AT 2100 FT MSL (2050+ FT AGL) UNTIL WITHIN 2 NM OF CLW (GLASS G AIRSPACE) ON A HDG OF 350 DEGS. WINDS FAVORED RWY 34 AT CLW AND, UPON RECEIVING FREQ CHANGE APPROVAL (FOR WHICH I HAD TO MAKE 2 REQUESTS, THE FIRST DENIED), CHANGED TO ADVISORY FREQ (123.0), RPTED POS AND ALT, AND ASKED FOR ARPT ADVISORY AND TFC. ACTIONS OF PLT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO AND SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT: DURING THIS TIME, I TURNED E OF THE FIELD FOR POS TO ENTER INTO EITHER R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 34 (EXPECTED AND MOST LIKELY) OR L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 16 (TFC ADVISORY DEPENDENT) AND BEGAN MY DSCNT. AFTER NO RESPONSE ON CTAF REGARDING FAVORED RWY, I CHOSE TO CONTINUE MY R TFC APCH TO RWY 34 (R TFC IS THE CORRECT TFC PATTERN FOR CLW RWY 34 FROM CURRENT AFM). IN A COMPLETE PWR OFF DOWNWIND BASE AND FINAL, I CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR LNDG (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GEAR DOWN). THE ACFT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY LANDED APPROX 1100 FT DOWN RWY 34, 2 FT L OF CTRLINE AND IN A CTLED DSCNT. IMPACT OF PROP AND FUSELAGE OCCURRED NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE FUSELAGE SETTLED GENTLY ONTO THE RWY AND DIRECTIONAL CTL WAS EASILY MAINTAINED WITH RUDDER AUTH. THE ACFT CAME TO REST 3 FT L OF CTRLINE AFTER TRAVELING APPROX 800 FT. I IMMEDIATELY MADE A RADIO CALL TO ANOTHER ACFT (WHICH RPTED INBOUND FOR LNDG AS I WAS ON FINAL) TO INFORM THEM THAT CLEARWATER AIRPARK WAS CLOSED, REPEATING THAT RWY 16/34 WAS CLOSED. I THEN PERFORMED A STANDARD EMER SHUTDOWN (FROM LEAR TRAINING) -- ALL ELECTRICAL OFF AND FUEL OFF, CABIN SECURED, NO FIRE, EXIT ACFT. AFTER ALERTING GND PERSONNEL THAT THERE WERE NO INJURIES, I LOCATED A HANDHELD VHF RADIO TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE ACFT ELT HAD NOT GONE OFF (IT HAD NOT). THERE WERE NO INJURIES, THE ACFT DAMAGE WAS MINOR (INCLUDING PROP AND SUDDEN ENG STOPPAGE) AND NOT SUFFICIENT TO BE CATEGORIZED AS 'ACCIDENT.' CAUSATION: 1) FAILURE TO GAIN ENOUGH TIME TO ADEQUATELY PERFORM A BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST RESULTING IN B) FAILURE TO SELECT GEAR DOWN AND C) TO VERIFY GEAR DOWN. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: WHILE NOT DIRECTLY PLACING THE BLAME ON PIE TWR, THE DELAYED HDOF PLACED ME IN A POS WHICH MADE IT IMPROBABLE THAT I WOULD HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO RUN A THOROUGH BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST AND FROM WHICH I NEEDED TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION (COMPLETELY DEPARTING AND RE-ENTERING THE CLW TFC AREA AT LOWER ALT AND AIRSPD). FURTHER, IF OTHER TFC HAD BEEN IN THE PATTERN, THE LATE FREQ CHANGE WOULD HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR A PLT WHO WAS NOT MONITORING CTAF ON A SECOND RADIO (AS I WAS) TO HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY INFORMED OF ARPT TFC PRIOR TO ENTERING AIRSPACE. AS A SOMEWHAT RELATED ISSUE FROM MY GEAR UP LNDG: I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR CTLRS TO UNDERSTAND THAT TIME AND SPACE ARE NEEDED TO TRANSITION INTO A CLASS G AIRFIELD. THE PROX OF CLW TO PIE DOES NOT ALLOW FOR A STANDARD 5 SM MINIMUM TRANSITION FROM THE S AFTER CLRING PIE AIRSPACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.