Narrative:

At cruise, approximately 45 mins into flight, we got ECAM green hydraulic low quantity followed by green hydraulic system low pressure. Assigned IOE first officer to fly. I did ECAM actions, then pulled out flight handbook and reviewed reference action items. Used radio to phone patch dispatch and discussed checklist and what impact complete loss of green system did to us. Crew, dispatch and maintenance agreed continuing to ord was a safe course of action. I did request that dispatch coordinate with ATC representative to get runway 9R and at least 10 NM final to allow time to lower flaps and gear and using longest runway due winds and no nosewheel steering. Also asked equipment stand by as reference items in checklist led us to believe manual gear extension was not 100% assured and we felt that alternate gear crank had not been used very much. I then called purser up to cockpit. Told her this was a cabin advisory. Told her nature of problem, time remaining, what our plans were and that I would make a PA as we descended into ord. We had assistance from ord first officer. We reviewed gravity gear extend checklist and partial gear extend checklist and tow-in procedures in flight handbook. Briefed approach including fact that if gear did not extend, we would go around with gear down (no way to retract with 0 green hydraulic) and that we would then re-evaluate before attempting to land. Also briefed what we would do if no direction control was available, I would use differential braking to taxi clear of runway. ATC in ord was very helpful, plan worked great. We had normal touchdown, stopped using only brakes, cleared runway 9R and got towed back to gate. Ord station customer service representative met us at gate. Everyone gave excellent support, that included passenger, first officer, ATC, dd southwest and first officer, and ord fire rescue. IOE was being conducted, but we suspended IOE activities during irregular procedure approach and landing. We did not declare an emergency during this event. Supplemental information from acn 611652: my biggest concern after the incident was that we did not declare an emergency. We did ask to have the trucks standing by. The possibility of gear collapse was not specifically outlined in the flight manual. We only inferred it from some of the notes when we read ahead to the partial gear irregular checklist. By not declaring an emergency, but then asking for the equipment to be standing by, seemed to cause some confusion for ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMER NOT DECLARED, BUT EMER GND EQUIP REQUESTED FOR LNDG WHEN AN A320 FLT CREW NOTES AND COORDINATES WITH COMPANY FOR POSSIBLE GEAR PROBS AFTER A LOSS OF THEIR 'GREEN' HYD SYS PRIOR TO LNDG AT ORD, IL.

Narrative: AT CRUISE, APPROX 45 MINS INTO FLT, WE GOT ECAM GREEN HYD LOW QUANTITY FOLLOWED BY GREEN HYD SYS LOW PRESSURE. ASSIGNED IOE FO TO FLY. I DID ECAM ACTIONS, THEN PULLED OUT FLT HANDBOOK AND REVIEWED REF ACTION ITEMS. USED RADIO TO PHONE PATCH DISPATCH AND DISCUSSED CHKLIST AND WHAT IMPACT COMPLETE LOSS OF GREEN SYS DID TO US. CREW, DISPATCH AND MAINT AGREED CONTINUING TO ORD WAS A SAFE COURSE OF ACTION. I DID REQUEST THAT DISPATCH COORDINATE WITH ATC REPRESENTATIVE TO GET RWY 9R AND AT LEAST 10 NM FINAL TO ALLOW TIME TO LOWER FLAPS AND GEAR AND USING LONGEST RWY DUE WINDS AND NO NOSEWHEEL STEERING. ALSO ASKED EQUIP STAND BY AS REF ITEMS IN CHKLIST LED US TO BELIEVE MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION WAS NOT 100% ASSURED AND WE FELT THAT ALTERNATE GEAR CRANK HAD NOT BEEN USED VERY MUCH. I THEN CALLED PURSER UP TO COCKPIT. TOLD HER THIS WAS A CABIN ADVISORY. TOLD HER NATURE OF PROB, TIME REMAINING, WHAT OUR PLANS WERE AND THAT I WOULD MAKE A PA AS WE DSNDED INTO ORD. WE HAD ASSISTANCE FROM ORD FO. WE REVIEWED GRAVITY GEAR EXTEND CHKLIST AND PARTIAL GEAR EXTEND CHKLIST AND TOW-IN PROCS IN FLT HANDBOOK. BRIEFED APCH INCLUDING FACT THAT IF GEAR DID NOT EXTEND, WE WOULD GO AROUND WITH GEAR DOWN (NO WAY TO RETRACT WITH 0 GREEN HYD) AND THAT WE WOULD THEN RE-EVALUATE BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO LAND. ALSO BRIEFED WHAT WE WOULD DO IF NO DIRECTION CTL WAS AVAILABLE, I WOULD USE DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING TO TAXI CLR OF RWY. ATC IN ORD WAS VERY HELPFUL, PLAN WORKED GREAT. WE HAD NORMAL TOUCHDOWN, STOPPED USING ONLY BRAKES, CLRED RWY 9R AND GOT TOWED BACK TO GATE. ORD STATION CUSTOMER SVC REPRESENTATIVE MET US AT GATE. EVERYONE GAVE EXCELLENT SUPPORT, THAT INCLUDED PAX, FO, ATC, DD SW AND FO, AND ORD FIRE RESCUE. IOE WAS BEING CONDUCTED, BUT WE SUSPENDED IOE ACTIVITIES DURING IRREGULAR PROC APCH AND LNDG. WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER DURING THIS EVENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 611652: MY BIGGEST CONCERN AFTER THE INCIDENT WAS THAT WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. WE DID ASK TO HAVE THE TRUCKS STANDING BY. THE POSSIBILITY OF GEAR COLLAPSE WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY OUTLINED IN THE FLT MANUAL. WE ONLY INFERRED IT FROM SOME OF THE NOTES WHEN WE READ AHEAD TO THE PARTIAL GEAR IRREGULAR CHKLIST. BY NOT DECLARING AN EMER, BUT THEN ASKING FOR THE EQUIP TO BE STANDING BY, SEEMED TO CAUSE SOME CONFUSION FOR ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.