Narrative:

During pushback, I noticed that a ramper was signaling the pushback crew that he had bags for the aircraft. The pushback person relayed to me that he would be putting on a couple of bags. As we began the pushback, I noticed that the ramp person was staying near the left side of the aircraft, indicating to me that he intended to put the bags in the aft pit/ left side of the aircraft. About 1/2 way through the pushback, I noticed that the ramp person received instructions from another ramp person to put the bags on the other side of the aircraft (right) and so he moved his tug to the right side of the airplane via the nose. I asked the pushback crew if he was going to use the right side pits and they replied 'yes.' at this time I asked and was granted permission to start the left engine. I instructed the first officer to start the left engine only and informed him that they would be loading bags on the right side of the aircraft. I observed the first officer turn the left start lever and watched the engine spin up and, at this point, my attention was diverted to the exterior of the aircraft where we were changing directions (stopping then being pulled forward) and I was scanning the outside for other traffic on pushback, and figuring delays for taxi, etc. I then got instructions to 'set brakes.' some time after this time, I happened to sense that the right engine was spooling up and we had not received clearance for start, nor had I instructed the first officer to start the right engine. I checked the overhead panel and noticed that the cargo light was on, indicating one of the pits was still open with the engine spooling up past 45%. I then notified the first officer that we did not have clearance to start as I reached to the right fuel control cutoff. At this time, the pushback crew advised 'tow bar and bypass pin removed.' I noticed the cargo door light go out and then I released the push crew and awaited salute and release from guidance. I then taxied out. The engine was definitely running and posed a hazard for anyone near the pits on the right side of the aircraft. There were essentially 3 problems that contributed to this incident. 1) the first officer starting the right engine before a command had been given. 2) the ground crew failing to notice, in a timely fashion, and tell me to abort the start due to cargo loading. They never mentioned it to me! 3) I did not abort the start immediately upon noticing what was happening rather than assessing. Upon debrief, the first officer stated that he had indeed not heard the command to start the right engine, but did it out of force of habit. He has less than 4 months on the airplane and I would say that he had not been exposed to the number of variable starts that a 'vet' might, so his habit pattern was more towards starting both engines in sequence than starting one at a time. It was also one of the few times he had been on the B767-300 so the airplane was new. No one was injured --thankfully. This could have been bad. Supplemental information from acn 6123608: I was listening to ramp, which there was a lot of communication on. I heard some conversation that it was not going to be loaded on this side. We pushed back into the alley and I thought I heard the captain 'cleared to start.' I proceeded to start the engines normally.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 FO STARTS THE R ENG WITHOUT THE CAPT'S PERMISSION WHILE RAMP PERSONNEL ARE LOADING BAGS ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT.

Narrative: DURING PUSHBACK, I NOTICED THAT A RAMPER WAS SIGNALING THE PUSHBACK CREW THAT HE HAD BAGS FOR THE ACFT. THE PUSHBACK PERSON RELAYED TO ME THAT HE WOULD BE PUTTING ON A COUPLE OF BAGS. AS WE BEGAN THE PUSHBACK, I NOTICED THAT THE RAMP PERSON WAS STAYING NEAR THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT, INDICATING TO ME THAT HE INTENDED TO PUT THE BAGS IN THE AFT PIT/ L SIDE OF THE ACFT. ABOUT 1/2 WAY THROUGH THE PUSHBACK, I NOTICED THAT THE RAMP PERSON RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM ANOTHER RAMP PERSON TO PUT THE BAGS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ACFT (R) AND SO HE MOVED HIS TUG TO THE R SIDE OF THE AIRPLANE VIA THE NOSE. I ASKED THE PUSHBACK CREW IF HE WAS GOING TO USE THE R SIDE PITS AND THEY REPLIED 'YES.' AT THIS TIME I ASKED AND WAS GRANTED PERMISSION TO START THE L ENG. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO START THE L ENG ONLY AND INFORMED HIM THAT THEY WOULD BE LOADING BAGS ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT. I OBSERVED THE FO TURN THE L START LEVER AND WATCHED THE ENG SPIN UP AND, AT THIS POINT, MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED TO THE EXTERIOR OF THE ACFT WHERE WE WERE CHANGING DIRECTIONS (STOPPING THEN BEING PULLED FORWARD) AND I WAS SCANNING THE OUTSIDE FOR OTHER TFC ON PUSHBACK, AND FIGURING DELAYS FOR TAXI, ETC. I THEN GOT INSTRUCTIONS TO 'SET BRAKES.' SOME TIME AFTER THIS TIME, I HAPPENED TO SENSE THAT THE R ENG WAS SPOOLING UP AND WE HAD NOT RECEIVED CLRNC FOR START, NOR HAD I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO START THE R ENG. I CHKED THE OVERHEAD PANEL AND NOTICED THAT THE CARGO LIGHT WAS ON, INDICATING ONE OF THE PITS WAS STILL OPEN WITH THE ENG SPOOLING UP PAST 45%. I THEN NOTIFIED THE FO THAT WE DID NOT HAVE CLRNC TO START AS I REACHED TO THE R FUEL CTL CUTOFF. AT THIS TIME, THE PUSHBACK CREW ADVISED 'TOW BAR AND BYPASS PIN REMOVED.' I NOTICED THE CARGO DOOR LIGHT GO OUT AND THEN I RELEASED THE PUSH CREW AND AWAITED SALUTE AND RELEASE FROM GUIDANCE. I THEN TAXIED OUT. THE ENG WAS DEFINITELY RUNNING AND POSED A HAZARD FOR ANYONE NEAR THE PITS ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT. THERE WERE ESSENTIALLY 3 PROBS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. 1) THE FO STARTING THE R ENG BEFORE A COMMAND HAD BEEN GIVEN. 2) THE GND CREW FAILING TO NOTICE, IN A TIMELY FASHION, AND TELL ME TO ABORT THE START DUE TO CARGO LOADING. THEY NEVER MENTIONED IT TO ME! 3) I DID NOT ABORT THE START IMMEDIATELY UPON NOTICING WHAT WAS HAPPENING RATHER THAN ASSESSING. UPON DEBRIEF, THE FO STATED THAT HE HAD INDEED NOT HEARD THE COMMAND TO START THE R ENG, BUT DID IT OUT OF FORCE OF HABIT. HE HAS LESS THAN 4 MONTHS ON THE AIRPLANE AND I WOULD SAY THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN EXPOSED TO THE NUMBER OF VARIABLE STARTS THAT A 'VET' MIGHT, SO HIS HABIT PATTERN WAS MORE TOWARDS STARTING BOTH ENGS IN SEQUENCE THAN STARTING ONE AT A TIME. IT WAS ALSO ONE OF THE FEW TIMES HE HAD BEEN ON THE B767-300 SO THE AIRPLANE WAS NEW. NO ONE WAS INJURED --THANKFULLY. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN BAD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 6123608: I WAS LISTENING TO RAMP, WHICH THERE WAS A LOT OF COM ON. I HEARD SOME CONVERSATION THAT IT WAS NOT GOING TO BE LOADED ON THIS SIDE. WE PUSHED BACK INTO THE ALLEY AND I THOUGHT I HEARD THE CAPT 'CLRED TO START.' I PROCEEDED TO START THE ENGS NORMALLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.