Narrative:

Breakdown in communication, both in the cockpit and with abq tower, resulting in possible incursion on runway 21 at taxiway east. As we approached runway 21 on taxiway east, tower cleared us on the runway. When I heard tower give the current winds to another aircraft, I became concerned that the winds might exceed the runway 21 tailwind limit. I asked tower to repeat the winds and told them we needed to recalculate our takeoff data and that we might not be able to depart on runway 21. Upon hearing this, the first officer immediately picked up the opc and began calculating the performance data with the updated winds. Tower acknowledged my call and told us to hold short of runway 21. Shortly after that, I inadvertently crossed the runway 21 hold short line, which I had mistaken for an instrument hold line. When we realized that we were on runway 21, I immediately requested clearance on the runway, which tower granted. We checked the opc and determined that we could meet runway 21 performance requirements for the current conditions. We then ensured that all checklists were completed and made an uneventful takeoff and departure. As far as I can tell, we did not create a hazardous situation or cause a loss of aircraft separation. Other facts and circumstances: this was the final day of a 4 day trip and our first day operating with the new fom procedures. I believe that we were both preoccupied and distraction with trying to 'unlearn' the procedures we had used over the preceding 3 days and, at the same time, try to correctly apply a new set of procedures and checklists. This preoccupation contributed to my inattentiveness in mistaking a runway hold short line for an instrument hold line. Also, without realizing it, we incorrectly reverted back to the old procedures. I allowed the first officer to take himself out of the loop by not correcting him when he reached for the opc as we taxied toward an active runway. We could have avoided this entire situation had we followed the new procedures! I should have kept the first officer 'in the loop' by allowing him (instead of me) to talk to tower. Also, I should have told the first officer not to begin calculating new performance data until we were completely stopped (with parking brake set) short of the runway 21 hold short line, or as directed by tower. I am amazed at how quickly we both reverted back to the old procedures during a busy time in the cockpit. Several lessons were learned from this occurrence.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 DEP FROM ABQ CROSSED HOLD LINE WHILE CALCULATING DEP DATA.

Narrative: BREAKDOWN IN COM, BOTH IN THE COCKPIT AND WITH ABQ TWR, RESULTING IN POSSIBLE INCURSION ON RWY 21 AT TXWY E. AS WE APCHED RWY 21 ON TXWY E, TWR CLRED US ON THE RWY. WHEN I HEARD TWR GIVE THE CURRENT WINDS TO ANOTHER ACFT, I BECAME CONCERNED THAT THE WINDS MIGHT EXCEED THE RWY 21 TAILWIND LIMIT. I ASKED TWR TO REPEAT THE WINDS AND TOLD THEM WE NEEDED TO RECALCULATE OUR TKOF DATA AND THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO DEPART ON RWY 21. UPON HEARING THIS, THE FO IMMEDIATELY PICKED UP THE OPC AND BEGAN CALCULATING THE PERFORMANCE DATA WITH THE UPDATED WINDS. TWR ACKNOWLEDGED MY CALL AND TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 21. SHORTLY AFTER THAT, I INADVERTENTLY CROSSED THE RWY 21 HOLD SHORT LINE, WHICH I HAD MISTAKEN FOR AN INST HOLD LINE. WHEN WE REALIZED THAT WE WERE ON RWY 21, I IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED CLRNC ON THE RWY, WHICH TWR GRANTED. WE CHKED THE OPC AND DETERMINED THAT WE COULD MEET RWY 21 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CURRENT CONDITIONS. WE THEN ENSURED THAT ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL TKOF AND DEP. AS FAR AS I CAN TELL, WE DID NOT CREATE A HAZARDOUS SIT OR CAUSE A LOSS OF ACFT SEPARATION. OTHER FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES: THIS WAS THE FINAL DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP AND OUR FIRST DAY OPERATING WITH THE NEW FOM PROCS. I BELIEVE THAT WE WERE BOTH PREOCCUPIED AND DISTR WITH TRYING TO 'UNLEARN' THE PROCS WE HAD USED OVER THE PRECEDING 3 DAYS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TRY TO CORRECTLY APPLY A NEW SET OF PROCS AND CHKLISTS. THIS PREOCCUPATION CONTRIBUTED TO MY INATTENTIVENESS IN MISTAKING A RWY HOLD SHORT LINE FOR AN INST HOLD LINE. ALSO, WITHOUT REALIZING IT, WE INCORRECTLY REVERTED BACK TO THE OLD PROCS. I ALLOWED THE FO TO TAKE HIMSELF OUT OF THE LOOP BY NOT CORRECTING HIM WHEN HE REACHED FOR THE OPC AS WE TAXIED TOWARD AN ACTIVE RWY. WE COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS ENTIRE SIT HAD WE FOLLOWED THE NEW PROCS! I SHOULD HAVE KEPT THE FO 'IN THE LOOP' BY ALLOWING HIM (INSTEAD OF ME) TO TALK TO TWR. ALSO, I SHOULD HAVE TOLD THE FO NOT TO BEGIN CALCULATING NEW PERFORMANCE DATA UNTIL WE WERE COMPLETELY STOPPED (WITH PARKING BRAKE SET) SHORT OF THE RWY 21 HOLD SHORT LINE, OR AS DIRECTED BY TWR. I AM AMAZED AT HOW QUICKLY WE BOTH REVERTED BACK TO THE OLD PROCS DURING A BUSY TIME IN THE COCKPIT. SEVERAL LESSONS WERE LEARNED FROM THIS OCCURRENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.