Narrative:

Just prior to intercepting the glideslope; I noted a rudder ratio advisory message. My first impression was to continue the approach and landing normally. We did not have much extra fuel and it was not a master caution/warning. However; as we intercepted the glideslope and began our descent to the runway; I noted the ailerons were showing 3 degrees of trim; which seemed excessive for the amount of wind we were showing at our altitude. I disconnected the autopilot and found the rudder less effective than usual. I also recalled there was some crosswind limit with rudder ratio; but could not recall the amount and with winds at the airport; believed it to be prudent to go around; run the checklist; and ensure we were operating the aircraft safely within limitations. I stated rudder ratio EICAS; let's go around and work this problem. We executed the go around; advised ATC; and followed their missed approach instructions. After the autopilot was engaged; the pilot monitoring (pm) did the rudder ratio QRH; which states crosswind limit is 15 knots since the left hydraulic system pressure was normal on our aircraft. He got a wind update from ATC and looked for a crosswind component chart to confirm precisely how much crosswind there was. I believed it to be 10-12 knots worth; but really wanted to confirm that with the chart. He could not find the chart even though we both came up with several search options. ATC was no help; they only wanted to know what max winds we could land with and did not seem to understand a crosswind limit. The first officer (first officer) believed the crosswind component to be 12-14. If we were going to land in ZZZ; I needed to make the decision quickly. The amount of fuel remaining was soon going to be such that our options would be severely limited and I didn't want to get in that situation with a 15 knot crosswind landing limit with winds in the region. We both agreed we could safely land in ZZZ and set up again for the ILS with flaps 25. As we intercepted the glideslope; we encountered an increasing airspeed windshear; despite the thrust levers being at idle. I was unable to note the final speed of the aircraft; but did see that it went past 180. We passed through the shear layer and I was able to stabilize the aircraft to continue the approach. The remainder of the approach; landing and rollout were normal. Having the crosswind component chart integrated to reference as a part of the checklist with the crosswind limitation would have been extremely helpful. Both of us remembered seeing a crosswind component chart somewhere; but a search with these keywords returns many documents; and is not the correct title of the chart; so we would not have quickly found the proper page. This is unsatisfactory when dealing with a situation and attempting to get all necessary information. It also would have been helpful to have had contingency fuel added to our flight plan due to the winds and the potential for windshear in the vicinity. I had been as fuel conscious as possible knowing the forecast conditions at our destination. I had delayed starting the APU; so we had most of our APU burn fuel/pre-fuel remaining after engine start. We also climbed 2;000 feet higher than flight planned because it gave us .4 more fuel and added no extra time to our flight. I usually only fly the flight plan; however I felt it necessary to give us a bit more of a pad. It turned out it was good thing I had chosen to do these things because this gave us the fuel necessary to work the system failure and not immediately divert.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 767 Captain reported a flight control problem while on approach that required calculating a crosswind component for landing. The flight deck crew was unable to find the crosswind chart and suggested one be readily available.

Narrative: Just prior to intercepting the glideslope; I noted a RUDDER RATIO advisory message. My first impression was to continue the approach and landing normally. We did not have much extra fuel and it was not a master caution/warning. However; as we intercepted the glideslope and began our descent to the runway; I noted the ailerons were showing 3 degrees of trim; which seemed excessive for the amount of wind we were showing at our altitude. I disconnected the autopilot and found the rudder less effective than usual. I also recalled there was some crosswind limit with rudder ratio; but could not recall the amount and with winds at the airport; believed it to be prudent to go around; run the checklist; and ensure we were operating the aircraft safely within limitations. I stated RUDDER RATIO EICAS; let's go around and work this problem. We executed the go around; advised ATC; and followed their missed approach instructions. After the autopilot was engaged; the Pilot Monitoring (PM) did the RUDDER RATIO QRH; which states crosswind limit is 15 knots since the left hydraulic system pressure was normal on our aircraft. He got a wind update from ATC and looked for a crosswind component chart to confirm precisely how much crosswind there was. I believed it to be 10-12 knots worth; but really wanted to confirm that with the chart. He could not find the chart even though we both came up with several search options. ATC was no help; they only wanted to know what max winds we could land with and did not seem to understand a crosswind limit. The First Officer (FO) believed the crosswind component to be 12-14. If we were going to land in ZZZ; I needed to make the decision quickly. The amount of fuel remaining was soon going to be such that our options would be severely limited and I didn't want to get in that situation with a 15 knot crosswind landing limit with winds in the region. We both agreed we could safely land in ZZZ and set up again for the ILS with flaps 25. As we intercepted the glideslope; we encountered an increasing airspeed windshear; despite the thrust levers being at idle. I was unable to note the final speed of the aircraft; but did see that it went past 180. We passed through the shear layer and I was able to stabilize the aircraft to continue the approach. The remainder of the approach; landing and rollout were normal. Having the crosswind component chart integrated to reference as a part of the checklist with the crosswind limitation would have been extremely helpful. Both of us remembered seeing a crosswind component chart somewhere; but a search with these keywords returns many documents; and is not the correct title of the chart; so we would not have quickly found the proper page. This is unsatisfactory when dealing with a situation and attempting to get all necessary information. It also would have been helpful to have had contingency fuel added to our flight plan due to the winds and the potential for windshear in the vicinity. I had been as fuel conscious as possible knowing the forecast conditions at our destination. I had delayed starting the APU; so we had most of our APU burn fuel/pre-fuel remaining after engine start. We also climbed 2;000 feet higher than flight planned because it gave us .4 more fuel and added no extra time to our flight. I usually only fly the flight plan; however I felt it necessary to give us a bit more of a pad. It turned out it was good thing I had chosen to do these things because this gave us the fuel necessary to work the system failure and not immediately divert.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.