Narrative:

Aircraft arrived over 5 hours late due to previous maintenance issues at previous stops. Of the 8 mels this aircraft was currently carrying; 2 were significant: splr #2 sv spoiler surface 2 or 4 and IR2 inoperative. Both of these mels impacted aircraft performance. When the aircraft arrived in ZZZ; the previous captain had written up the alternate brake accumulator for depleting after 2 brake applications (fom indicates there should be at least 7 applications to a fully charged accumulator).ZZZ maintenance arrived at the aircraft and began to troubleshoot the accumulator and was servicing the accumulator at the yellow hydraulic service point. After servicing the accumulator and checking the pressure at the service point; the maintenance specialist came up to the cockpit to indicated that the accumulator was in the normal range and suggested we activate the brakes (via accumulator pressure) to ops check it. Again; the accumulator depleted after 2 applications of the parking brake. I again indicated that our manuals indicate we should have at least 7 applications and this time he indicated that the [maintenance controller] said it only needed to be 2 applications and clearly we were getting that. He left the cockpit to discuss with [maintenance controller] and decided to re-check the accumulator at the service point and came back to indicate it was in normal limits. I reiterated that the only indications I could count on in the cockpit was the triple indicator and the system's display and had no way on knowing what the accumulator was indicating at the service point in flight. While he accepted this; he was clearly following the guidance he was getting from [maintenance controller] and thus; after discussing the issue with [maintenance controller]; he came back to the cockpit and began to sign it off in the log book. I asked him if the system was fixed and he said he had followed the guidance and [maintenance controller] concurred; directing him to sign it off. I re-checked the alternate brakes and the accumulator depleted again after 2 applications. This frustrated me immensely and I told him I believed he was signing off an unsafe aircraft. He called the [maintenance controller] to discuss and I asked to speak with the [maintenance controller] controller to indicate my concerns. He listened and then dismissed my concerns saying it was not my job to evaluate the maintenance procedures and that they had complied with the procedure and the aircraft was safe to fly. I took great exception to this dismissal and indicated that it was not safe to fly and I would not accept this unsafe condition. I was frustrated with the [maintenance controller] and he said enough and handed me off to the supervisor. I told him the same information and that I was required to have at least 7 applications before the accumulator depleted and that this solution was not acceptable. [Maintenance controller] continued to troubleshoot to no avail and was adamant that 2 applications were the correct answer. Finally; the maintenance specialist asked to take a picture of our fom reference so that he could send it to [maintenance controller]. After multiple attempts to deplete and re-charge the accumulator; I finally made the decision that this was not going to be resolved. The passengers had been on the aircraft for well over an hour and had already been waiting over 5 hours at the gate for this flight. I had been keeping them appraised of the situation but reached a point where I didn't believe a solution was going to be realized so I had them deplane. I called the chief pilot's duty phone to apprise them of the situation and my concern that [maintenance controller] was pushing us to take an unsafe aircraft. I indicated that our books (fom) said to expect at least 7 applications and that [maintenance controller] wouldn't accept this and was challenging it. I said that after working with [maintenance controller] and the maintenance specialist for nearly 2 hours; we were going nowhere and I would not take the aircraft under these circumstances. I also looked up the MEL for the triple indicator in case it was inoperative and pointed out to the maintenance specialist that I still needed an acceptable indication on the systems page; and we didn't even have that. Throughout this entire situation; there was no doubt in my mind that both my judgment along with our fom procedures were being challenged and discarded by both [maintenance controller] as well as the [operations control] who was giving in to the pressure of another flight needing the gate we were at the expense of ensuring the safety of this flight; its 127 passengers; and the crew of 6. In over 35 years of flying; I have never been pushed as hard to accept an unsafe aircraft as I was in this situation. I shared with the [operations control] that pushing someone like they were pushing me was getting [company] dangerously close to an aircraft accident and that we needed to work together as a team to ensure the safe operations and not to discard the inputs of the crew when they believed their operating procedures were being violated. Finally; on top of all of this; the yellow hydraulic system was grossly over-serviced and when pointed out to the maintenance specialist; he was unsure how to read the gauge and further made me uncomfortable with the competence of those advising me this was a safe solution. Unfortunately; the management within [the company] is willing to sacrifice safety to sustain and improve their financial bottom line. The pressures all organizations (crew; maintenance; [operations control]; etc.) are under are creating an environment where a lack of trust and poor communications fosters a 'make it happen at all costs' culture at the cost of a safety-first mentality. I have been in aviation for over three decades and have led organizations larger than [company]. This is a leadership and management issue that permeates from the front office of both [second company] and [company]. It is only a matter of time before there is an aircraft accident if this is not addressed. Safety-first and teamwork is the only remedy to this issue and leadership needs to create this culture.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reported refusing an aircraft that was returned to service from maintenance after an issue could not be satisfactorily cleared.

Narrative: Aircraft arrived over 5 hours late due to previous maintenance issues at previous stops. Of the 8 MELs this aircraft was currently carrying; 2 were significant: SPLR #2 SV Spoiler Surface 2 or 4 and IR2 inoperative. Both of these MELs impacted aircraft performance. When the aircraft arrived in ZZZ; the previous Captain had written up the Alternate Brake Accumulator for depleting after 2 brake applications (FOM indicates there should be at least 7 applications to a fully charged accumulator).ZZZ maintenance arrived at the aircraft and began to troubleshoot the accumulator and was servicing the accumulator at the Yellow Hydraulic service point. After servicing the accumulator and checking the pressure at the service point; the maintenance specialist came up to the cockpit to indicated that the accumulator was in the normal range and suggested we activate the brakes (via accumulator pressure) to ops check it. Again; the accumulator depleted after 2 applications of the parking brake. I again indicated that our manuals indicate we should have at least 7 applications and this time he indicated that the [Maintenance Controller] said it only needed to be 2 applications and clearly we were getting that. He left the cockpit to discuss with [Maintenance Controller] and decided to re-check the accumulator at the service point and came back to indicate it was in normal limits. I reiterated that the only indications I could count on in the cockpit was the triple indicator and the system's display and had no way on knowing what the accumulator was indicating at the service point in flight. While he accepted this; he was clearly following the guidance he was getting from [Maintenance Controller] and thus; after discussing the issue with [Maintenance Controller]; he came back to the cockpit and began to sign it off in the log book. I asked him if the system was fixed and he said he had followed the guidance and [Maintenance Controller] concurred; directing him to sign it off. I re-checked the alternate brakes and the accumulator depleted again after 2 applications. This frustrated me immensely and I told him I believed he was signing off an unsafe aircraft. He called the [Maintenance Controller] to discuss and I asked to speak with the [Maintenance Controller] controller to indicate my concerns. He listened and then dismissed my concerns saying it was not my job to evaluate the maintenance procedures and that they had complied with the procedure and the aircraft was safe to fly. I took great exception to this dismissal and indicated that it was not safe to fly and I would not accept this unsafe condition. I was frustrated with the [Maintenance Controller] and he said enough and handed me off to the supervisor. I told him the same information and that I was required to have at least 7 applications before the accumulator depleted and that this solution was not acceptable. [Maintenance Controller] continued to troubleshoot to no avail and was adamant that 2 applications were the correct answer. Finally; the maintenance specialist asked to take a picture of our FOM reference so that he could send it to [Maintenance Controller]. After multiple attempts to deplete and re-charge the accumulator; I finally made the decision that this was not going to be resolved. The passengers had been on the aircraft for well over an hour and had already been waiting over 5 hours at the gate for this flight. I had been keeping them appraised of the situation but reached a point where I didn't believe a solution was going to be realized so I had them deplane. I called the Chief Pilot's Duty Phone to apprise them of the situation and my concern that [Maintenance Controller] was pushing us to take an unsafe aircraft. I indicated that our books (FOM) said to expect at least 7 applications and that [Maintenance Controller] wouldn't accept this and was challenging it. I said that after working with [Maintenance Controller] and the maintenance specialist for nearly 2 hours; we were going nowhere and I would not take the aircraft under these circumstances. I also looked up the MEL for the triple indicator in case it was inoperative and pointed out to the maintenance specialist that I still needed an acceptable indication on the systems page; and we didn't even have that. Throughout this entire situation; there was no doubt in my mind that both my judgment along with our FOM procedures were being challenged and discarded by both [Maintenance Controller] as well as the [Operations Control] who was giving in to the pressure of another flight needing the gate we were at the expense of ensuring the safety of this flight; its 127 passengers; and the crew of 6. In over 35 years of flying; I have never been pushed as hard to accept an unsafe aircraft as I was in this situation. I shared with the [Operations Control] that pushing someone like they were pushing me was getting [Company] dangerously close to an aircraft accident and that we needed to work together as a team to ensure the safe operations and not to discard the inputs of the crew when they believed their operating procedures were being violated. Finally; on top of all of this; the Yellow hydraulic system was grossly over-serviced and when pointed out to the maintenance specialist; he was unsure how to read the gauge and further made me uncomfortable with the competence of those advising me this was a safe solution. Unfortunately; the management within [the Company] is willing to sacrifice safety to sustain and improve their financial bottom line. The pressures all organizations (crew; maintenance; [Operations Control]; etc.) are under are creating an environment where a lack of trust and poor communications fosters a 'make it happen at all costs' culture at the cost of a safety-first mentality. I have been in aviation for over three decades and have led organizations larger than [Company]. This is a leadership and management issue that permeates from the front office of both [second Company] and [Company]. It is only a matter of time before there is an aircraft accident if this is not addressed. Safety-First and teamwork is the only remedy to this issue and leadership needs to create this culture.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.