Narrative:

Flight was scheduled to depart iad at XA30Z for ZZZ. The captain likes to be very involved in the flight planning stage. The captain is aware that the iad station prefuels the aircraft hours before the captain arrives for flight planning. The plane is often prefueled to the wrong amount since this captain regularly works with his dispatcher to fine-tune the flight plan originally proposed by the dispatcher. Being concerned that the plane will likely be prefueled to an amount in excess of the amount the captain is planning for the trip, he makes a call to the zone controller to advise not to fuel until the captain has finalized the fuel load. This heads-up call was made from the motel on the night before the flight. The morning of the flight, the captain called zone control to remind them that he had called the night before with instructions not to fuel the plane until the fuel load was finalized. This call was made 3 hours before scheduled departure. The captain offered that it was safe to prefuel up to but no more than 40000 pounds of fuel. The crew arrived at the flight office and started flight planning. The release was signed for an approved fuel load of 44000 pounds (this was a reduction of 19000 pounds from the dispatcher's first suggestion due to carrying ferry fuel). The captain was concerned about en route turbulence and wanted the plane to be light enough to climb above the turbulence area. There was predicted moderate turbulence between FL240 and FL370 in the second 1/2 of the flight. The flight plan, with the ferry fuel, was restricting the flight to FL350. The route was through the turbulence area. By reducing the planned fuel load to 44000 pounds, the flight would be capable of FL390 initially, and then FL410 approaching the moderate turbulence box. The dispatcher and captain agreed to make the final fuel load 44000 pounds instead of 63000 pounds. The captain called control to inform them that it was now ok to fuel. He was informed by control that they had already fueled the plane to 63000 pounds. The captain told control that with 70 mins to go, there was time to remove the excess fuel. Control refused to do it. When reminded that they were told twice, with plenty of notice not to fuel, control told the captain that it did not matter, he was not going to defuel. The plane had been fueled almost 2 1/2 hours before scheduled pushback. At the plane, the captain was approached by a flight manager, and the station chief pilot. After hearing the story, the captain was told that it was important to get the flight out on time, and that the fuel could not be removed. The captain said that while not unsafe, the excess fuel was making the flight less safe than he had planned with the dispatcher, and that the fuel had to be removed to clear a turbulence box. When the chief pilot could not convince the captain to take the existing fuel load, the captain suggested that he could be replaced by another captain willing to take the fuel load. So as to keep the flight close to schedule, the chief pilot removed the captain from the flight instead of removing the excess fuel. Problem: aircraft was prefueled to a fuel load that was not approved by the captain. Solution: program computer with a fuel block flight command. This command could be used up to 48 hours before pushback, only by capts interested in planning their fuel loads jointly with their dispatchers. The fuel sheet would be blocked from printing. No one would be able to override this command. The command would deactivate after 1 of 2 events: 1) the captain signs the release, or 2) at 45 mins to go, the fuel sheet would automatically release with the dispatcher's suggested fuel load, if the captain had not yet signed the release. In this case, captain's authority/authorized and his concern about turbulence, was ignored. The captain gave sufficient notice not to prefuel. The station ignored the captain's instructions. Further, the company wanted the flight out on time so much that they preferred to remove the captain and find one who was willing to take their fuel load. The chief pilot, when asked by the captain, admitted that he had not reviewed any WX charts prior to confronting the captain about fuel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIC'S DELAYED FUELING REQUEST IS IGNORED BY THE OPS DEPT WITH THE PIC REPLACED AFTER HE REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE ACFT WITH MORE FUEL LOADED THAN HE DESIRED. CAPT OF ACR B757-200 HAS FUELING REQUEST IGNORED BY THE OPS DEPT AT IAD, AND IS REPLACED AFTER HE REFUSES ACFT THAT IS LOADED WITH MORE FUEL THAN HE DESIRED.

Narrative: FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART IAD AT XA30Z FOR ZZZ. THE CAPT LIKES TO BE VERY INVOLVED IN THE FLT PLANNING STAGE. THE CAPT IS AWARE THAT THE IAD STATION PREFUELS THE ACFT HRS BEFORE THE CAPT ARRIVES FOR FLT PLANNING. THE PLANE IS OFTEN PREFUELED TO THE WRONG AMOUNT SINCE THIS CAPT REGULARLY WORKS WITH HIS DISPATCHER TO FINE-TUNE THE FLT PLAN ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY THE DISPATCHER. BEING CONCERNED THAT THE PLANE WILL LIKELY BE PREFUELED TO AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT THE CAPT IS PLANNING FOR THE TRIP, HE MAKES A CALL TO THE ZONE CTLR TO ADVISE NOT TO FUEL UNTIL THE CAPT HAS FINALIZED THE FUEL LOAD. THIS HEADS-UP CALL WAS MADE FROM THE MOTEL ON THE NIGHT BEFORE THE FLT. THE MORNING OF THE FLT, THE CAPT CALLED ZONE CTL TO REMIND THEM THAT HE HAD CALLED THE NIGHT BEFORE WITH INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO FUEL THE PLANE UNTIL THE FUEL LOAD WAS FINALIZED. THIS CALL WAS MADE 3 HRS BEFORE SCHEDULED DEP. THE CAPT OFFERED THAT IT WAS SAFE TO PREFUEL UP TO BUT NO MORE THAN 40000 LBS OF FUEL. THE CREW ARRIVED AT THE FLT OFFICE AND STARTED FLT PLANNING. THE RELEASE WAS SIGNED FOR AN APPROVED FUEL LOAD OF 44000 LBS (THIS WAS A REDUCTION OF 19000 LBS FROM THE DISPATCHER'S FIRST SUGGESTION DUE TO CARRYING FERRY FUEL). THE CAPT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ENRTE TURB AND WANTED THE PLANE TO BE LIGHT ENOUGH TO CLB ABOVE THE TURB AREA. THERE WAS PREDICTED MODERATE TURB BTWN FL240 AND FL370 IN THE SECOND 1/2 OF THE FLT. THE FLT PLAN, WITH THE FERRY FUEL, WAS RESTRICTING THE FLT TO FL350. THE RTE WAS THROUGH THE TURB AREA. BY REDUCING THE PLANNED FUEL LOAD TO 44000 LBS, THE FLT WOULD BE CAPABLE OF FL390 INITIALLY, AND THEN FL410 APCHING THE MODERATE TURB BOX. THE DISPATCHER AND CAPT AGREED TO MAKE THE FINAL FUEL LOAD 44000 LBS INSTEAD OF 63000 LBS. THE CAPT CALLED CTL TO INFORM THEM THAT IT WAS NOW OK TO FUEL. HE WAS INFORMED BY CTL THAT THEY HAD ALREADY FUELED THE PLANE TO 63000 LBS. THE CAPT TOLD CTL THAT WITH 70 MINS TO GO, THERE WAS TIME TO REMOVE THE EXCESS FUEL. CTL REFUSED TO DO IT. WHEN REMINDED THAT THEY WERE TOLD TWICE, WITH PLENTY OF NOTICE NOT TO FUEL, CTL TOLD THE CAPT THAT IT DID NOT MATTER, HE WAS NOT GOING TO DEFUEL. THE PLANE HAD BEEN FUELED ALMOST 2 1/2 HRS BEFORE SCHEDULED PUSHBACK. AT THE PLANE, THE CAPT WAS APCHED BY A FLT MGR, AND THE STATION CHIEF PLT. AFTER HEARING THE STORY, THE CAPT WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE FLT OUT ON TIME, AND THAT THE FUEL COULD NOT BE REMOVED. THE CAPT SAID THAT WHILE NOT UNSAFE, THE EXCESS FUEL WAS MAKING THE FLT LESS SAFE THAN HE HAD PLANNED WITH THE DISPATCHER, AND THAT THE FUEL HAD TO BE REMOVED TO CLR A TURB BOX. WHEN THE CHIEF PLT COULD NOT CONVINCE THE CAPT TO TAKE THE EXISTING FUEL LOAD, THE CAPT SUGGESTED THAT HE COULD BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER CAPT WILLING TO TAKE THE FUEL LOAD. SO AS TO KEEP THE FLT CLOSE TO SCHEDULE, THE CHIEF PLT REMOVED THE CAPT FROM THE FLT INSTEAD OF REMOVING THE EXCESS FUEL. PROB: ACFT WAS PREFUELED TO A FUEL LOAD THAT WAS NOT APPROVED BY THE CAPT. SOLUTION: PROGRAM COMPUTER WITH A FUEL BLOCK FLT COMMAND. THIS COMMAND COULD BE USED UP TO 48 HRS BEFORE PUSHBACK, ONLY BY CAPTS INTERESTED IN PLANNING THEIR FUEL LOADS JOINTLY WITH THEIR DISPATCHERS. THE FUEL SHEET WOULD BE BLOCKED FROM PRINTING. NO ONE WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERRIDE THIS COMMAND. THE COMMAND WOULD DEACTIVATE AFTER 1 OF 2 EVENTS: 1) THE CAPT SIGNS THE RELEASE, OR 2) AT 45 MINS TO GO, THE FUEL SHEET WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RELEASE WITH THE DISPATCHER'S SUGGESTED FUEL LOAD, IF THE CAPT HAD NOT YET SIGNED THE RELEASE. IN THIS CASE, CAPT'S AUTH AND HIS CONCERN ABOUT TURB, WAS IGNORED. THE CAPT GAVE SUFFICIENT NOTICE NOT TO PREFUEL. THE STATION IGNORED THE CAPT'S INSTRUCTIONS. FURTHER, THE COMPANY WANTED THE FLT OUT ON TIME SO MUCH THAT THEY PREFERRED TO REMOVE THE CAPT AND FIND ONE WHO WAS WILLING TO TAKE THEIR FUEL LOAD. THE CHIEF PLT, WHEN ASKED BY THE CAPT, ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NOT REVIEWED ANY WX CHARTS PRIOR TO CONFRONTING THE CAPT ABOUT FUEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.