37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 615093 |
Time | |
Date | 200403 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Super King Air 200 HDC |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : maintenance |
Person 1 | |
Function | maintenance : inspector |
Qualification | technician : powerplant technician : inspection authority technician : airframe |
Experience | maintenance technician : 11 |
ASRS Report | 615093 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other other : person 3 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : assigned or threatened penalties other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : repair performance deficiency : inspection |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Maintenance Human Performance Chart Or Publication Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
A form 337 was filed and received by the local FSDO office on mar/mon/04. The major repairs listed on the form were flush fuselage repairs at F.south. 334.25, F.south. 342.25, and rh gear well at aft gear sprocket. The data used was advisory circular 43.13-1B. The local FSDO notified me on mar/mon/04 of a possible violation due to the fact that the repairs were done in the pressurized area of the aircraft and that advisory circular 43.13.-1B was not applicable to repairs in these areas. Some of the factors that affected my judgement and the decision that was made are as follows: 1) the repairs were made by an a&P mechanic with extensive sheet metal experience. He elected to use advisory circular 43.13-1B and I questioned him about it. He said it was applicable at the time and I accepted it at that time. I had a vague memory of its exclusion from pressurized areas of the aircraft. I did not find anything that excluded these areas and so approved the repair. 2) failure to notice and read the very first page of advisory circular 43.13-1B that excluded its use for pressurized areas of the aircraft. 3) the a&P mechanic was a sheet metal instructor on the field, though did not offer FAA approved instruction. 4) no srm available at the time. 5) the aircraft was under extensive repair and was not in service.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A BEECH 200 WAS OPERATED WITH AN UNAPPROVED SHEET METAL FUSELAGE REPAIR. LCL FSDO NOTIFIED RPTR OF POSSIBLE VIOLATION DUE TO REPAIR NOT APPROVED.
Narrative: A FORM 337 WAS FILED AND RECEIVED BY THE LCL FSDO OFFICE ON MAR/MON/04. THE MAJOR REPAIRS LISTED ON THE FORM WERE FLUSH FUSELAGE REPAIRS AT F.S. 334.25, F.S. 342.25, AND RH GEAR WELL AT AFT GEAR SPROCKET. THE DATA USED WAS ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13-1B. THE LCL FSDO NOTIFIED ME ON MAR/MON/04 OF A POSSIBLE VIOLATION DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE REPAIRS WERE DONE IN THE PRESSURIZED AREA OF THE ACFT AND THAT ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13.-1B WAS NOT APPLICABLE TO REPAIRS IN THESE AREAS. SOME OF THE FACTORS THAT AFFECTED MY JUDGEMENT AND THE DECISION THAT WAS MADE ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) THE REPAIRS WERE MADE BY AN A&P MECH WITH EXTENSIVE SHEET METAL EXPERIENCE. HE ELECTED TO USE ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13-1B AND I QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT IT. HE SAID IT WAS APPLICABLE AT THE TIME AND I ACCEPTED IT AT THAT TIME. I HAD A VAGUE MEMORY OF ITS EXCLUSION FROM PRESSURIZED AREAS OF THE ACFT. I DID NOT FIND ANYTHING THAT EXCLUDED THESE AREAS AND SO APPROVED THE REPAIR. 2) FAILURE TO NOTICE AND READ THE VERY FIRST PAGE OF ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13-1B THAT EXCLUDED ITS USE FOR PRESSURIZED AREAS OF THE ACFT. 3) THE A&P MECH WAS A SHEET METAL INSTRUCTOR ON THE FIELD, THOUGH DID NOT OFFER FAA APPROVED INSTRUCTION. 4) NO SRM AVAILABLE AT THE TIME. 5) THE ACFT WAS UNDER EXTENSIVE REPAIR AND WAS NOT IN SVC.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.