37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 615405 |
Time | |
Date | 200404 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : elm.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 260 flight time total : 11000 flight time type : 5000 |
ASRS Report | 615405 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Weather Flight Crew Human Performance Environmental Factor Company |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Flight to buf. Forecast showed thunderstorms 2 hours after our arrival time. Had many passenger. We reduced the required fuel until the dispatcher approval and departed. We got 3/4 the way to buf, and there were level 5 thunderstorms at the field. Because we traded fuel for passenger, we could not hold for long and diverted to elm for fuel and let the line of thunderstorms pass our destination. The maximum fuel we took on the amended release was 3200 pounds. This gave us the maximum payload in the cabin with the same dispatcher working up a new release, the minimum fuel was increased by 400 pounds. I did the paperwork, and we left elm. Upon calling in the times and takeoff fuel, it was noticed that we left with less than needed fuel to fly the last 1/4 of the flight. 3200 pounds for takeoff on our first flight turned into 3600 pounds for the second. Our dispatcher added an alternate, and then several hundred pounds of holding fuel, bringing up the required dispatch fuel to more than what we left ZZZ with. I had the aircraft fueled to the original fuel load knowing what the weight and balance would be. It was after takeoff that we noticed the discrepancy on the fuel load. If we would have seen this before, we would have the dispatcher lower it. When we left, we had the required fuel to fly to our destination, the alternate, our 1000 pound reserve fuel, and some holding fuel, but did not have what was on the release. We basically left safely, but did not have the excess holding fuel. Why the dispatcher did not set us up for the same fuel, I do not know. I don't think the passenger or the airline would like it if we had to kick people off before their arrival at their destination, but if it was necessary, we would have done it. But we did not need the fuel. This was extra fuel we left behind, but it is legally required to be there. Again, if we had more time (we were on the ground for 23 mins), we would have changed the paperwork, and departed with the same fuel load, but legally. Factors: time -- our time was short, and definitely helped with creating this screw-up. No real communication about the fuel load was a definite problem on our checklists, before engine start, the verbiage is 'minimum fuel XXXX and YYYY on board.' we said the min fuel and fuel on board, but nothing registered. I already had the weight and balance paperwork done before we landed at our diversion airport. Knowing that I could only have that much fuel on board, I never thought we needed more to go the last 80 mi of our flight. We completed this flight knowing we had plenty of excess fuel, and at no time did we feel we pushed the safety envelope. We knew our limits by reducing the dispatch release's limits every single flight since then, I have become very involved into the preflight planning of our flight.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AFTER DIVERTING FROM THEIR ORIGINAL DEST OF BUF, A DHC8 FLT CREW DEPARTS ELM WITH LESS FUEL THAN SPECIFIED IN THE DISPATCH RELEASE FOR THEIR FLT INTO BUF, NY.
Narrative: FLT TO BUF. FORECAST SHOWED TSTMS 2 HRS AFTER OUR ARR TIME. HAD MANY PAX. WE REDUCED THE REQUIRED FUEL UNTIL THE DISPATCHER APPROVAL AND DEPARTED. WE GOT 3/4 THE WAY TO BUF, AND THERE WERE LEVEL 5 TSTMS AT THE FIELD. BECAUSE WE TRADED FUEL FOR PAX, WE COULD NOT HOLD FOR LONG AND DIVERTED TO ELM FOR FUEL AND LET THE LINE OF TSTMS PASS OUR DEST. THE MAX FUEL WE TOOK ON THE AMENDED RELEASE WAS 3200 LBS. THIS GAVE US THE MAX PAYLOAD IN THE CABIN WITH THE SAME DISPATCHER WORKING UP A NEW RELEASE, THE MINIMUM FUEL WAS INCREASED BY 400 LBS. I DID THE PAPERWORK, AND WE LEFT ELM. UPON CALLING IN THE TIMES AND TKOF FUEL, IT WAS NOTICED THAT WE LEFT WITH LESS THAN NEEDED FUEL TO FLY THE LAST 1/4 OF THE FLT. 3200 LBS FOR TKOF ON OUR FIRST FLT TURNED INTO 3600 LBS FOR THE SECOND. OUR DISPATCHER ADDED AN ALTERNATE, AND THEN SEVERAL HUNDRED LBS OF HOLDING FUEL, BRINGING UP THE REQUIRED DISPATCH FUEL TO MORE THAN WHAT WE LEFT ZZZ WITH. I HAD THE ACFT FUELED TO THE ORIGINAL FUEL LOAD KNOWING WHAT THE WT AND BAL WOULD BE. IT WAS AFTER TKOF THAT WE NOTICED THE DISCREPANCY ON THE FUEL LOAD. IF WE WOULD HAVE SEEN THIS BEFORE, WE WOULD HAVE THE DISPATCHER LOWER IT. WHEN WE LEFT, WE HAD THE REQUIRED FUEL TO FLY TO OUR DEST, THE ALTERNATE, OUR 1000 LB RESERVE FUEL, AND SOME HOLDING FUEL, BUT DID NOT HAVE WHAT WAS ON THE RELEASE. WE BASICALLY LEFT SAFELY, BUT DID NOT HAVE THE EXCESS HOLDING FUEL. WHY THE DISPATCHER DID NOT SET US UP FOR THE SAME FUEL, I DO NOT KNOW. I DON'T THINK THE PAX OR THE AIRLINE WOULD LIKE IT IF WE HAD TO KICK PEOPLE OFF BEFORE THEIR ARR AT THEIR DEST, BUT IF IT WAS NECESSARY, WE WOULD HAVE DONE IT. BUT WE DID NOT NEED THE FUEL. THIS WAS EXTRA FUEL WE LEFT BEHIND, BUT IT IS LEGALLY REQUIRED TO BE THERE. AGAIN, IF WE HAD MORE TIME (WE WERE ON THE GND FOR 23 MINS), WE WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE PAPERWORK, AND DEPARTED WITH THE SAME FUEL LOAD, BUT LEGALLY. FACTORS: TIME -- OUR TIME WAS SHORT, AND DEFINITELY HELPED WITH CREATING THIS SCREW-UP. NO REAL COM ABOUT THE FUEL LOAD WAS A DEFINITE PROB ON OUR CHKLISTS, BEFORE ENG START, THE VERBIAGE IS 'MINIMUM FUEL XXXX AND YYYY ON BOARD.' WE SAID THE MIN FUEL AND FUEL ON BOARD, BUT NOTHING REGISTERED. I ALREADY HAD THE WT AND BAL PAPERWORK DONE BEFORE WE LANDED AT OUR DIVERSION ARPT. KNOWING THAT I COULD ONLY HAVE THAT MUCH FUEL ON BOARD, I NEVER THOUGHT WE NEEDED MORE TO GO THE LAST 80 MI OF OUR FLT. WE COMPLETED THIS FLT KNOWING WE HAD PLENTY OF EXCESS FUEL, AND AT NO TIME DID WE FEEL WE PUSHED THE SAFETY ENVELOPE. WE KNEW OUR LIMITS BY REDUCING THE DISPATCH RELEASE'S LIMITS EVERY SINGLE FLT SINCE THEN, I HAVE BECOME VERY INVOLVED INTO THE PREFLT PLANNING OF OUR FLT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.