Narrative:

I was off my assigned altitude by 700 ft. I was on an instrument training flight. IM a 280 hour VFR pilot and was returning from charlottesville, va (cho) to my home airport, potomac airfield (vkx). The flight from vkx to cho was uneventful, though a little stressful. The reports of moderate turbulence below 12000 ft were correct (we were at 4000 ft). The winds at charlottesville were strong and gusty, but we landed safely. After landing at cho, we taxied off the runway and immediately filed a return flight. (The CFI did the filing.) our routing wasnT as direct as we had hoped, given the deteriorating WX: cho-gve-ojaay-V376-irons-vkx. About 20 mins after takeoff from cho, we were in IMC, which is something I was hoping for, because itsouth good practice. What I wasnT hoping for was the rime ice that started to accumulate on our cessnasouth wheels. We were at 6000 ft and although it was 2 degrees C, I didnT like the ice and with my CFIsouth concurrence, I asked for a lower altitude. Potomac approach immediately gave us 5000 ft and said that if 5000 ft didnT get us out of icing conditions, we could request an even lower altitude. Meanwhile, other pilots were regularly asking ATC about the WX: what did their WX radar paint? With the exception of 1 thunderstorm near winchester (to our west), the controllers reported that they only saw level 1 precipitation. Still, the fact that a number of pilots were asking told me that they were nervous. I was, too. The forecast said that there was a chance of isolated thunderstorms. The temperature between the 2 sides of the cold front that were approaching washington, dc, was sufficient to produce thunderstorms. Our C172 didnT have a stormscope, but I wish it had. In IMC and just below the clouds, all we had to rely on were what the controllersouth radar showed. The turbulence in the clouds was moderate -- it was hard to hold the wings level. The turbulence was slightly less out of the clouds, but it was still moderate and we reduced our speed to maneuvering speed. Approximately 10 mi south of dca, which was next to our destination airport, ATC issued a microburst alert for washington national airport. This added to my anxiety level -- and, as I removed my hood, I told the CFI that I would fly the approach to potomac, but thought that he should do the landing. At around this time, I started to descend from our assigned altitude of 2000 ft. It was almost an automatic response: from this general location, on a VFR flight, IM usually at 1300 ft or descending to it, and thatsouth just what I did, despite ATCsouth last instruction to us. IM not sure if I knew that I was still supposed to be at 2000 ft -- that is, IM not sure if I forgot my altitude assignment, or if I just was on autoplt, doing what my subconscious thought I should do to get down safely. The CFI ad pointed out my altitude excursion (usually 100-200 ft, caused in part by the turbulence, and in part by my inexperience flying under the hood) but didnT mention that I was descending and had descended to 1300 ft. Although the CFI and I didnT talk about it, I think that he, too, was both preoccupied, a little stressed, and concerned about the conditions in which we were flying and about to land. It was when ATC issued a sharp instruction to us to climb to 1600 ft that we both realized what had happened. I immediately climbed. ATC was extremely busy -- in addition to the severe WX it was rush hour at national airport. The CFI landed, and despite the rainy, gusty conditions, put the plane down safely. He elected not to fly the normal pattern, but did a straight-in approach instead. IM not sure that theresouth anything I could have done to prevent my altitude deviation of 700 ft. I do know that this was the most stressful and scary flight Ive ever been on. The lesson I did take home is that when I am under a lot of stress, there is a much higher chance than normal that I will make a mistake, and (this is the important part) I wonT always realize that Ive made a mistake. The stress, anxiety and fear I experienced was far greater than what I imagined I would feel in that kind of situation. Ive read a lot of articles about pilots in difficult sits, and I always imagined that I would staycool, detached and fully aware. Theresouth an enormous reality gap between reading about pilots who encounter bad WX and actually experiencing it. When IM under stress itsouth time to check checklists, instruments, instructions, and check them again. I need to recognize and remember that stress, anxiety, worry and fear, regardless of whether the actual nature of the dangers, can mask problems of my own making.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 PLT ON IFR TRAINING FLT TO VKX DSNDS BELOW ASSIGNED ALT.

Narrative: I WAS OFF MY ASSIGNED ALT BY 700 FT. I WAS ON AN INST TRAINING FLT. IM A 280 HR VFR PLT AND WAS RETURNING FROM CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA (CHO) TO MY HOME ARPT, POTOMAC AIRFIELD (VKX). THE FLT FROM VKX TO CHO WAS UNEVENTFUL, THOUGH A LITTLE STRESSFUL. THE RPTS OF MODERATE TURB BELOW 12000 FT WERE CORRECT (WE WERE AT 4000 FT). THE WINDS AT CHARLOTTESVILLE WERE STRONG AND GUSTY, BUT WE LANDED SAFELY. AFTER LNDG AT CHO, WE TAXIED OFF THE RWY AND IMMEDIATELY FILED A RETURN FLT. (THE CFI DID THE FILING.) OUR ROUTING WASNT AS DIRECT AS WE HAD HOPED, GIVEN THE DETERIORATING WX: CHO-GVE-OJAAY-V376-IRONS-VKX. ABOUT 20 MINS AFTER TKOF FROM CHO, WE WERE IN IMC, WHICH IS SOMETHING I WAS HOPING FOR, BECAUSE ITS GOOD PRACTICE. WHAT I WASNT HOPING FOR WAS THE RIME ICE THAT STARTED TO ACCUMULATE ON OUR CESSNAS WHEELS. WE WERE AT 6000 FT AND ALTHOUGH IT WAS 2 DEGS C, I DIDNT LIKE THE ICE AND WITH MY CFIS CONCURRENCE, I ASKED FOR A LOWER ALT. POTOMAC APCH IMMEDIATELY GAVE US 5000 FT AND SAID THAT IF 5000 FT DIDNT GET US OUT OF ICING CONDITIONS, WE COULD REQUEST AN EVEN LOWER ALT. MEANWHILE, OTHER PLTS WERE REGULARLY ASKING ATC ABOUT THE WX: WHAT DID THEIR WX RADAR PAINT? WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1 TSTM NEAR WINCHESTER (TO OUR W), THE CTLRS RPTED THAT THEY ONLY SAW LEVEL 1 PRECIP. STILL, THE FACT THAT A NUMBER OF PLTS WERE ASKING TOLD ME THAT THEY WERE NERVOUS. I WAS, TOO. THE FORECAST SAID THAT THERE WAS A CHANCE OF ISOLATED TSTMS. THE TEMP BTWN THE 2 SIDES OF THE COLD FRONT THAT WERE APCHING WASHINGTON, DC, WAS SUFFICIENT TO PRODUCE TSTMS. OUR C172 DIDNT HAVE A STORMSCOPE, BUT I WISH IT HAD. IN IMC AND JUST BELOW THE CLOUDS, ALL WE HAD TO RELY ON WERE WHAT THE CTLRS RADAR SHOWED. THE TURB IN THE CLOUDS WAS MODERATE -- IT WAS HARD TO HOLD THE WINGS LEVEL. THE TURB WAS SLIGHTLY LESS OUT OF THE CLOUDS, BUT IT WAS STILL MODERATE AND WE REDUCED OUR SPD TO MANEUVERING SPD. APPROX 10 MI S OF DCA, WHICH WAS NEXT TO OUR DEST ARPT, ATC ISSUED A MICROBURST ALERT FOR WASHINGTON NATIONAL ARPT. THIS ADDED TO MY ANXIETY LEVEL -- AND, AS I REMOVED MY HOOD, I TOLD THE CFI THAT I WOULD FLY THE APCH TO POTOMAC, BUT THOUGHT THAT HE SHOULD DO THE LNDG. AT AROUND THIS TIME, I STARTED TO DSND FROM OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 2000 FT. IT WAS ALMOST AN AUTOMATIC RESPONSE: FROM THIS GENERAL LOCATION, ON A VFR FLT, IM USUALLY AT 1300 FT OR DSNDING TO IT, AND THATS JUST WHAT I DID, DESPITE ATCS LAST INSTRUCTION TO US. IM NOT SURE IF I KNEW THAT I WAS STILL SUPPOSED TO BE AT 2000 FT -- THAT IS, IM NOT SURE IF I FORGOT MY ALT ASSIGNMENT, OR IF I JUST WAS ON AUTOPLT, DOING WHAT MY SUBCONSCIOUS THOUGHT I SHOULD DO TO GET DOWN SAFELY. THE CFI AD POINTED OUT MY ALT EXCURSION (USUALLY 100-200 FT, CAUSED IN PART BY THE TURB, AND IN PART BY MY INEXPERIENCE FLYING UNDER THE HOOD) BUT DIDNT MENTION THAT I WAS DSNDING AND HAD DSNDED TO 1300 FT. ALTHOUGH THE CFI AND I DIDNT TALK ABOUT IT, I THINK THAT HE, TOO, WAS BOTH PREOCCUPIED, A LITTLE STRESSED, AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH WE WERE FLYING AND ABOUT TO LAND. IT WAS WHEN ATC ISSUED A SHARP INSTRUCTION TO US TO CLB TO 1600 FT THAT WE BOTH REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I IMMEDIATELY CLBED. ATC WAS EXTREMELY BUSY -- IN ADDITION TO THE SEVERE WX IT WAS RUSH HR AT NATIONAL ARPT. THE CFI LANDED, AND DESPITE THE RAINY, GUSTY CONDITIONS, PUT THE PLANE DOWN SAFELY. HE ELECTED NOT TO FLY THE NORMAL PATTERN, BUT DID A STRAIGHT-IN APCH INSTEAD. IM NOT SURE THAT THERES ANYTHING I COULD HAVE DONE TO PREVENT MY ALTDEV OF 700 FT. I DO KNOW THAT THIS WAS THE MOST STRESSFUL AND SCARY FLT IVE EVER BEEN ON. THE LESSON I DID TAKE HOME IS THAT WHEN I AM UNDER A LOT OF STRESS, THERE IS A MUCH HIGHER CHANCE THAN NORMAL THAT I WILL MAKE A MISTAKE, AND (THIS IS THE IMPORTANT PART) I WONT ALWAYS REALIZE THAT IVE MADE A MISTAKE. THE STRESS, ANXIETY AND FEAR I EXPERIENCED WAS FAR GREATER THAN WHAT I IMAGINED I WOULD FEEL IN THAT KIND OF SIT. IVE READ A LOT OF ARTICLES ABOUT PLTS IN DIFFICULT SITS, AND I ALWAYS IMAGINED THAT I WOULD STAYCOOL, DETACHED AND FULLY AWARE. THERES AN ENORMOUS REALITY GAP BTWN READING ABOUT PLTS WHO ENCOUNTER BAD WX AND ACTUALLY EXPERIENCING IT. WHEN IM UNDER STRESS ITS TIME TO CHK CHKLISTS, INSTS, INSTRUCTIONS, AND CHECK THEM AGAIN. I NEED TO RECOGNIZE AND REMEMBER THAT STRESS, ANXIETY, WORRY AND FEAR, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE ACTUAL NATURE OF THE DANGERS, CAN MASK PROBS OF MY OWN MAKING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.