Narrative:

We just received the plane that flew in. After my outside preflight, I started my cockpit preflight. I quickly discovered the APU squib was not testing. I showed the captain. He immediately called the company and had it MEL'ed. So we had them connect the ground power and turned off the APU, but the engine turned very slowly, and we aborted the start. Captain tested the APU squib again, and now it tested perfect, over and over again. Captain wanted to start the engines with the APU. I said 'you can't, it is MEL'ed!' he said 'it is testing fine' and cranked the APU. I was pretty upset and the captain knew it. But he thought it was the correct thing to do. I was overruled. We began to start the first engine, and it turned slowly again. We both looked at bleed sources, and the captain had left the wing heat switch on, from his flow. (I wish I would have caught it.) he turned off the wing heat switch, and started fine, both engines. Rest of trip went fine. But when we got close to our destination, I reminded the captain that when he calls in range, to 'make sure we get 'air and electrics' as per the MEL.' captain overruled again, and mentioned it was still testing fine. We discussed this a lot for the next 2 days. He did not agree with my interpretation on MEL's. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first officer reported he had to fly with the captain for 2 more days. After the incident the relations between the captain and first officer were chilly at best. The air carrier does not have a way to enforce CRM. The first officer did not report the incident to anyone.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 CAPT INSISTED ON USING THE APU AFTER IT WAS MEL'ED INOP. THE FIRE WARNING SYS DID NOT TEST PROPERLY.

Narrative: WE JUST RECEIVED THE PLANE THAT FLEW IN. AFTER MY OUTSIDE PREFLT, I STARTED MY COCKPIT PREFLT. I QUICKLY DISCOVERED THE APU SQUIB WAS NOT TESTING. I SHOWED THE CAPT. HE IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE COMPANY AND HAD IT MEL'ED. SO WE HAD THEM CONNECT THE GND PWR AND TURNED OFF THE APU, BUT THE ENG TURNED VERY SLOWLY, AND WE ABORTED THE START. CAPT TESTED THE APU SQUIB AGAIN, AND NOW IT TESTED PERFECT, OVER AND OVER AGAIN. CAPT WANTED TO START THE ENGS WITH THE APU. I SAID 'YOU CAN'T, IT IS MEL'ED!' HE SAID 'IT IS TESTING FINE' AND CRANKED THE APU. I WAS PRETTY UPSET AND THE CAPT KNEW IT. BUT HE THOUGHT IT WAS THE CORRECT THING TO DO. I WAS OVERRULED. WE BEGAN TO START THE FIRST ENG, AND IT TURNED SLOWLY AGAIN. WE BOTH LOOKED AT BLEED SOURCES, AND THE CAPT HAD LEFT THE WING HEAT SWITCH ON, FROM HIS FLOW. (I WISH I WOULD HAVE CAUGHT IT.) HE TURNED OFF THE WING HEAT SWITCH, AND STARTED FINE, BOTH ENGS. REST OF TRIP WENT FINE. BUT WHEN WE GOT CLOSE TO OUR DEST, I REMINDED THE CAPT THAT WHEN HE CALLS IN RANGE, TO 'MAKE SURE WE GET 'AIR AND ELECTRICS' AS PER THE MEL.' CAPT OVERRULED AGAIN, AND MENTIONED IT WAS STILL TESTING FINE. WE DISCUSSED THIS A LOT FOR THE NEXT 2 DAYS. HE DID NOT AGREE WITH MY INTERP ON MEL'S. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO RPTED HE HAD TO FLY WITH THE CAPT FOR 2 MORE DAYS. AFTER THE INCIDENT THE RELATIONS BTWN THE CAPT AND FO WERE CHILLY AT BEST. THE ACR DOES NOT HAVE A WAY TO ENFORCE CRM. THE FO DID NOT RPT THE INCIDENT TO ANYONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.