Narrative:

Landing was made on the belly of the plane. No gear up warning was provided by the C182RG's landing gear warning system. My instructor and I were practicing precision lndgs in partial fulfillment of the 10-hour complex aircraft experience requirement for the commercial pilot license. Our first landing was to the 1000 ft aiming point marks. The second was a short-field landing. On the 3RD landing downwind and abeam the numbers, I performed the gumps check which consisted of gear down, check for visual indication of gear down, mixture rich, propeller fully forward. Our aiming point on this short-field approach was just beyond the runway numbers. As we neared the runway, it became apparent that our approach was high. Even so, there was no indication that it couldn't be completed successfully. I flared a bit high. The plane settled hard and bounced. When we landed the second time, it was on the underside of the plane. We slid and stopped on the runway. There were no injuries apparent. During our approach there was no aural warning to indicate anything was amiss with the landing gear/flaps/power combination. I spoke with a FSDO inspector and provided him with a brief oral summary. The FSDO inspector stated that they discovered a wire connecting the landing gear warning system was not connected to the cockpit speaker. This was the reason that we did not hear the warning signal. He stated that checking the stall warning system was a step in the published preflight inspection procedure. I told him that I had not performed that step, that it was an oversight. My instructor and I have not found information in the aircraft's poh to substantiate the claim that testing the stall warning system also tests the landing gear warning system. I did find a circuit diagram for the hydraulic system. The preflight inspection of the aircraft was inadequate and unacceptable. A landing on the belly of the aircraft could have been averted had the landing gear warning system been functioning properly. The poh does not detail how to check the proper functioning of the landing gear warning system. Such a procedure should be developed and incorporated into the checklist and placarded in the cockpit. Supplemental information from acn 615545: I rechked fuel, oil, nose strut, propeller hub, brakes, and airframe overview. I did not check all of the other items behind my student. Contributing factors: too much trust in student's judgement regarding preflight of aircraft. Instructor was under the false perception that the student was thorough in all phases of flight. Student was always eager and well prepared. A 'STAR student' if you will. I am reevaluating my instructor-student relationship with each student. I believe that my friendly nature has led to an overly trusting relationship with most students. This bond may have created a false sense of security on my part, regarding my student's preflight procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT PLTS OF C182 (RG) SUFFER GEAR COLLAPSE AFTER BOUNCED ON LNDG. LNDG GEAR AURAL WARNING FOUND TO BE INOP DURING POST INCIDENT INSPECTION.

Narrative: LNDG WAS MADE ON THE BELLY OF THE PLANE. NO GEAR UP WARNING WAS PROVIDED BY THE C182RG'S LNDG GEAR WARNING SYS. MY INSTRUCTOR AND I WERE PRACTICING PRECISION LNDGS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 10-HR COMPLEX ACFT EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT FOR THE COMMERCIAL PLT LICENSE. OUR FIRST LNDG WAS TO THE 1000 FT AIMING POINT MARKS. THE SECOND WAS A SHORT-FIELD LNDG. ON THE 3RD LNDG DOWNWIND AND ABEAM THE NUMBERS, I PERFORMED THE GUMPS CHK WHICH CONSISTED OF GEAR DOWN, CHK FOR VISUAL INDICATION OF GEAR DOWN, MIXTURE RICH, PROP FULLY FORWARD. OUR AIMING POINT ON THIS SHORT-FIELD APCH WAS JUST BEYOND THE RWY NUMBERS. AS WE NEARED THE RWY, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT OUR APCH WAS HIGH. EVEN SO, THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT IT COULDN'T BE COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY. I FLARED A BIT HIGH. THE PLANE SETTLED HARD AND BOUNCED. WHEN WE LANDED THE SECOND TIME, IT WAS ON THE UNDERSIDE OF THE PLANE. WE SLID AND STOPPED ON THE RWY. THERE WERE NO INJURIES APPARENT. DURING OUR APCH THERE WAS NO AURAL WARNING TO INDICATE ANYTHING WAS AMISS WITH THE LNDG GEAR/FLAPS/PWR COMBINATION. I SPOKE WITH A FSDO INSPECTOR AND PROVIDED HIM WITH A BRIEF ORAL SUMMARY. THE FSDO INSPECTOR STATED THAT THEY DISCOVERED A WIRE CONNECTING THE LNDG GEAR WARNING SYS WAS NOT CONNECTED TO THE COCKPIT SPEAKER. THIS WAS THE REASON THAT WE DID NOT HEAR THE WARNING SIGNAL. HE STATED THAT CHKING THE STALL WARNING SYS WAS A STEP IN THE PUBLISHED PREFLT INSPECTION PROC. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD NOT PERFORMED THAT STEP, THAT IT WAS AN OVERSIGHT. MY INSTRUCTOR AND I HAVE NOT FOUND INFO IN THE ACFT'S POH TO SUBSTANTIATE THE CLAIM THAT TESTING THE STALL WARNING SYS ALSO TESTS THE LNDG GEAR WARNING SYS. I DID FIND A CIRCUIT DIAGRAM FOR THE HYD SYS. THE PREFLT INSPECTION OF THE ACFT WAS INADEQUATE AND UNACCEPTABLE. A LNDG ON THE BELLY OF THE ACFT COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED HAD THE LNDG GEAR WARNING SYS BEEN FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. THE POH DOES NOT DETAIL HOW TO CHK THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF THE LNDG GEAR WARNING SYS. SUCH A PROC SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AND INCORPORATED INTO THE CHKLIST AND PLACARDED IN THE COCKPIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 615545: I RECHKED FUEL, OIL, NOSE STRUT, PROP HUB, BRAKES, AND AIRFRAME OVERVIEW. I DID NOT CHK ALL OF THE OTHER ITEMS BEHIND MY STUDENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: TOO MUCH TRUST IN STUDENT'S JUDGEMENT REGARDING PREFLT OF ACFT. INSTRUCTOR WAS UNDER THE FALSE PERCEPTION THAT THE STUDENT WAS THOROUGH IN ALL PHASES OF FLT. STUDENT WAS ALWAYS EAGER AND WELL PREPARED. A 'STAR STUDENT' IF YOU WILL. I AM REEVALUATING MY INSTRUCTOR-STUDENT RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH STUDENT. I BELIEVE THAT MY FRIENDLY NATURE HAS LED TO AN OVERLY TRUSTING RELATIONSHIP WITH MOST STUDENTS. THIS BOND MAY HAVE CREATED A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY ON MY PART, REGARDING MY STUDENT'S PREFLT PROC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.