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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 616306 |
Time | |
Date | 200404 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : aml.vortac |
State Reference | VA |
Altitude | msl single value : 1500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : pct.tracon tower : vps.tower |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 63 flight time total : 1040 flight time type : 924 |
ASRS Report | 616306 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : local |
Events | |
Anomaly | airspace violation : entry airspace violation : exit non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | atc equipment other atc equipment : radar/mode c other controllera other controllerb other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : returned to assigned airspace |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew faa : investigated faa : assigned or threatened penalties Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance FAA Airspace Structure ATC Human Performance ATC Facility |
Primary Problem | ATC Facility |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
The pilot of aircraft X was communicating with iad tower on 120.1 for the first five photo locations as the majority of these sites were located in the iad class B surface area. After completing the photo mission on location #5, aircraft X departed the class B surface area in a northerly direction from the aml 080 at 7 DME on the way to the 6TH location at aml 025 at 24 DME. After crossing the potomac, iad tower requested that the pilot contact potomac approach on 134.2. Approximately 20 miles north of iad, the pilot contacted the controller on 134.2 and advised him that we would be approaching location #6 shortly and would be descending to 800 ft for the photo mission. Following the photo mission at site #6, we would then climb back to 1500 ft, turn southeast and fly to location #7. The controller instructed the pilot to squawk 1200 and to come up on frequency 126.75 at the conclusion of site #6 and a new controller would issue a new squawk code for the remainder of the flight. Before complying with this request, the pilot of aircraft X requested to remain on the original ADIZ squawk code. This request was denied. Complying with the ATC request, the pilot changed transponder code to 1200 and descended over site #6 to conduct the photo mission. At the conclusion of the photo mission over site #6, aircraft X climbed back up to 1500 ft, continued to squawk 1200, and came up on frequency 126.75 and informed the new controller of our intention of continuing the flight by proceeding to site #7 dca 355 at 9 DME as instructed by the previous controller (134.2). After initially responding that he could find no paperwork for aircraft X, the controller issued the pilot of aircraft X a new squawk code, and granted clearance to proceed on course to site #7. In addition, the controller requested that the pilot call an issued phone number at the conclusion of the flight. At the conclusion of the flight, the pilot made the call and was informed that ATC was submitting a pilot deviation report to the FAA enforcement office citing a violation of the ADIZ (entering ADIZ on a 1200 code). The problem arose as a direct result of the 134.2 controller not granting the pilot's request to remain on the original ADIZ squawk code, and then compounded the error by failing to adequately hand off the flight to the controller on 126.75. The problem was discovered on 126.75, and he assumed that the pilot was at fault (as opposed to ATC). The pilot informed the 126.75 controller that he was complying with instructions issued by the previous controller on 134.2, but for whatever reason this information was not viewed credibly or even verified between the two controllers. Contributing factors included location #6 being located just outside the ADIZ (hence the erroneous instruction from the 134.2 controller to the pilot to squawk 1200 even though he knew the flight would be continuing back in to the ADIZ after the photo mission at site #6 was completed) and the lack of communication between the controllers on this flight. Poor low-level radio and radar coverage in this sector also contributed. Corrective actions: it appears since the advent of the ADIZ and frz flight restrictions (in the dca metropolitan area) after 9/11, the potomac TRACON has not been adequately staffed or equipped to manage the enormous workload imposed on them by having to track GA VFR flts operating in the region. The increased workload has significantly contributed to the many mistakes made by the controllers handling aircraft in the region. Unfortunately the pilot is more often than not assumed to be at fault when a perceived transgression has taken place, and assumed 'guilty' until they can prove themselves innocent. One final thought, clearly the controller on 126.75 eventually 'found' our flight plan paperwork since he did issue us a new squawk code, cleared us on course (inside the ADIZ) and then cleared us to site #7 in the dca frz (flight restricted zone) -- the most heavily guarded airspace in the us. Since this clearance would have never been provided had we not been on an approved ADIZ and frz waivered flight plan, it is apparent that ATC was well aware of our intentions on departure from hef, en route from iad to site #6, became confused between sites 6 and 7,then granted us clearance into the frz. The conclusion, the sequence of ATC events during the flight clearly exonerates the pilot of any wrong doing. What is the purpose of this enforcement action activity? It makes no sense.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: VFR ACFT PLT WAS CONDUCTING A PHOTO MISSION ON A VFR ADIZ AND FRZ FLT PLAN WITH A DISCRETE XPONDER CODE. PLT IS INSTRUCTED BY A PCT CTLR TO SQUAWK 1200 THEN LATER CITED BY ATC FOR SQUAWKING 1200 IN THE ADIZ AREA.
Narrative: THE PLT OF ACFT X WAS COMMUNICATING WITH IAD TWR ON 120.1 FOR THE FIRST FIVE PHOTO LOCATIONS AS THE MAJORITY OF THESE SITES WERE LOCATED IN THE IAD CLASS B SURFACE AREA. AFTER COMPLETING THE PHOTO MISSION ON LOCATION #5, ACFT X DEPARTED THE CLASS B SURFACE AREA IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION FROM THE AML 080 AT 7 DME ON THE WAY TO THE 6TH LOCATION AT AML 025 AT 24 DME. AFTER XING THE POTOMAC, IAD TWR REQUESTED THAT THE PLT CONTACT POTOMAC APCH ON 134.2. APPROX 20 MILES N OF IAD, THE PLT CONTACTED THE CTLR ON 134.2 AND ADVISED HIM THAT WE WOULD BE APCHING LOCATION #6 SHORTLY AND WOULD BE DSNDING TO 800 FT FOR THE PHOTO MISSION. FOLLOWING THE PHOTO MISSION AT SITE #6, WE WOULD THEN CLB BACK TO 1500 FT, TURN SOUTHEAST AND FLY TO LOCATION #7. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED THE PLT TO SQUAWK 1200 AND TO COME UP ON FREQ 126.75 AT THE CONCLUSION OF SITE #6 AND A NEW CTLR WOULD ISSUE A NEW SQUAWK CODE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. BEFORE COMPLYING WITH THIS REQUEST, THE PLT OF ACFT X REQUESTED TO REMAIN ON THE ORIGINAL ADIZ SQUAWK CODE. THIS REQUEST WAS DENIED. COMPLYING WITH THE ATC REQUEST, THE PLT CHANGED TRANSPONDER CODE TO 1200 AND DSNDED OVER SITE #6 TO CONDUCT THE PHOTO MISSION. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PHOTO MISSION OVER SITE #6, ACFT X CLBED BACK UP TO 1500 FT, CONTINUED TO SQUAWK 1200, AND CAME UP ON FREQ 126.75 AND INFORMED THE NEW CTLR OF OUR INTENTION OF CONTINUING THE FLT BY PROCEEDING TO SITE #7 DCA 355 AT 9 DME AS INSTRUCTED BY THE PREVIOUS CTLR (134.2). AFTER INITIALLY RESPONDING THAT HE COULD FIND NO PAPERWORK FOR ACFT X, THE CTLR ISSUED THE PLT OF ACFT X A NEW SQUAWK CODE, AND GRANTED CLRNC TO PROCEED ON COURSE TO SITE #7. IN ADDITION, THE CTLR REQUESTED THAT THE PLT CALL AN ISSUED PHONE NUMBER AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FLT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FLT, THE PLT MADE THE CALL AND WAS INFORMED THAT ATC WAS SUBMITTING A PLT DEV RPT TO THE FAA ENFORCEMENT OFFICE CITING A VIOLATION OF THE ADIZ (ENTERING ADIZ ON A 1200 CODE). THE PROB AROSE AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE 134.2 CTLR NOT GRANTING THE PLT'S REQUEST TO REMAIN ON THE ORIGINAL ADIZ SQUAWK CODE, AND THEN COMPOUNDED THE ERROR BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY HAND OFF THE FLT TO THE CTLR ON 126.75. THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED ON 126.75, AND HE ASSUMED THAT THE PLT WAS AT FAULT (AS OPPOSED TO ATC). THE PLT INFORMED THE 126.75 CTLR THAT HE WAS COMPLYING WITH INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE PREVIOUS CTLR ON 134.2, BUT FOR WHATEVER REASON THIS INFO WAS NOT VIEWED CREDIBLY OR EVEN VERIFIED BETWEEN THE TWO CTLRS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED LOCATION #6 BEING LOCATED JUST OUTSIDE THE ADIZ (HENCE THE ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION FROM THE 134.2 CTLR TO THE PLT TO SQUAWK 1200 EVEN THOUGH HE KNEW THE FLT WOULD BE CONTINUING BACK IN TO THE ADIZ AFTER THE PHOTO MISSION AT SITE #6 WAS COMPLETED) AND THE LACK OF COM BETWEEN THE CTLRS ON THIS FLT. POOR LOW-LEVEL RADIO AND RADAR COVERAGE IN THIS SECTOR ALSO CONTRIBUTED. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: IT APPEARS SINCE THE ADVENT OF THE ADIZ AND FRZ FLT RESTRICTIONS (IN THE DCA METROPOLITAN AREA) AFTER 9/11, THE POTOMAC TRACON HAS NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY STAFFED OR EQUIPPED TO MANAGE THE ENORMOUS WORKLOAD IMPOSED ON THEM BY HAVING TO TRACK GA VFR FLTS OPERATING IN THE REGION. THE INCREASED WORKLOAD HAS SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE MANY MISTAKES MADE BY THE CTLRS HANDLING ACFT IN THE REGION. UNFORTUNATELY THE PLT IS MORE OFTEN THAN NOT ASSUMED TO BE AT FAULT WHEN A PERCEIVED TRANSGRESSION HAS TAKEN PLACE, AND ASSUMED 'GUILTY' UNTIL THEY CAN PROVE THEMSELVES INNOCENT. ONE FINAL THOUGHT, CLEARLY THE CTLR ON 126.75 EVENTUALLY 'FOUND' OUR FLT PLAN PAPERWORK SINCE HE DID ISSUE US A NEW SQUAWK CODE, CLRED US ON COURSE (INSIDE THE ADIZ) AND THEN CLRED US TO SITE #7 IN THE DCA FRZ (FLT RESTRICTED ZONE) -- THE MOST HEAVILY GUARDED AIRSPACE IN THE US. SINCE THIS CLRNC WOULD HAVE NEVER BEEN PROVIDED HAD WE NOT BEEN ON AN APPROVED ADIZ AND FRZ WAIVERED FLT PLAN, IT IS APPARENT THAT ATC WAS WELL AWARE OF OUR INTENTIONS ON DEP FROM HEF, ENRTE FROM IAD TO SITE #6, BECAME CONFUSED BETWEEN SITES 6 AND 7,THEN GRANTED US CLRNC INTO THE FRZ. THE CONCLUSION, THE SEQUENCE OF ATC EVENTS DURING THE FLT CLEARLY EXONERATES THE PLT OF ANY WRONG DOING. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS ENFORCEMENT ACTION ACTIVITY? IT MAKES NO SENSE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.