37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 616434 |
Time | |
Date | 200405 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl bound upper : 35000 agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zzz1.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | cruise : level ground : parked ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 20000 flight time type : 540 |
ASRS Report | 616434 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical cabin event other maintenance problem : improper documentation maintenance problem : non compliance with mel maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far non adherence : company policies other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : cab 4 |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : overcame equipment problem other |
Consequence | other other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : fault isolation performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : repair performance deficiency : unqualified personnel |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Maintenance Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft Cabin Crew Human Performance Chart Or Publication |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Situations | |
Publication | Minimum Equipment List |
Narrative:
Rear galley deferred due to some problem. Water valve was still open and while en route at FL350 flooded rear galley to the extreme. Standing water in galley and up to 2 rows in rear of aircraft. Maintenance failed to close the shutoff valve prior to flight (aircraft came in from ZZZ1). The flight attendants could not find the shutoff valve to stop the water. Water continued to flow until our jump seater, airbus captain, returned to the rear and shut the fluid flow off. Major mistake by maintenance followed by lack of training or poor performance by the flight service to shut the water off. This could have been very dangerous. I feel this was a major breach of the safety net of our operation. Do not know all the potential damage which could result. I do know aircraft are not swimming pools. The water could have created control problems, electrical shorts for passenger and crew in galley, as well as major electrical problems. This was a potential problem which could have resulted in a hull loss. Very upset that maintenance did not shut the valve off and equally upset flight service could not find the valve shutoff. Suggest crew option be given to fix such problems in the future. Now, as I understand it, we are not to leave the cockpit. Please advise as to the best option in advent that no cockpit crew member is available for maintenance intervention.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN AIRBUS 320 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A REAR GALLEY WATER LEAK DEFERRED, BUT WATER TO AFT GALLEY NOT SHUT OFF. REAR GALLEY FLOODED.
Narrative: REAR GALLEY DEFERRED DUE TO SOME PROB. WATER VALVE WAS STILL OPEN AND WHILE ENRTE AT FL350 FLOODED REAR GALLEY TO THE EXTREME. STANDING WATER IN GALLEY AND UP TO 2 ROWS IN REAR OF ACFT. MAINT FAILED TO CLOSE THE SHUTOFF VALVE PRIOR TO FLT (ACFT CAME IN FROM ZZZ1). THE FLT ATTENDANTS COULD NOT FIND THE SHUTOFF VALVE TO STOP THE WATER. WATER CONTINUED TO FLOW UNTIL OUR JUMP SEATER, AIRBUS CAPT, RETURNED TO THE REAR AND SHUT THE FLUID FLOW OFF. MAJOR MISTAKE BY MAINT FOLLOWED BY LACK OF TRAINING OR POOR PERFORMANCE BY THE FLT SVC TO SHUT THE WATER OFF. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN VERY DANGEROUS. I FEEL THIS WAS A MAJOR BREACH OF THE SAFETY NET OF OUR OP. DO NOT KNOW ALL THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE WHICH COULD RESULT. I DO KNOW ACFT ARE NOT SWIMMING POOLS. THE WATER COULD HAVE CREATED CTL PROBS, ELECTRICAL SHORTS FOR PAX AND CREW IN GALLEY, AS WELL AS MAJOR ELECTRICAL PROBS. THIS WAS A POTENTIAL PROB WHICH COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A HULL LOSS. VERY UPSET THAT MAINT DID NOT SHUT THE VALVE OFF AND EQUALLY UPSET FLT SVC COULD NOT FIND THE VALVE SHUTOFF. SUGGEST CREW OPTION BE GIVEN TO FIX SUCH PROBS IN THE FUTURE. NOW, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, WE ARE NOT TO LEAVE THE COCKPIT. PLEASE ADVISE AS TO THE BEST OPTION IN ADVENT THAT NO COCKPIT CREW MEMBER IS AVAILABLE FOR MAINT INTERVENTION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.