Narrative:

After pushback and engine start, first officer called for taxi clearance. Controller gave instructions to taxi to runway 19 via taxiway F, runway 6/24, south, runway 19. At least that was what we understood as being correct. I began to follow the taxi instructions. As we approached runway 28, I asked first officer to confirm we were cleared to cross runway 28 at taxiway F. Controller said to hold short. I was able to stop short of runway just as a B737 rolled past us on runway 28 during takeoff roll. After we were cleared to cross runway 28, we continued our taxi to runway 19. Factors involved: 1) ATIS was reporting calm winds, showing runway 19 as departure runway, and runway 10 as landing runway. Runway 28 for takeoff did not enter into my thought process, 2) before I was monitoring ground frequency, I observed the other air carrier flight taxiing out, I assumed he was taxiing for takeoff on runway 19, 3) the controller was very difficult to understand. His instructions were very lazy. When asked to repeat initial taxi instructions, he repeated them in the same manner as the first time. It has become common practice with me to confirm clearance to cross runways as we approach that runway. In this case, it prevented a possible accident. Supplemental information from acn 617818: we stopped the aircraft with the nose gear well short of the runway 'hold short' line and a few seconds later a B737 went past from right to left on takeoff roll on runway 28. The controller had a strong cajun accent with a monotone/lazy approach to talking. This made him very hard to understand. One would think that a controller allowing an aircraft to take off on an unexpected runway with other aircraft taxiing across that runway would be very clear and timely about hold short instructions. It should be noted that we never heard takeoff clearance for the B737 since we were on ground control frequency, not tower. Had we not asked or had the controller delayed his response to us anymore than he already had, I'm not sure what would have happened.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ON TAXI OUT TO RWY 19, MSY, CAPT QUESTIONS INTERIM RWY 28 XING, STOPPING AS B737 IS ON TKOF ROLL.

Narrative: AFTER PUSHBACK AND ENG START, FO CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC. CTLR GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI TO RWY 19 VIA TXWY F, RWY 6/24, S, RWY 19. AT LEAST THAT WAS WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD AS BEING CORRECT. I BEGAN TO FOLLOW THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. AS WE APCHED RWY 28, I ASKED FO TO CONFIRM WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 28 AT TXWY F. CTLR SAID TO HOLD SHORT. I WAS ABLE TO STOP SHORT OF RWY JUST AS A B737 ROLLED PAST US ON RWY 28 DURING TKOF ROLL. AFTER WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 28, WE CONTINUED OUR TAXI TO RWY 19. FACTORS INVOLVED: 1) ATIS WAS RPTING CALM WINDS, SHOWING RWY 19 AS DEP RWY, AND RWY 10 AS LNDG RWY. RWY 28 FOR TKOF DID NOT ENTER INTO MY THOUGHT PROCESS, 2) BEFORE I WAS MONITORING GND FREQ, I OBSERVED THE OTHER ACR FLT TAXIING OUT, I ASSUMED HE WAS TAXIING FOR TKOF ON RWY 19, 3) THE CTLR WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE VERY LAZY. WHEN ASKED TO REPEAT INITIAL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, HE REPEATED THEM IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE FIRST TIME. IT HAS BECOME COMMON PRACTICE WITH ME TO CONFIRM CLRNC TO CROSS RWYS AS WE APCH THAT RWY. IN THIS CASE, IT PREVENTED A POSSIBLE ACCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 617818: WE STOPPED THE ACFT WITH THE NOSE GEAR WELL SHORT OF THE RWY 'HOLD SHORT' LINE AND A FEW SECONDS LATER A B737 WENT PAST FROM R TO L ON TKOF ROLL ON RWY 28. THE CTLR HAD A STRONG CAJUN ACCENT WITH A MONOTONE/LAZY APCH TO TALKING. THIS MADE HIM VERY HARD TO UNDERSTAND. ONE WOULD THINK THAT A CTLR ALLOWING AN ACFT TO TAKE OFF ON AN UNEXPECTED RWY WITH OTHER ACFT TAXIING ACROSS THAT RWY WOULD BE VERY CLR AND TIMELY ABOUT HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WE NEVER HEARD TKOF CLRNC FOR THE B737 SINCE WE WERE ON GND CTL FREQ, NOT TWR. HAD WE NOT ASKED OR HAD THE CTLR DELAYED HIS RESPONSE TO US ANYMORE THAN HE ALREADY HAD, I'M NOT SURE WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.