Narrative:

WX was VFR, visibility reduced due to haze, convective activity in the area, buildups of clouds starting. Bdl was landing runway 24/15. Strong tailwind on the arrs from the northwest. The west departure controller started handoff on a B757 landing bdl runway 15 nne, leaving 8000 ft. Our requirement is to hand off bdl arrs descending to 5000 ft, unless coordinated. The B757 checked in on my frequency descending to 4000 ft. I hear the west departure controller release an aircraft off westover air reserve base climbing to 5000 ft. This worries me because the B757 that west departure handed off to me, descending to 4000 ft, crosses the westover departure course. The B757 asks me for a turn to the south to avoid buildups of clouds. The west departure controller calls me on the override asking me if I will take the handoff on the J328. The J328 was 7 mi west of the B757. The J328 was at 5000 ft and 50-60 KTS faster than the B757. The B757 was descending through 6300 ft. I told the west departure controller I would not take the handoff because of the speed difference and that the B757 was higher, converging and still abeam the J328, and I was worried about the aircraft released off westover. The west controller turned the J328. At the same time, I asked the B757 if he needed a vector for descent. It was 10 mi northeast of bdl at 6000 ft. The pilot said no, he would just slow down and descend. The B757 ground speed decreased to 190 KTS. Taking into account of the overtake of the J328 and the wake created by the B757, I felt it was unsafe and a situation that could develop into a loss of separation. The ground speed overtake reached 90 KTS when the pilot of the B757 said he would slow to make the descent. I asked the supervisor to do a quality assurance review of the situation because I felt the operation was unsafe. During the review, it was found that the west departure controller entered my (bristol) controller's airspace without a handoff or coordination. Supplemental information from acn 618170: handing off traffic to bristol sector arriving bdl. 1ST aircraft, B757, slow descending, 2ND aircraft made faster descent. After bristol accepted handoff on 1ST aircraft, I realized aircraft #2 was descending much more rapidly and was descending over the runway 15 shelf belonging to bristol. I tried to call bristol to take the handoff but was too late. The aircraft entered the shelf descending to 5000 ft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Y90 CTLR RPTED AN AIRSPACE DEV DURING A TFC PERIOD INVOLVING STRONG TAILWINDS BTWN A B757 AND A D328.

Narrative: WX WAS VFR, VISIBILITY REDUCED DUE TO HAZE, CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY IN THE AREA, BUILDUPS OF CLOUDS STARTING. BDL WAS LNDG RWY 24/15. STRONG TAILWIND ON THE ARRS FROM THE NW. THE W DEP CTLR STARTED HDOF ON A B757 LNDG BDL RWY 15 NNE, LEAVING 8000 FT. OUR REQUIREMENT IS TO HAND OFF BDL ARRS DSNDING TO 5000 FT, UNLESS COORDINATED. THE B757 CHKED IN ON MY FREQ DSNDING TO 4000 FT. I HEAR THE W DEP CTLR RELEASE AN ACFT OFF WESTOVER AIR RESERVE BASE CLBING TO 5000 FT. THIS WORRIES ME BECAUSE THE B757 THAT W DEP HANDED OFF TO ME, DSNDING TO 4000 FT, CROSSES THE WESTOVER DEP COURSE. THE B757 ASKS ME FOR A TURN TO THE S TO AVOID BUILDUPS OF CLOUDS. THE W DEP CTLR CALLS ME ON THE OVERRIDE ASKING ME IF I WILL TAKE THE HDOF ON THE J328. THE J328 WAS 7 MI W OF THE B757. THE J328 WAS AT 5000 FT AND 50-60 KTS FASTER THAN THE B757. THE B757 WAS DSNDING THROUGH 6300 FT. I TOLD THE W DEP CTLR I WOULD NOT TAKE THE HDOF BECAUSE OF THE SPD DIFFERENCE AND THAT THE B757 WAS HIGHER, CONVERGING AND STILL ABEAM THE J328, AND I WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE ACFT RELEASED OFF WESTOVER. THE W CTLR TURNED THE J328. AT THE SAME TIME, I ASKED THE B757 IF HE NEEDED A VECTOR FOR DSCNT. IT WAS 10 MI NE OF BDL AT 6000 FT. THE PLT SAID NO, HE WOULD JUST SLOW DOWN AND DSND. THE B757 GND SPD DECREASED TO 190 KTS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF THE OVERTAKE OF THE J328 AND THE WAKE CREATED BY THE B757, I FELT IT WAS UNSAFE AND A SIT THAT COULD DEVELOP INTO A LOSS OF SEPARATION. THE GND SPD OVERTAKE REACHED 90 KTS WHEN THE PLT OF THE B757 SAID HE WOULD SLOW TO MAKE THE DSCNT. I ASKED THE SUPVR TO DO A QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW OF THE SIT BECAUSE I FELT THE OP WAS UNSAFE. DURING THE REVIEW, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE W DEP CTLR ENTERED MY (BRISTOL) CTLR'S AIRSPACE WITHOUT A HDOF OR COORD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 618170: HANDING OFF TFC TO BRISTOL SECTOR ARRIVING BDL. 1ST ACFT, B757, SLOW DSNDING, 2ND ACFT MADE FASTER DSCNT. AFTER BRISTOL ACCEPTED HDOF ON 1ST ACFT, I REALIZED ACFT #2 WAS DSNDING MUCH MORE RAPIDLY AND WAS DSNDING OVER THE RWY 15 SHELF BELONGING TO BRISTOL. I TRIED TO CALL BRISTOL TO TAKE THE HDOF BUT WAS TOO LATE. THE ACFT ENTERED THE SHELF DSNDING TO 5000 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.