Narrative:

Apparent confusion amongst approach controllers meant that my clearance to begin a VOR approach (to an airport at sea level) was given while still at 8000 ft and included a subsequent (almost steep) turn to intercept the final approach course, close to the FAF, while still descending at rates up to 2000 FPM. Primarily because of the speed associated with this descent, flaps were deployed only to (less than) 10 degrees prior to crossing the FAF and were not subsequently deployed further. During the descent on approach, a low altitude alert was issued by the tower including the current altimeter setting. I checked the setting and my altitude, which was above the appropriate MDA, and proceeded with the approach. Cloud bases were variable and I was in and out of cloud which impacted forward visibility, though I had clear ground contact from before the final DME based stepdown. After finally breaking out and making visual contact with the runway, it was clear that my speed was still higher than usual and I elected to perform an s-turn to slow down. It was only after landing and being asked by the tower controller about cloud bases and why I had performed an s-turn on final approach that I realized that I had not lowered the flaps to the normal landing position. The nonstandard descending turn close to the FAF meant that the aircraft was flying faster than usual. The high workload associated with intercepting the VOR track and beginning final descent in this circumstance, at speeds higher than I could deploy the flaps, resulted in beginning the final approach descent in what for me is a nonstandard confign. This nonstandard confign resulted in a final visual approach that did not 'feel right,' because the plane was not slowly normally or descending with the normal nose attitude. I elected to perform an s-turn to slow the plane as I did not think to check the flap position on short final. The low altitude alert was an additional stress factor during the approach, particularly following the high rates of descent during the initial part of the approach. However, my understanding is that rate of descent is part of the algorithm which triggers the alert and I confirmed on checking my altitude that I was above prescribed minimums. While flying this approach previously, I had been issued with such an alert while within altitude limits and had often heard other aircraft trigger the warning and so it was not as stressing as it might otherwise have been. This is the second time in as many months that relatively acute and steep turns close to FAF or OM have contributed to difficult approachs for me. They make it difficult to 'stay ahead' of the aircraft and reduce one's ability to cope with subsequent issues in the approach. I will be careful to request alternative dscnts/turns when making these approachs in the future.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C210 PVT PLT COMPLAINS OF HAVING TO MAKE A NONSTANDARD TURN VOR APCH INTO GON, CT, UNDER PVD APCH CTL.

Narrative: APPARENT CONFUSION AMONGST APCH CTLRS MEANT THAT MY CLRNC TO BEGIN A VOR APCH (TO AN ARPT AT SEA LEVEL) WAS GIVEN WHILE STILL AT 8000 FT AND INCLUDED A SUBSEQUENT (ALMOST STEEP) TURN TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE, CLOSE TO THE FAF, WHILE STILL DSNDING AT RATES UP TO 2000 FPM. PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE SPD ASSOCIATED WITH THIS DSCNT, FLAPS WERE DEPLOYED ONLY TO (LESS THAN) 10 DEGS PRIOR TO XING THE FAF AND WERE NOT SUBSEQUENTLY DEPLOYED FURTHER. DURING THE DSCNT ON APCH, A LOW ALT ALERT WAS ISSUED BY THE TWR INCLUDING THE CURRENT ALTIMETER SETTING. I CHKED THE SETTING AND MY ALT, WHICH WAS ABOVE THE APPROPRIATE MDA, AND PROCEEDED WITH THE APCH. CLOUD BASES WERE VARIABLE AND I WAS IN AND OUT OF CLOUD WHICH IMPACTED FORWARD VISIBILITY, THOUGH I HAD CLR GND CONTACT FROM BEFORE THE FINAL DME BASED STEPDOWN. AFTER FINALLY BREAKING OUT AND MAKING VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE RWY, IT WAS CLR THAT MY SPD WAS STILL HIGHER THAN USUAL AND I ELECTED TO PERFORM AN S-TURN TO SLOW DOWN. IT WAS ONLY AFTER LNDG AND BEING ASKED BY THE TWR CTLR ABOUT CLOUD BASES AND WHY I HAD PERFORMED AN S-TURN ON FINAL APCH THAT I REALIZED THAT I HAD NOT LOWERED THE FLAPS TO THE NORMAL LNDG POS. THE NONSTANDARD DSNDING TURN CLOSE TO THE FAF MEANT THAT THE ACFT WAS FLYING FASTER THAN USUAL. THE HIGH WORKLOAD ASSOCIATED WITH INTERCEPTING THE VOR TRACK AND BEGINNING FINAL DSCNT IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, AT SPDS HIGHER THAN I COULD DEPLOY THE FLAPS, RESULTED IN BEGINNING THE FINAL APCH DSCNT IN WHAT FOR ME IS A NONSTANDARD CONFIGN. THIS NONSTANDARD CONFIGN RESULTED IN A FINAL VISUAL APCH THAT DID NOT 'FEEL RIGHT,' BECAUSE THE PLANE WAS NOT SLOWLY NORMALLY OR DSNDING WITH THE NORMAL NOSE ATTITUDE. I ELECTED TO PERFORM AN S-TURN TO SLOW THE PLANE AS I DID NOT THINK TO CHK THE FLAP POS ON SHORT FINAL. THE LOW ALT ALERT WAS AN ADDITIONAL STRESS FACTOR DURING THE APCH, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THE HIGH RATES OF DSCNT DURING THE INITIAL PART OF THE APCH. HOWEVER, MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT RATE OF DSCNT IS PART OF THE ALGORITHM WHICH TRIGGERS THE ALERT AND I CONFIRMED ON CHKING MY ALT THAT I WAS ABOVE PRESCRIBED MINIMUMS. WHILE FLYING THIS APCH PREVIOUSLY, I HAD BEEN ISSUED WITH SUCH AN ALERT WHILE WITHIN ALT LIMITS AND HAD OFTEN HEARD OTHER ACFT TRIGGER THE WARNING AND SO IT WAS NOT AS STRESSING AS IT MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN. THIS IS THE SECOND TIME IN AS MANY MONTHS THAT RELATIVELY ACUTE AND STEEP TURNS CLOSE TO FAF OR OM HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO DIFFICULT APCHS FOR ME. THEY MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO 'STAY AHEAD' OF THE ACFT AND REDUCE ONE'S ABILITY TO COPE WITH SUBSEQUENT ISSUES IN THE APCH. I WILL BE CAREFUL TO REQUEST ALTERNATIVE DSCNTS/TURNS WHEN MAKING THESE APCHS IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.