Narrative:

The cause of the incident began when departing hastings airport. I noted an aircraft taking off from runway 30, which the northerly wind favored, so I taxied to the end of runway 30. As I entered the run-up area, I noted a second aircraft using runway 12 for touch and goes. This second aircraft was now the only aircraft in the pattern as far as I was aware (the first aircraft announced leaving the airport area to the east). Rather than taxi to the other end (runway 12), I notified the other pilot that the winds favored runway 30 and thus I was going to depart from runway 30 after his next touch and go if that didn't pose any problems with him. He replied that would be find and I began my preflight checks. Based on his radios calls, he was going to continue using runway 12 and was well into the downwind leg when I completed the preflight check with the exception of 2 items: the transponder and the strobes. I placed the checklist back in the pouch and made a mental note to activate the transponder and strobe once the other aircraft was clear and I was ready to roll. 3 or 4 mins later, the other aircraft completed his touch and go, then once he was clear, I announced and departed from runway 30. Before I turned left crosswind after departure, he announced that he was on a left downwind for runway 12 and had me in sight. After the crosswind leg, I announced that I was departing the airport area to the west and continued climbing. Once I reached 3500 ft, I leveled off and the aircraft started accelerating from the climb speed of 90 mph to 120 mph. Very soon after leveling off, I glanced left and at my approximately 10 O'clock position I noticed a northbound B737 slightly above the horizon, less than what I would guess to be 1/8 mi, descending in a slight right bank. It was closing very fast. (This B737 was close enough that I remember noticing it was equipped with old turbojets instead of the newer turbofans, and that the landing gear was still up.) judging by the fact that the B737 remained in the same spot in my window, it was obvious that we were on a collision course. Within what seemed like a few nanoseconds getting the B737 in sight, I immediately executed an evasive maneuver by pushing forward and rolling right on the yoke hoping to dive out of the way and also hoping the B737 would see me and climb to the left. The B737 passed almost directly overhead as I leveled out at 3200 ft. A few seconds later, I noticed the B737 making one slight course correction to the right to line up with runway 35 at grr. I don't know if that course correction was the result of an evasive maneuver or if they were simply making their final line-up with the runway, but it was clear from my viewpoint that they were lining up for runway 35, which we also had in sight. After the danger had passed, I then began to wonder how on earth ATC could have let us get so close, and, as I brought my eyes back into the cockpit, the first thing I looked at was the transponder -- still in the standby position. Even worse, the strobes were still off. My attempt to make a mental note to turn those items on before departing had failed miserably. I turned the strobes on immediately, but watched for other traffic and waited for a few mi of separation from the B737 before putting the transponder into mode C. I did this to avoid creating a panic on grr approach's radar screen. Clearly my decision to place the checklist back into the pouch before completing all items was the start of this problem. Thus, in the future, the checklist will remain in my left hand until fully completed. Contributing factors were my failure to see and avoid this aircraft, and runway confusion at the uncontrolled hastings airport (which led to the poor checklist decision). Would I have considered using runway 12 instead? No, the winds definitely favored runway 30, and that should have been the active runway. In the future I will at least encourage the other pilot to use the wind-favored runway instead of just 'hinting' at it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: VFR PA28 DEP FROM 9D9 EXPERIENCED NMAC WITH B737 ON TURNING FINAL FOR GRR AT 3500 FT.

Narrative: THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT BEGAN WHEN DEPARTING HASTINGS ARPT. I NOTED AN ACFT TAKING OFF FROM RWY 30, WHICH THE NORTHERLY WIND FAVORED, SO I TAXIED TO THE END OF RWY 30. AS I ENTERED THE RUN-UP AREA, I NOTED A SECOND ACFT USING RWY 12 FOR TOUCH AND GOES. THIS SECOND ACFT WAS NOW THE ONLY ACFT IN THE PATTERN AS FAR AS I WAS AWARE (THE FIRST ACFT ANNOUNCED LEAVING THE ARPT AREA TO THE E). RATHER THAN TAXI TO THE OTHER END (RWY 12), I NOTIFIED THE OTHER PLT THAT THE WINDS FAVORED RWY 30 AND THUS I WAS GOING TO DEPART FROM RWY 30 AFTER HIS NEXT TOUCH AND GO IF THAT DIDN'T POSE ANY PROBS WITH HIM. HE REPLIED THAT WOULD BE FIND AND I BEGAN MY PREFLT CHKS. BASED ON HIS RADIOS CALLS, HE WAS GOING TO CONTINUE USING RWY 12 AND WAS WELL INTO THE DOWNWIND LEG WHEN I COMPLETED THE PREFLT CHK WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 2 ITEMS: THE XPONDER AND THE STROBES. I PLACED THE CHKLIST BACK IN THE POUCH AND MADE A MENTAL NOTE TO ACTIVATE THE XPONDER AND STROBE ONCE THE OTHER ACFT WAS CLR AND I WAS READY TO ROLL. 3 OR 4 MINS LATER, THE OTHER ACFT COMPLETED HIS TOUCH AND GO, THEN ONCE HE WAS CLR, I ANNOUNCED AND DEPARTED FROM RWY 30. BEFORE I TURNED L XWIND AFTER DEP, HE ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS ON A L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 12 AND HAD ME IN SIGHT. AFTER THE XWIND LEG, I ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS DEPARTING THE ARPT AREA TO THE W AND CONTINUED CLBING. ONCE I REACHED 3500 FT, I LEVELED OFF AND THE ACFT STARTED ACCELERATING FROM THE CLB SPD OF 90 MPH TO 120 MPH. VERY SOON AFTER LEVELING OFF, I GLANCED L AND AT MY APPROX 10 O'CLOCK POS I NOTICED A NBOUND B737 SLIGHTLY ABOVE THE HORIZON, LESS THAN WHAT I WOULD GUESS TO BE 1/8 MI, DSNDING IN A SLIGHT R BANK. IT WAS CLOSING VERY FAST. (THIS B737 WAS CLOSE ENOUGH THAT I REMEMBER NOTICING IT WAS EQUIPPED WITH OLD TURBOJETS INSTEAD OF THE NEWER TURBOFANS, AND THAT THE LNDG GEAR WAS STILL UP.) JUDGING BY THE FACT THAT THE B737 REMAINED IN THE SAME SPOT IN MY WINDOW, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE ON A COLLISION COURSE. WITHIN WHAT SEEMED LIKE A FEW NANOSECONDS GETTING THE B737 IN SIGHT, I IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED AN EVASIVE MANEUVER BY PUSHING FORWARD AND ROLLING R ON THE YOKE HOPING TO DIVE OUT OF THE WAY AND ALSO HOPING THE B737 WOULD SEE ME AND CLB TO THE L. THE B737 PASSED ALMOST DIRECTLY OVERHEAD AS I LEVELED OUT AT 3200 FT. A FEW SECONDS LATER, I NOTICED THE B737 MAKING ONE SLIGHT COURSE CORRECTION TO THE R TO LINE UP WITH RWY 35 AT GRR. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT COURSE CORRECTION WAS THE RESULT OF AN EVASIVE MANEUVER OR IF THEY WERE SIMPLY MAKING THEIR FINAL LINE-UP WITH THE RWY, BUT IT WAS CLR FROM MY VIEWPOINT THAT THEY WERE LINING UP FOR RWY 35, WHICH WE ALSO HAD IN SIGHT. AFTER THE DANGER HAD PASSED, I THEN BEGAN TO WONDER HOW ON EARTH ATC COULD HAVE LET US GET SO CLOSE, AND, AS I BROUGHT MY EYES BACK INTO THE COCKPIT, THE FIRST THING I LOOKED AT WAS THE XPONDER -- STILL IN THE STANDBY POS. EVEN WORSE, THE STROBES WERE STILL OFF. MY ATTEMPT TO MAKE A MENTAL NOTE TO TURN THOSE ITEMS ON BEFORE DEPARTING HAD FAILED MISERABLY. I TURNED THE STROBES ON IMMEDIATELY, BUT WATCHED FOR OTHER TFC AND WAITED FOR A FEW MI OF SEPARATION FROM THE B737 BEFORE PUTTING THE XPONDER INTO MODE C. I DID THIS TO AVOID CREATING A PANIC ON GRR APCH'S RADAR SCREEN. CLRLY MY DECISION TO PLACE THE CHKLIST BACK INTO THE POUCH BEFORE COMPLETING ALL ITEMS WAS THE START OF THIS PROB. THUS, IN THE FUTURE, THE CHKLIST WILL REMAIN IN MY L HAND UNTIL FULLY COMPLETED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE MY FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID THIS ACFT, AND RWY CONFUSION AT THE UNCTLED HASTINGS ARPT (WHICH LED TO THE POOR CHKLIST DECISION). WOULD I HAVE CONSIDERED USING RWY 12 INSTEAD? NO, THE WINDS DEFINITELY FAVORED RWY 30, AND THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE ACTIVE RWY. IN THE FUTURE I WILL AT LEAST ENCOURAGE THE OTHER PLT TO USE THE WIND-FAVORED RWY INSTEAD OF JUST 'HINTING' AT IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.