Narrative:

On may/sat/04, we departed eggw at XA57Z for inl. The captain was flying and I was in the right seat for the 7.6 hour flight. The flight was uneventful and we didn't anticipate any WX problems at our destination. About 100 NM from inl, I listened to and recorded the ASOS information and completed the landing initials. The wind was 140 degrees at 14 KTS gusting to 20 KTS, cavok, favoring runway 13. I briefed captain on the WX report and suggested the back course approach to runway 13 with the arc transition, which I programmed into the FMS. At some point in the descent, we were handed off from edmonton radar to ZMP for the approach. Minneapolis cleared us direct inl. Captain selected direct inl, while I selected an intercept to the arc transition. The descent and approach checklists were accomplished and we had briefed the approach. At about 30 mi from the airport, minneapolis asked us to report the airport in sight. We were looking for the airport, but could not locate it and I suggested proceeding direct to devie intersection, which is the final approach fix for the localizer back course runway 13. I selected direct devie intersection in my FMS, and I am not sure captain changed his box from direct inl to direct devie intersection. I was talking to minneapolis, when captain said he had the airport. I looked and saw what looked like the identical airport layout to inl, a runway in the direction of 130 degrees and a short cross runway in the direction of 220 degrees. I told minneapolis that we had the airport and he advised to cancel with him in the air or on the ground. Since we were on a wide base leg by this time and no aircraft were indicated on the TCASII, I asked captain if he wanted to cancel now and he said go ahead. I cancelled the IFR and switched to unicom on 122.8, which I had been monitoring. I broadcast our position on unicom and the FBO at inl gave us a lengthy report of wind conditions and where to park for customs once we had landed. Due to the rapid exchange of communications, I failed to provide the necessary backup to first officer and check my navigation display which would have shown us still outside devie intersection and at the wrong airport. A second distraction was the visual cues I had once we turned final. I felt we were a little high and I was concerned at first whether we could get down comfortably. In reality, although we were a little high, the illusion was compounded by the shorter 100 ft wide runway. With the landing checklist to be completed, protracted communications and what turned out to be a short approach all contributed to taking me out of the loop with regards to catching our error. A normal landing was made and we turned off at the first taxiway. As we turned off the runway someone on the unicom frequency said, 'I bet you guys are looking for inl, this happens all the time.' after this comment, first officer and I realized that we were at the wrong airport. I called minneapolis and admitted our mistake and asked them if they owned this airspace and he responded, 'yes, do you want an IFR or VFR to inl.' I said we would do it VFR. We programmed the box and departed to inl within the time it took to taxi to the takeoff runway. We did not park or open the door and it didn't look like any officials were around to handle formalities. On landing at inl, we cleared united states customs and they did not ask and we did not report that we had landed at ft francis. We refueled and proceeded to den, our final leg. I have pointed out a few of the contributing factors that led me to lose situational awareness, but why we didn't fly the approach to the runway is beyond me. I would like to add that fatigue could have played a possible role. We had been on a demanding european trip for 9 days compounded with late night arrs and maintenance issues. Supplemental information from acn 619541: the pilots (2) were not familiar with international falls area. Center was busy and not watching us closely. PF was 'outside' flying VMC and never came back inside to confirm proper airport. Runway we landed on was 4500 ft by 100 ft. Runway we were supposed to land on was 6500 ft by 150 ft. Optically they look the same. Both airports uncontrolled. Factors: fatigue. Lack of local area knowledge. Similar runways and visual cues. Less than perfectsynergy between pilots. Lack of active center participation because of workload.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A G4 FLT CREW APCHS AND LANDS AT THE WRONG ARPT WHEN THEY WERE NE OF CYAG, ONT, VERSUS THEIR DEST ARPT OF INL, MN.

Narrative: ON MAY/SAT/04, WE DEPARTED EGGW AT XA57Z FOR INL. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND I WAS IN THE R SEAT FOR THE 7.6 HR FLT. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WE DIDN'T ANTICIPATE ANY WX PROBS AT OUR DEST. ABOUT 100 NM FROM INL, I LISTENED TO AND RECORDED THE ASOS INFO AND COMPLETED THE LNDG INITIALS. THE WIND WAS 140 DEGS AT 14 KTS GUSTING TO 20 KTS, CAVOK, FAVORING RWY 13. I BRIEFED CAPT ON THE WX RPT AND SUGGESTED THE BACK COURSE APCH TO RWY 13 WITH THE ARC TRANSITION, WHICH I PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMS. AT SOME POINT IN THE DSCNT, WE WERE HANDED OFF FROM EDMONTON RADAR TO ZMP FOR THE APCH. MINNEAPOLIS CLRED US DIRECT INL. CAPT SELECTED DIRECT INL, WHILE I SELECTED AN INTERCEPT TO THE ARC TRANSITION. THE DSCNT AND APCH CHKLISTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED AND WE HAD BRIEFED THE APCH. AT ABOUT 30 MI FROM THE ARPT, MINNEAPOLIS ASKED US TO RPT THE ARPT IN SIGHT. WE WERE LOOKING FOR THE ARPT, BUT COULD NOT LOCATE IT AND I SUGGESTED PROCEEDING DIRECT TO DEVIE INTXN, WHICH IS THE FINAL APCH FIX FOR THE LOC BACK COURSE RWY 13. I SELECTED DIRECT DEVIE INTXN IN MY FMS, AND I AM NOT SURE CAPT CHANGED HIS BOX FROM DIRECT INL TO DIRECT DEVIE INTXN. I WAS TALKING TO MINNEAPOLIS, WHEN CAPT SAID HE HAD THE ARPT. I LOOKED AND SAW WHAT LOOKED LIKE THE IDENTICAL ARPT LAYOUT TO INL, A RWY IN THE DIRECTION OF 130 DEGS AND A SHORT CROSS RWY IN THE DIRECTION OF 220 DEGS. I TOLD MINNEAPOLIS THAT WE HAD THE ARPT AND HE ADVISED TO CANCEL WITH HIM IN THE AIR OR ON THE GND. SINCE WE WERE ON A WIDE BASE LEG BY THIS TIME AND NO ACFT WERE INDICATED ON THE TCASII, I ASKED CAPT IF HE WANTED TO CANCEL NOW AND HE SAID GO AHEAD. I CANCELLED THE IFR AND SWITCHED TO UNICOM ON 122.8, WHICH I HAD BEEN MONITORING. I BROADCAST OUR POS ON UNICOM AND THE FBO AT INL GAVE US A LENGTHY RPT OF WIND CONDITIONS AND WHERE TO PARK FOR CUSTOMS ONCE WE HAD LANDED. DUE TO THE RAPID EXCHANGE OF COMS, I FAILED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY BACKUP TO FO AND CHK MY NAV DISPLAY WHICH WOULD HAVE SHOWN US STILL OUTSIDE DEVIE INTXN AND AT THE WRONG ARPT. A SECOND DISTR WAS THE VISUAL CUES I HAD ONCE WE TURNED FINAL. I FELT WE WERE A LITTLE HIGH AND I WAS CONCERNED AT FIRST WHETHER WE COULD GET DOWN COMFORTABLY. IN REALITY, ALTHOUGH WE WERE A LITTLE HIGH, THE ILLUSION WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE SHORTER 100 FT WIDE RWY. WITH THE LNDG CHKLIST TO BE COMPLETED, PROTRACTED COMS AND WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE A SHORT APCH ALL CONTRIBUTED TO TAKING ME OUT OF THE LOOP WITH REGARDS TO CATCHING OUR ERROR. A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE AND WE TURNED OFF AT THE FIRST TXWY. AS WE TURNED OFF THE RWY SOMEONE ON THE UNICOM FREQ SAID, 'I BET YOU GUYS ARE LOOKING FOR INL, THIS HAPPENS ALL THE TIME.' AFTER THIS COMMENT, FO AND I REALIZED THAT WE WERE AT THE WRONG ARPT. I CALLED MINNEAPOLIS AND ADMITTED OUR MISTAKE AND ASKED THEM IF THEY OWNED THIS AIRSPACE AND HE RESPONDED, 'YES, DO YOU WANT AN IFR OR VFR TO INL.' I SAID WE WOULD DO IT VFR. WE PROGRAMMED THE BOX AND DEPARTED TO INL WITHIN THE TIME IT TOOK TO TAXI TO THE TKOF RWY. WE DID NOT PARK OR OPEN THE DOOR AND IT DIDN'T LOOK LIKE ANY OFFICIALS WERE AROUND TO HANDLE FORMALITIES. ON LNDG AT INL, WE CLRED UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND THEY DID NOT ASK AND WE DID NOT RPT THAT WE HAD LANDED AT FT FRANCIS. WE REFUELED AND PROCEEDED TO DEN, OUR FINAL LEG. I HAVE POINTED OUT A FEW OF THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT LED ME TO LOSE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, BUT WHY WE DIDN'T FLY THE APCH TO THE RWY IS BEYOND ME. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT FATIGUE COULD HAVE PLAYED A POSSIBLE ROLE. WE HAD BEEN ON A DEMANDING EUROPEAN TRIP FOR 9 DAYS COMPOUNDED WITH LATE NIGHT ARRS AND MAINT ISSUES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 619541: THE PLTS (2) WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH INTL FALLS AREA. CTR WAS BUSY AND NOT WATCHING US CLOSELY. PF WAS 'OUTSIDE' FLYING VMC AND NEVER CAME BACK INSIDE TO CONFIRM PROPER ARPT. RWY WE LANDED ON WAS 4500 FT BY 100 FT. RWY WE WERE SUPPOSED TO LAND ON WAS 6500 FT BY 150 FT. OPTICALLY THEY LOOK THE SAME. BOTH ARPTS UNCTLED. FACTORS: FATIGUE. LACK OF LCL AREA KNOWLEDGE. SIMILAR RWYS AND VISUAL CUES. LESS THAN PERFECTSYNERGY BTWN PLTS. LACK OF ACTIVE CTR PARTICIPATION BECAUSE OF WORKLOAD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.