Narrative:

We arrived at the airplane at approximately XA20 for our scheduled departure of XB20. When we arrived, the airplane was extremely hot, -88 degrees F in the cockpit, and the ground air was hooked up, but obviously not working. The captain started the APU and asked for the ground air to be disconnected. Preflight duties prior to push were task saturated and I started to feel rushed as various maintenance issues came up. As I was talking to maintenance, a ramp worker came into the cockpit and told us they wanted to push as quickly as possible due to an approaching thunderstorm. The first maintenance issue I dealt with was a review of the manual start procedure because the #2 autostart was MEL'ed inoperative. As I was reviewing this, the #1 mcdu went blank. Maintenance instructed us on resetting some circuit breakers, but this failed to correct the problem, so we decided to defer it. As we were doing this, the APU bleed air valve failed and now we had no aircraft on the airplane with a lot of people on board. I noticed 88 degrees F again in the cockpit after a short period of time. We needed to get an engine started to cool off the airplane and the captain left the cockpit to secure ground air. They finally hooked up the air and we started #1 engine normally at the gate. After finding a gate agent to remove the jetway, we pushed back, which was uneventful and got a clearance to do a xbleed manual start on the #2 engine. I was very involved in 2 checklists at this time -- the xbleed procedure and manual start procedure. I finished the start, completed my after start flow. At this point, I was feeling task saturated and absolutely overwhelmed in dealing with these unusual items. At this point, we contacted maintenance on communication #2 as we needed a new release prior to taxi, some placards and release #2. This process took some time, but finally the release came over the ACARS printer. As the captain was checking it, release #2 came over and I stated 'we have release #2.' at this point, we were now legal to taxi (ie, we had the release) and the captain said, 'I'll call for taxi.' I was hanging up on communication #2 with maintenance. I heard the taxi clearance and heard the captain acknowledge it. The captain released the brake and as I was putting in flaps 1 degree, I heard a crunching sound come from the nose section and immediately knew something wasn't right as we made contact with the tow bar and tug. At this point, we started our shutdown procedures and coordination with the ground. I stayed on board until all souls had deplaned. Supplemental information from acn 620433: I went to the cockpit to find the interior temperature at 96 degrees F. A large stage 2-3 thunderstorm was developing rapidly just west of the orlando airport. With the planned loading of the aircraft, there was no room for additional extra fuel we might need in the circumnav of en route thunderstorms. I returned to the cockpit to find that the first officer had correctly loaded all the information necessary into the computer system and was busy studying the manual start procedure. As, I was about to complete my normal cockpit preflight duties, we were informed by operations that local lightning strikes had closed the ramp. The process of loading the aircraft would have to stop. I informed the passenger that we would be delayed due to the lightning and ramp closure and asked them for their patience. Fortunately, soon thereafter, the ramp opened again and loading of the aircraft resumed a single chime of an ECAM fault was heard and both of us quickly noticed that we had suffered the loss of the APU bleed valve. Without air conditioning, the temperature of the cabin began to quickly elevate. I coordinated with the ground crew to provide an air cart for the start of the #1 engine. The jetway was removed from the aircraft and checklists and coordination for pushback were completed. By this time we had burned all but 100 pounds of our planned taxi fuel. After a lengthy pushback, the parking brake was set and I directed the crew to disconnect the tow bar, but stay connected (head set) until we could determine the success or failure of the manual start of the #2 engine. It became painfully obvious at this point that we would not only have to manually start the #2 engine, butwe would also have to set up for a xbleed start, using pneumatic air from the operating #1 engine. I asked the ground crew to clear the area behind the aircraft. The additional manual start of #2 engine commenced. The start went smoothly and flawlessly. At this point, getting to the takeoff roll with all the required fuel quantities for legal dispatch, became a paramount concern to me. As the first officer was cleaning up from the manual start of #2 engine, I asked him if we were ready for taxi. His response was negative. As he was reviewing all the documents to determine our legality, I recognized that, as 'work load manager,' I had overloaded my flying partner. So I informed him that I would call for taxi. I released the parking brake and we began to slowly roll forward. As the nosewheel axle came in contact with the detached tow bar, we heard a faint grinding noise, followed quickly by the sound of the aircraft in contact with the tug. The push crew had not been released, and were still parked (out of sight) in front of the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 FLT CREW TAXI INTO THEIR TOW BAR TRYING TO MEET TAXI FUEL REQUIREMENT AFTER EQUIP MALFUNCTIONS AND A WX GND DELAY.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED AT THE AIRPLANE AT APPROX XA20 FOR OUR SCHEDULED DEP OF XB20. WHEN WE ARRIVED, THE AIRPLANE WAS EXTREMELY HOT, -88 DEGS F IN THE COCKPIT, AND THE GND AIR WAS HOOKED UP, BUT OBVIOUSLY NOT WORKING. THE CAPT STARTED THE APU AND ASKED FOR THE GND AIR TO BE DISCONNECTED. PREFLT DUTIES PRIOR TO PUSH WERE TASK SATURATED AND I STARTED TO FEEL RUSHED AS VARIOUS MAINT ISSUES CAME UP. AS I WAS TALKING TO MAINT, A RAMP WORKER CAME INTO THE COCKPIT AND TOLD US THEY WANTED TO PUSH AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE DUE TO AN APCHING TSTM. THE FIRST MAINT ISSUE I DEALT WITH WAS A REVIEW OF THE MANUAL START PROC BECAUSE THE #2 AUTOSTART WAS MEL'ED INOP. AS I WAS REVIEWING THIS, THE #1 MCDU WENT BLANK. MAINT INSTRUCTED US ON RESETTING SOME CIRCUIT BREAKERS, BUT THIS FAILED TO CORRECT THE PROB, SO WE DECIDED TO DEFER IT. AS WE WERE DOING THIS, THE APU BLEED AIR VALVE FAILED AND NOW WE HAD NO ACFT ON THE AIRPLANE WITH A LOT OF PEOPLE ON BOARD. I NOTICED 88 DEGS F AGAIN IN THE COCKPIT AFTER A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. WE NEEDED TO GET AN ENG STARTED TO COOL OFF THE AIRPLANE AND THE CAPT LEFT THE COCKPIT TO SECURE GND AIR. THEY FINALLY HOOKED UP THE AIR AND WE STARTED #1 ENG NORMALLY AT THE GATE. AFTER FINDING A GATE AGENT TO REMOVE THE JETWAY, WE PUSHED BACK, WHICH WAS UNEVENTFUL AND GOT A CLRNC TO DO A XBLEED MANUAL START ON THE #2 ENG. I WAS VERY INVOLVED IN 2 CHKLISTS AT THIS TIME -- THE XBLEED PROC AND MANUAL START PROC. I FINISHED THE START, COMPLETED MY AFTER START FLOW. AT THIS POINT, I WAS FEELING TASK SATURATED AND ABSOLUTELY OVERWHELMED IN DEALING WITH THESE UNUSUAL ITEMS. AT THIS POINT, WE CONTACTED MAINT ON COM #2 AS WE NEEDED A NEW RELEASE PRIOR TO TAXI, SOME PLACARDS AND RELEASE #2. THIS PROCESS TOOK SOME TIME, BUT FINALLY THE RELEASE CAME OVER THE ACARS PRINTER. AS THE CAPT WAS CHKING IT, RELEASE #2 CAME OVER AND I STATED 'WE HAVE RELEASE #2.' AT THIS POINT, WE WERE NOW LEGAL TO TAXI (IE, WE HAD THE RELEASE) AND THE CAPT SAID, 'I'LL CALL FOR TAXI.' I WAS HANGING UP ON COM #2 WITH MAINT. I HEARD THE TAXI CLRNC AND HEARD THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGE IT. THE CAPT RELEASED THE BRAKE AND AS I WAS PUTTING IN FLAPS 1 DEG, I HEARD A CRUNCHING SOUND COME FROM THE NOSE SECTION AND IMMEDIATELY KNEW SOMETHING WASN'T RIGHT AS WE MADE CONTACT WITH THE TOW BAR AND TUG. AT THIS POINT, WE STARTED OUR SHUTDOWN PROCS AND COORD WITH THE GND. I STAYED ON BOARD UNTIL ALL SOULS HAD DEPLANED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 620433: I WENT TO THE COCKPIT TO FIND THE INTERIOR TEMP AT 96 DEGS F. A LARGE STAGE 2-3 TSTM WAS DEVELOPING RAPIDLY JUST W OF THE ORLANDO ARPT. WITH THE PLANNED LOADING OF THE ACFT, THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR ADDITIONAL EXTRA FUEL WE MIGHT NEED IN THE CIRCUMNAV OF ENRTE TSTMS. I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT TO FIND THAT THE FO HAD CORRECTLY LOADED ALL THE INFO NECESSARY INTO THE COMPUTER SYS AND WAS BUSY STUDYING THE MANUAL START PROC. AS, I WAS ABOUT TO COMPLETE MY NORMAL COCKPIT PREFLT DUTIES, WE WERE INFORMED BY OPS THAT LCL LIGHTNING STRIKES HAD CLOSED THE RAMP. THE PROCESS OF LOADING THE ACFT WOULD HAVE TO STOP. I INFORMED THE PAX THAT WE WOULD BE DELAYED DUE TO THE LIGHTNING AND RAMP CLOSURE AND ASKED THEM FOR THEIR PATIENCE. FORTUNATELY, SOON THEREAFTER, THE RAMP OPENED AGAIN AND LOADING OF THE ACFT RESUMED A SINGLE CHIME OF AN ECAM FAULT WAS HEARD AND BOTH OF US QUICKLY NOTICED THAT WE HAD SUFFERED THE LOSS OF THE APU BLEED VALVE. WITHOUT AIR CONDITIONING, THE TEMP OF THE CABIN BEGAN TO QUICKLY ELEVATE. I COORDINATED WITH THE GND CREW TO PROVIDE AN AIR CART FOR THE START OF THE #1 ENG. THE JETWAY WAS REMOVED FROM THE ACFT AND CHKLISTS AND COORD FOR PUSHBACK WERE COMPLETED. BY THIS TIME WE HAD BURNED ALL BUT 100 LBS OF OUR PLANNED TAXI FUEL. AFTER A LENGTHY PUSHBACK, THE PARKING BRAKE WAS SET AND I DIRECTED THE CREW TO DISCONNECT THE TOW BAR, BUT STAY CONNECTED (HEAD SET) UNTIL WE COULD DETERMINE THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE MANUAL START OF THE #2 ENG. IT BECAME PAINFULLY OBVIOUS AT THIS POINT THAT WE WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE TO MANUALLY START THE #2 ENG, BUTWE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO SET UP FOR A XBLEED START, USING PNEUMATIC AIR FROM THE OPERATING #1 ENG. I ASKED THE GND CREW TO CLR THE AREA BEHIND THE ACFT. THE ADDITIONAL MANUAL START OF #2 ENG COMMENCED. THE START WENT SMOOTHLY AND FLAWLESSLY. AT THIS POINT, GETTING TO THE TKOF ROLL WITH ALL THE REQUIRED FUEL QUANTITIES FOR LEGAL DISPATCH, BECAME A PARAMOUNT CONCERN TO ME. AS THE FO WAS CLEANING UP FROM THE MANUAL START OF #2 ENG, I ASKED HIM IF WE WERE READY FOR TAXI. HIS RESPONSE WAS NEGATIVE. AS HE WAS REVIEWING ALL THE DOCUMENTS TO DETERMINE OUR LEGALITY, I RECOGNIZED THAT, AS 'WORK LOAD MGR,' I HAD OVERLOADED MY FLYING PARTNER. SO I INFORMED HIM THAT I WOULD CALL FOR TAXI. I RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND WE BEGAN TO SLOWLY ROLL FORWARD. AS THE NOSEWHEEL AXLE CAME IN CONTACT WITH THE DETACHED TOW BAR, WE HEARD A FAINT GRINDING NOISE, FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY THE SOUND OF THE ACFT IN CONTACT WITH THE TUG. THE PUSH CREW HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED, AND WERE STILL PARKED (OUT OF SIGHT) IN FRONT OF THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.