Narrative:

I have logged a multitude of takeoffs and lndgs at this field over the past several yrs. On this date, I taxied the aircraft from the northwest corner of the field to an avionics shop located on the southwest corner. After the avionics work was complete, I wanted to perform one full stop landing before returning the aircraft to its parking spot. I received the AWOS information, which indicated that runway 15/33 was closed. Normally, this runway is not used for landing and departing traffic, but rather as a taxiway to bring aircraft to the approach end of runway 28. I, therefore, expected to receive a taxi clearance which would avoid the use of runway 15/33. Because I had initially planned only on having the avionics work performed, I did not have my usual compliment of flight data on board. In particular, I was lacking my publication substitute for the AFD. It contains detailed runway diagrams in addition to frequency, altitude, pattern information, and other detailed data about each airport. I contacted sch ground, indicated that I had the AWOS information, provided my position on the field, and stated my intentions for 1 full stop landing. I was given 'taxi to runway 28 at taxiway B.' I began taxiing on taxiway a, took a right onto taxiway B and stopped at the red runway signs, which indicate both runway 4/22 and runway 10/28. I recognized this position as a hold short position for runway 4/22, however, I was confused to its significance with regards to runway 28. Rather than concentrate on the signage, I was instead trying to envision the runway diagram and assess my position with regards to runway 28. Taxiway B is a diagonal taxiway which dumps out onto runway 4/22. It does not directly intersect with runway 10/28, but rather one must taxi onto runway 22 then taxi a short distance, after which one crosses onto runway 10/28. While holding short, I contemplated whether this was the correct hold short point or whether I should be holding short closer to runway 10/28. I had never taxied to runway 28 this way and could not envision exactly where I should be without the runway diagram. After holding short for about 15 seconds, I had decided that this was not the proper hold short point for runway 28. I thought perhaps that taxiway B crossed runway 22 and subsequently intersected with runway 28. I crossed the hold short line, intending to cross runway 22 and continue on taxiway B, which caused a runway incursion onto runway 22. The ground controller asked me to hold my position, which I did immediately. He indicated that I had crossed the proper hold short position. I responded that I thought the taxi clearance allowed me to cross runways and txwys, allowing me to cross runway 22 to get to runway 28 at taxiway B. He was confused by this, since one cannot cross runway 22 there, but taxi onto it and turn onto runway 28. Taxiway B ends at runway 22. The controller told me to hold my position and perform my run-up in my present position. My position at that time was still taxiway B, just before runway 22, but beyond the hold short line on taxiway B. Without the runway diagram, and after hearing the controller refute my erroneous contention about being able to cross runway 22, I ws confused as to the exact layout of the intersection that lay ahead. At that time, I told the ground controller that I wished to taxi back to the ramp. I received the clearance, performed a 180 degree turn, and taxied back to my tiedown spot. This situation never presented any real danger, because I never did cross onto runway 22 and there was no traffic operating on runway 4/22 at the time. It certainly could have been an issue if I was allowed to continue onto the runway and there were operations on the runway at the time. I take full responsibility for this incursion and understand the chain of events that led up to it. In hindsight, I probably did not want to appear inexperienced to the controller and instead adopted the approach of figuring it out for myself. Instead of hiding my confusion from the controller, which is not a rule violation, I actually committed a violation which, under different circumstances, could have been a safety issue. 4 major factors played a role: 1) lack of runway diagram, 2) complexity of the intersection, 3) I didn't carefully study and digest the red runway signs, and 4) I didn't ask for assistance in a momentof confusion. In the future, I will not venture into uncharted territory. Also, I will ask for assistance in moments of indecision rather than making an uncertain choice. Also, I noticed that the controllers had changed the clearance to 'taxi to runway 28, hold short at bravo' in later days. I wonder if other pilots made the same mistake I did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION AFTER A PA28 PVT PLT GETS CONFUSED WHEN TAXIING TO ACTIVE RWY 28 AND HOLDS AT THE WRONG POS, XING THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR AN INACTIVE RWY 4-22 AT SCH, NY.

Narrative: I HAVE LOGGED A MULTITUDE OF TKOFS AND LNDGS AT THIS FIELD OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YRS. ON THIS DATE, I TAXIED THE ACFT FROM THE NW CORNER OF THE FIELD TO AN AVIONICS SHOP LOCATED ON THE SW CORNER. AFTER THE AVIONICS WORK WAS COMPLETE, I WANTED TO PERFORM ONE FULL STOP LNDG BEFORE RETURNING THE ACFT TO ITS PARKING SPOT. I RECEIVED THE AWOS INFO, WHICH INDICATED THAT RWY 15/33 WAS CLOSED. NORMALLY, THIS RWY IS NOT USED FOR LNDG AND DEPARTING TFC, BUT RATHER AS A TXWY TO BRING ACFT TO THE APCH END OF RWY 28. I, THEREFORE, EXPECTED TO RECEIVE A TAXI CLRNC WHICH WOULD AVOID THE USE OF RWY 15/33. BECAUSE I HAD INITIALLY PLANNED ONLY ON HAVING THE AVIONICS WORK PERFORMED, I DID NOT HAVE MY USUAL COMPLIMENT OF FLT DATA ON BOARD. IN PARTICULAR, I WAS LACKING MY PUB SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AFD. IT CONTAINS DETAILED RWY DIAGRAMS IN ADDITION TO FREQ, ALT, PATTERN INFO, AND OTHER DETAILED DATA ABOUT EACH ARPT. I CONTACTED SCH GND, INDICATED THAT I HAD THE AWOS INFO, PROVIDED MY POS ON THE FIELD, AND STATED MY INTENTIONS FOR 1 FULL STOP LNDG. I WAS GIVEN 'TAXI TO RWY 28 AT TXWY B.' I BEGAN TAXIING ON TXWY A, TOOK A R ONTO TXWY B AND STOPPED AT THE RED RWY SIGNS, WHICH INDICATE BOTH RWY 4/22 AND RWY 10/28. I RECOGNIZED THIS POS AS A HOLD SHORT POS FOR RWY 4/22, HOWEVER, I WAS CONFUSED TO ITS SIGNIFICANCE WITH REGARDS TO RWY 28. RATHER THAN CONCENTRATE ON THE SIGNAGE, I WAS INSTEAD TRYING TO ENVISION THE RWY DIAGRAM AND ASSESS MY POS WITH REGARDS TO RWY 28. TXWY B IS A DIAGONAL TXWY WHICH DUMPS OUT ONTO RWY 4/22. IT DOES NOT DIRECTLY INTERSECT WITH RWY 10/28, BUT RATHER ONE MUST TAXI ONTO RWY 22 THEN TAXI A SHORT DISTANCE, AFTER WHICH ONE CROSSES ONTO RWY 10/28. WHILE HOLDING SHORT, I CONTEMPLATED WHETHER THIS WAS THE CORRECT HOLD SHORT POINT OR WHETHER I SHOULD BE HOLDING SHORT CLOSER TO RWY 10/28. I HAD NEVER TAXIED TO RWY 28 THIS WAY AND COULD NOT ENVISION EXACTLY WHERE I SHOULD BE WITHOUT THE RWY DIAGRAM. AFTER HOLDING SHORT FOR ABOUT 15 SECONDS, I HAD DECIDED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE PROPER HOLD SHORT POINT FOR RWY 28. I THOUGHT PERHAPS THAT TXWY B CROSSED RWY 22 AND SUBSEQUENTLY INTERSECTED WITH RWY 28. I CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE, INTENDING TO CROSS RWY 22 AND CONTINUE ON TXWY B, WHICH CAUSED A RWY INCURSION ONTO RWY 22. THE GND CTLR ASKED ME TO HOLD MY POS, WHICH I DID IMMEDIATELY. HE INDICATED THAT I HAD CROSSED THE PROPER HOLD SHORT POS. I RESPONDED THAT I THOUGHT THE TAXI CLRNC ALLOWED ME TO CROSS RWYS AND TXWYS, ALLOWING ME TO CROSS RWY 22 TO GET TO RWY 28 AT TXWY B. HE WAS CONFUSED BY THIS, SINCE ONE CANNOT CROSS RWY 22 THERE, BUT TAXI ONTO IT AND TURN ONTO RWY 28. TXWY B ENDS AT RWY 22. THE CTLR TOLD ME TO HOLD MY POS AND PERFORM MY RUN-UP IN MY PRESENT POS. MY POS AT THAT TIME WAS STILL TXWY B, JUST BEFORE RWY 22, BUT BEYOND THE HOLD SHORT LINE ON TXWY B. WITHOUT THE RWY DIAGRAM, AND AFTER HEARING THE CTLR REFUTE MY ERRONEOUS CONTENTION ABOUT BEING ABLE TO CROSS RWY 22, I WS CONFUSED AS TO THE EXACT LAYOUT OF THE INTXN THAT LAY AHEAD. AT THAT TIME, I TOLD THE GND CTLR THAT I WISHED TO TAXI BACK TO THE RAMP. I RECEIVED THE CLRNC, PERFORMED A 180 DEG TURN, AND TAXIED BACK TO MY TIEDOWN SPOT. THIS SIT NEVER PRESENTED ANY REAL DANGER, BECAUSE I NEVER DID CROSS ONTO RWY 22 AND THERE WAS NO TFC OPERATING ON RWY 4/22 AT THE TIME. IT CERTAINLY COULD HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE IF I WAS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE ONTO THE RWY AND THERE WERE OPS ON THE RWY AT THE TIME. I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS INCURSION AND UNDERSTAND THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED UP TO IT. IN HINDSIGHT, I PROBABLY DID NOT WANT TO APPEAR INEXPERIENCED TO THE CTLR AND INSTEAD ADOPTED THE APCH OF FIGURING IT OUT FOR MYSELF. INSTEAD OF HIDING MY CONFUSION FROM THE CTLR, WHICH IS NOT A RULE VIOLATION, I ACTUALLY COMMITTED A VIOLATION WHICH, UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES, COULD HAVE BEEN A SAFETY ISSUE. 4 MAJOR FACTORS PLAYED A ROLE: 1) LACK OF RWY DIAGRAM, 2) COMPLEXITY OF THE INTXN, 3) I DIDN'T CAREFULLY STUDY AND DIGEST THE RED RWY SIGNS, AND 4) I DIDN'T ASK FOR ASSISTANCE IN A MOMENTOF CONFUSION. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT VENTURE INTO UNCHARTED TERRITORY. ALSO, I WILL ASK FOR ASSISTANCE IN MOMENTS OF INDECISION RATHER THAN MAKING AN UNCERTAIN CHOICE. ALSO, I NOTICED THAT THE CTLRS HAD CHANGED THE CLRNC TO 'TAXI TO RWY 28, HOLD SHORT AT BRAVO' IN LATER DAYS. I WONDER IF OTHER PLTS MADE THE SAME MISTAKE I DID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.