Narrative:

During takeoff on runway 25R, I rejected the takeoff for a left aft entry door EICAS message. The first officer was making the takeoff. I initiated the rejected takeoff at approximately 100 KTS. We decelerated to a very slow speed and cleared the runway. I did not stop the aircraft on the runway for the following reasons: the adjacent ramp was wide open which would allow emergency equipment unimpeded access to the aircraft. Orientation into the wind for both slide deployment and fire control if necessary. Lastly, but most importantly, because of observations made during the boarding phase, I felt an evacuate/evacuation would be probable, commanded or not. When clearing the runway, the 'remain seated, situation under control,' PA was made, along with a brief explanation of the rejected takeoff. We were informed by the tower of some brake smoke, but not fire. This was verified by the aircraft behind us. The tower advised that the ramp in front of the fire station was available, if we wanted access to their brake cooling fans. We thought it prudent to accept. We faced into the wind, established communications with fire/rescue, and secured the engines. Brake temperatures continued to rise while parked and remained high until cooling fans were established. We requested an inspection by air carrier maintenance. The main trucks and brakes were inspected, and we were allowed to taxi back to the gate when cooled to level 4. Once at the gate, the second rush began to get the aircraft back in service. The L4 door was put on MEL. We were told we were good to go. We took the necessary time to comply with QRH brake cooling charts and operational requirements to operate the flight safely. Factors that may have affected this flight: WX temperature, 42 degrees C, LLWS winds 180 desg/14 KTS gusting 24 KTS, inbound maintenance issue with L4 door. Boarding process with 2 different crews (flight attendants came from international gate, loss of crew continuity), corrective action on L4 door was addressed late in the departure process. This left much doubt with the statement, 'we lubed the micro switch and you are good to go.' residual brake temperatures (3) on right main truck from inbound flight. 1's and 2's on left main truck. Conversation with previous crew on maintenance discrepancy. Ramp and break room conversation about air carrier authority/authorized overtime for technicians to clean up excessive number of MEL's on system-wide fleet. Combination side-load from wind gusts and door caution message during takeoff roll. The above factors do not justify the inappropriate response for a door caution light. Especially in light of the current corporate culture regarding rejected takeoff decisions. I have operated the aircraft for a number of yrs and have seen this situation on the B757 on a prior takeoff event, and responded to it correctly. I have also responded correctly during simulator training. Considering all that took place prior to departure and the issues we have been seeing on the line with the continued obvious pressure on the line technicians to move the aircraft, I think the combination with the above factors placed me into a spring-loaded mode, much as we are in simulators. In addition, during takeoff roll, there were normal side-loading gusts. One was rather profound, which was simultaneous with the left aft entry door message. The airspeed was accelerating rapidly through 100 KTS. This all occurred in a microsecond. I was uncomfortable with the situation, and responded immediately with the rejected takeoff. On a positive note, all 123 passenger remained aboard. We communicated the situation effectively and appeased their concerns.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OVERHEATED BRAKES AND A SUBSEQUENT FLT DELAY SUFFERED BY A B757-200 FLT CREW WHEN THE PIC ABORTS THE TKOF AT 100 KTS FOR AN L-4 DOOR WARNING EICAS MESSAGE.

Narrative: DURING TKOF ON RWY 25R, I REJECTED THE TKOF FOR A L AFT ENTRY DOOR EICAS MESSAGE. THE FO WAS MAKING THE TKOF. I INITIATED THE REJECTED TKOF AT APPROX 100 KTS. WE DECELERATED TO A VERY SLOW SPD AND CLRED THE RWY. I DID NOT STOP THE ACFT ON THE RWY FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: THE ADJACENT RAMP WAS WIDE OPEN WHICH WOULD ALLOW EMER EQUIP UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO THE ACFT. ORIENTATION INTO THE WIND FOR BOTH SLIDE DEPLOYMENT AND FIRE CTL IF NECESSARY. LASTLY, BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE OF OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING THE BOARDING PHASE, I FELT AN EVAC WOULD BE PROBABLE, COMMANDED OR NOT. WHEN CLRING THE RWY, THE 'REMAIN SEATED, SIT UNDER CTL,' PA WAS MADE, ALONG WITH A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE REJECTED TKOF. WE WERE INFORMED BY THE TWR OF SOME BRAKE SMOKE, BUT NOT FIRE. THIS WAS VERIFIED BY THE ACFT BEHIND US. THE TWR ADVISED THAT THE RAMP IN FRONT OF THE FIRE STATION WAS AVAILABLE, IF WE WANTED ACCESS TO THEIR BRAKE COOLING FANS. WE THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO ACCEPT. WE FACED INTO THE WIND, ESTABLISHED COMS WITH FIRE/RESCUE, AND SECURED THE ENGS. BRAKE TEMPS CONTINUED TO RISE WHILE PARKED AND REMAINED HIGH UNTIL COOLING FANS WERE ESTABLISHED. WE REQUESTED AN INSPECTION BY ACR MAINT. THE MAIN TRUCKS AND BRAKES WERE INSPECTED, AND WE WERE ALLOWED TO TAXI BACK TO THE GATE WHEN COOLED TO LEVEL 4. ONCE AT THE GATE, THE SECOND RUSH BEGAN TO GET THE ACFT BACK IN SVC. THE L4 DOOR WAS PUT ON MEL. WE WERE TOLD WE WERE GOOD TO GO. WE TOOK THE NECESSARY TIME TO COMPLY WITH QRH BRAKE COOLING CHARTS AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE THE FLT SAFELY. FACTORS THAT MAY HAVE AFFECTED THIS FLT: WX TEMP, 42 DEGS C, LLWS WINDS 180 DESG/14 KTS GUSTING 24 KTS, INBOUND MAINT ISSUE WITH L4 DOOR. BOARDING PROCESS WITH 2 DIFFERENT CREWS (FLT ATTENDANTS CAME FROM INTL GATE, LOSS OF CREW CONTINUITY), CORRECTIVE ACTION ON L4 DOOR WAS ADDRESSED LATE IN THE DEP PROCESS. THIS LEFT MUCH DOUBT WITH THE STATEMENT, 'WE LUBED THE MICRO SWITCH AND YOU ARE GOOD TO GO.' RESIDUAL BRAKE TEMPS (3) ON R MAIN TRUCK FROM INBOUND FLT. 1'S AND 2'S ON L MAIN TRUCK. CONVERSATION WITH PREVIOUS CREW ON MAINT DISCREPANCY. RAMP AND BREAK ROOM CONVERSATION ABOUT ACR AUTH OVERTIME FOR TECHNICIANS TO CLEAN UP EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF MEL'S ON SYS-WIDE FLEET. COMBINATION SIDE-LOAD FROM WIND GUSTS AND DOOR CAUTION MESSAGE DURING TKOF ROLL. THE ABOVE FACTORS DO NOT JUSTIFY THE INAPPROPRIATE RESPONSE FOR A DOOR CAUTION LIGHT. ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT CORPORATE CULTURE REGARDING REJECTED TKOF DECISIONS. I HAVE OPERATED THE ACFT FOR A NUMBER OF YRS AND HAVE SEEN THIS SIT ON THE B757 ON A PRIOR TKOF EVENT, AND RESPONDED TO IT CORRECTLY. I HAVE ALSO RESPONDED CORRECTLY DURING SIMULATOR TRAINING. CONSIDERING ALL THAT TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO DEP AND THE ISSUES WE HAVE BEEN SEEING ON THE LINE WITH THE CONTINUED OBVIOUS PRESSURE ON THE LINE TECHNICIANS TO MOVE THE ACFT, I THINK THE COMBINATION WITH THE ABOVE FACTORS PLACED ME INTO A SPRING-LOADED MODE, MUCH AS WE ARE IN SIMULATORS. IN ADDITION, DURING TKOF ROLL, THERE WERE NORMAL SIDE-LOADING GUSTS. ONE WAS RATHER PROFOUND, WHICH WAS SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE L AFT ENTRY DOOR MESSAGE. THE AIRSPD WAS ACCELERATING RAPIDLY THROUGH 100 KTS. THIS ALL OCCURRED IN A MICROSECOND. I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SIT, AND RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE REJECTED TKOF. ON A POSITIVE NOTE, ALL 123 PAX REMAINED ABOARD. WE COMMUNICATED THE SIT EFFECTIVELY AND APPEASED THEIR CONCERNS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.