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Attributes | |
ACN | 621671 |
Time | |
Date | 200406 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : iad.airport |
State Reference | VA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : iad.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 9000 flight time type : 300 |
ASRS Report | 621671 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera other controllerb other flight crewa other flight crewb other other : 3 |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued advisory controller : issued new clearance none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Narrative:
After much thought, I feel it necessary to bring to light an issue that I feel could have had a great impact on the safety of ground operations at dulles airport. I was flying a 757 scheduled to departure dulles at xa:30 local time. With aircraft and weather delays, we did not push back until xc:23 local. This pushback had been coordinated with the ground metering controller who was regulating the outbound flow of dulles traffic. After engine start we were instructed to taxi westbound and to contact, via voice, the dulles ground controller. As we were taxiing westward and contacted the ground controller as instructed, we were met with what would be to put it mildly a verbal tongue lashing to the effect that we were not to talk to ground and that they would talk to us when they so chose. I believe that this statement was repeated by the ground controller to another aircraft. Another crew (not our flight) eventually wondered aloud as to how crews were to know this. We were fortunate in being able to inquiry (with, what we thought was a great risk of incurring wrath of the controller by even doing so) as to our departure flow over the linden departure fix and were eventually instructed to taxi to the run-up pad to await our turn in line. The problem that arose however, was that ground controllers were not able to provide adequate information as to whether crews would shut down the engines or what to expect. We all realized that even though there was no weather overhead the field (or even west) different centers were controling the acceptance rates. The sharp and intimidating demeanor of the ground controller, however, was figuratively browbeating the crews into not trying to solicit information with which they could formulate a plan with their dispatchers. One crew mentioned crew duty day legality problems and was bruskly pushed aside. More than once the controller barked out that metering should not have released the aircraft. This is quite possibly true, but the crew operates under the procedures so prescribed by the FAA at dulles. If they were told to contact metering and this agency releases the aircraft, it should not be incumbent upon the crew to deny the metering release. In other words, when told to push and taxi, they do just that. The worst however, was an incident with the departure flight. This flight had originally called for taxi on ground instead of ramp frequency. A few minutes later the aircraft had reached the taxi position and was looking for instructions. I have never in my aviation career heard such rude treatment of an aircraft by a ground controller. The aircraft was eventually told to taxi to a spot, and after a few minutes the pilot inquired as to why he had been instructed to taxi to this spot. The ground controller retorted that, 'well you wanted to move, so I moved you.' after a number of such ill-treatments, the captain voiced his concern that he was being treated rudely. The controller stated, 'yeah, I am rude.' the troubling aspect is that there was now a heavily laden aircraft are being taxied around a busy international airport so a controller can apparently spite a captain. Even more troubling was the atmosphere that was created by the ground controllers. Every crew realized that the situation was dynamic and in flux. In times such as these communication is vital and it was effectively being squelched, and in some cases rudeness was worn as a badge of honor. The captain mentioned that he would seek redress of this issue as it had deteriorated to an unacceptable level. Crews that had concerns about duty days, weather, or fuel, were unable to adequately give voice to their questions. Worse, an airline from another country was being shabbily treated as its crew tried to make the same planning assessments. The fact that communication with the ground controllers was so adversely affected makes this a concern for a safety review.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B757 FO EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH THE REPORTED RUDE BEHAVIOR OF AN IAD GND CTLR.
Narrative: AFTER MUCH THOUGHT, I FEEL IT NECESSARY TO BRING TO LIGHT AN ISSUE THAT I FEEL COULD HAVE HAD A GREAT IMPACT ON THE SAFETY OF GND OPS AT DULLES ARPT. I WAS FLYING A 757 SCHEDULED TO DEP DULLES AT XA:30 LOCAL TIME. WITH ACFT AND WEATHER DELAYS, WE DID NOT PUSH BACK UNTIL XC:23 LOCAL. THIS PUSHBACK HAD BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE GND METERING CTLR WHO WAS REGULATING THE OUTBOUND FLOW OF DULLES TFC. AFTER ENG START WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI WESTBOUND AND TO CONTACT, VIA VOICE, THE DULLES GND CTLR. AS WE WERE TAXIING WESTWARD AND CONTACTED THE GND CTLR AS INSTRUCTED, WE WERE MET WITH WHAT WOULD BE TO PUT IT MILDLY A VERBAL TONGUE LASHING TO THE EFFECT THAT WE WERE NOT TO TALK TO GND AND THAT THEY WOULD TALK TO US WHEN THEY SO CHOSE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS STATEMENT WAS REPEATED BY THE GND CTLR TO ANOTHER ACFT. ANOTHER CREW (NOT OUR FLT) EVENTUALLY WONDERED ALOUD AS TO HOW CREWS WERE TO KNOW THIS. WE WERE FORTUNATE IN BEING ABLE TO INQUIRY (WITH, WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS A GREAT RISK OF INCURRING WRATH OF THE CTLR BY EVEN DOING SO) AS TO OUR DEP FLOW OVER THE LINDEN DEP FIX AND WERE EVENTUALLY INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO THE RUN-UP PAD TO AWAIT OUR TURN IN LINE. THE PROB THAT AROSE HOWEVER, WAS THAT GND CTLRS WERE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE INFO AS TO WHETHER CREWS WOULD SHUT DOWN THE ENGS OR WHAT TO EXPECT. WE ALL REALIZED THAT EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO WEATHER OVERHEAD THE FIELD (OR EVEN WEST) DIFFERENT CENTERS WERE CTLING THE ACCEPTANCE RATES. THE SHARP AND INTIMIDATING DEMEANOR OF THE GND CTLR, HOWEVER, WAS FIGURATIVELY BROWBEATING THE CREWS INTO NOT TRYING TO SOLICIT INFO WITH WHICH THEY COULD FORMULATE A PLAN WITH THEIR DISPATCHERS. ONE CREW MENTIONED CREW DUTY DAY LEGALITY PROBS AND WAS BRUSKLY PUSHED ASIDE. MORE THAN ONCE THE CTLR BARKED OUT THAT METERING SHOULD NOT HAVE RELEASED THE ACFT. THIS IS QUITE POSSIBLY TRUE, BUT THE CREW OPERATES UNDER THE PROCS SO PRESCRIBED BY THE FAA AT DULLES. IF THEY WERE TOLD TO CONTACT METERING AND THIS AGENCY RELEASES THE ACFT, IT SHOULD NOT BE INCUMBENT UPON THE CREW TO DENY THE METERING RELEASE. IN OTHER WORDS, WHEN TOLD TO PUSH AND TAXI, THEY DO JUST THAT. THE WORST HOWEVER, WAS AN INCIDENT WITH THE DEP FLT. THIS FLT HAD ORIGINALLY CALLED FOR TAXI ON GND INSTEAD OF RAMP FREQ. A FEW MINUTES LATER THE ACFT HAD REACHED THE TAXI POSITION AND WAS LOOKING FOR INSTRUCTIONS. I HAVE NEVER IN MY AVIATION CAREER HEARD SUCH RUDE TREATMENT OF AN ACFT BY A GND CTLR. THE ACFT WAS EVENTUALLY TOLD TO TAXI TO A SPOT, AND AFTER A FEW MINUTES THE PLT INQUIRED AS TO WHY HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO THIS SPOT. THE GND CTLR RETORTED THAT, 'WELL YOU WANTED TO MOVE, SO I MOVED YOU.' AFTER A NUMBER OF SUCH ILL-TREATMENTS, THE CAPT VOICED HIS CONCERN THAT HE WAS BEING TREATED RUDELY. THE CTLR STATED, 'YEAH, I AM RUDE.' THE TROUBLING ASPECT IS THAT THERE WAS NOW A HEAVILY LADEN ACFT ARE BEING TAXIED AROUND A BUSY INTERNATIONAL ARPT SO A CTLR CAN APPARENTLY SPITE A CAPT. EVEN MORE TROUBLING WAS THE ATMOSPHERE THAT WAS CREATED BY THE GND CTLRS. EVERY CREW REALIZED THAT THE SIT WAS DYNAMIC AND IN FLUX. IN TIMES SUCH AS THESE COM IS VITAL AND IT WAS EFFECTIVELY BEING SQUELCHED, AND IN SOME CASES RUDENESS WAS WORN AS A BADGE OF HONOR. THE CAPT MENTIONED THAT HE WOULD SEEK REDRESS OF THIS ISSUE AS IT HAD DETERIORATED TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL. CREWS THAT HAD CONCERNS ABOUT DUTY DAYS, WEATHER, OR FUEL, WERE UNABLE TO ADEQUATELY GIVE VOICE TO THEIR QUESTIONS. WORSE, AN AIRLINE FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY WAS BEING SHABBILY TREATED AS ITS CREW TRIED TO MAKE THE SAME PLANNING ASSESSMENTS. THE FACT THAT COM WITH THE GND CTLRS WAS SO ADVERSELY AFFECTED MAKES THIS A CONCERN FOR A SAFETY REVIEW.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.