Narrative:

Winter operations were in effect. After deicing, taxied to runway 6R and held short on taxiway north. Tower said, 'cleared to cross runway 6R, turn left heading 360 degrees, cleared for takeoff runway 6L.' I do not recall tower saying anything about also crossing runway 6C. I crossed runway 6R, turned the corner on the next runway and started the takeoff roll. Tower said 'cancel takeoff clearance, you're on runway 6C.' takeoff was rejected, I taxied clear at taxiway south, and taxied to runway 6L via taxiway G. The subsequent takeoff on runway 6L was uneventful. All checklists we accomplished. The following operational threats and distrs were present: 1) first winter operations of the season: re-familiarization with the de-ice checklist. 2) night IMC with 1 mi visibility. 3) after pushback, runway change to shorter runway 6L from longer runway 6R, new load manifest. Supplemental information from acn 622371: contributing factors and threats would be 'flight control' on the annunciator. While I was running the before takeoff checklist and looking up to reset the yaw damper, visibility 1 mi, runway markings and numbers covered by previous blowing snow, some residual deice fluid on windshield, txwys and runways snow covered, nighttime, and runway 6L being fairly new. This event to me is about as classic as an event could be when it comes to showing how important vigilance and monitoring is. This is an event I shall never forget, and the importance of always shifting my attention outside the cockpit as well as within, shall never be underestimated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW BEGAN TKOF ON A CLOSED RWY DURING A NIGHT OP.

Narrative: WINTER OPS WERE IN EFFECT. AFTER DEICING, TAXIED TO RWY 6R AND HELD SHORT ON TXWY N. TWR SAID, 'CLRED TO CROSS RWY 6R, TURN L HDG 360 DEGS, CLRED FOR TKOF RWY 6L.' I DO NOT RECALL TWR SAYING ANYTHING ABOUT ALSO XING RWY 6C. I CROSSED RWY 6R, TURNED THE CORNER ON THE NEXT RWY AND STARTED THE TKOF ROLL. TWR SAID 'CANCEL TKOF CLRNC, YOU'RE ON RWY 6C.' TKOF WAS REJECTED, I TAXIED CLR AT TXWY S, AND TAXIED TO RWY 6L VIA TXWY G. THE SUBSEQUENT TKOF ON RWY 6L WAS UNEVENTFUL. ALL CHKLISTS WE ACCOMPLISHED. THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL THREATS AND DISTRS WERE PRESENT: 1) FIRST WINTER OPS OF THE SEASON: RE-FAMILIARIZATION WITH THE DE-ICE CHKLIST. 2) NIGHT IMC WITH 1 MI VISIBILITY. 3) AFTER PUSHBACK, RWY CHANGE TO SHORTER RWY 6L FROM LONGER RWY 6R, NEW LOAD MANIFEST. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 622371: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THREATS WOULD BE 'FLT CTL' ON THE ANNUNCIATOR. WHILE I WAS RUNNING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND LOOKING UP TO RESET THE YAW DAMPER, VISIBILITY 1 MI, RWY MARKINGS AND NUMBERS COVERED BY PREVIOUS BLOWING SNOW, SOME RESIDUAL DEICE FLUID ON WINDSHIELD, TXWYS AND RWYS SNOW COVERED, NIGHTTIME, AND RWY 6L BEING FAIRLY NEW. THIS EVENT TO ME IS ABOUT AS CLASSIC AS AN EVENT COULD BE WHEN IT COMES TO SHOWING HOW IMPORTANT VIGILANCE AND MONITORING IS. THIS IS AN EVENT I SHALL NEVER FORGET, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ALWAYS SHIFTING MY ATTN OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT AS WELL AS WITHIN, SHALL NEVER BE UNDERESTIMATED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.