Narrative:

It was the captain's leg. We were climbing out of 8000 ft MSL, pwm to ZZZ, when we received 2 caution messages: 'stabilizer and mach trim.' the autoplt disengaged and the captain had to put a good amount of forward pressure on the yoke. We ran the QRH procedures and contacted maintenance. They helped us troubleshoot the problem, nothing was resolved. Dispatch said we need 3500 ft of runway to land at our landing weight and advised us to continue to lga. The captain and I thought it would be better to get the aircraft on the ground as soon as possible by declaring an emergency and landing in boston. Our company and maintenance both disagreed with our decision. The captain and I evaluated the problem furthermore and at that time, we were closer to our destination than bos. We had sufficient landing distance and the aircraft was controllable. So we continued to ZZZ. Once we got handed off to ZZZ approach, the captain advised me to declare an emergency for precautionary measures, to have men and equipment standing by. We continued, landed, taxied clear of the runway with no assistance needed. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that maintenance has not reported the action taken or components replaced to correct the failed stabilizer trim. The report said flight crews do not receive reports from maintenance on logbook write-ups even when requested.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL65 CLBING OUT OF 8000 FT HAD 2 CAUTION WARNINGS 'STABILIZER AND MACH TRIM.' FORWARD PRESSURE ON YOKE REQUIRED. DECLARED AN EMER.

Narrative: IT WAS THE CAPT'S LEG. WE WERE CLBING OUT OF 8000 FT MSL, PWM TO ZZZ, WHEN WE RECEIVED 2 CAUTION MESSAGES: 'STABILIZER AND MACH TRIM.' THE AUTOPLT DISENGAGED AND THE CAPT HAD TO PUT A GOOD AMOUNT OF FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE YOKE. WE RAN THE QRH PROCS AND CONTACTED MAINT. THEY HELPED US TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB, NOTHING WAS RESOLVED. DISPATCH SAID WE NEED 3500 FT OF RWY TO LAND AT OUR LNDG WT AND ADVISED US TO CONTINUE TO LGA. THE CAPT AND I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GET THE ACFT ON THE GND ASAP BY DECLARING AN EMER AND LNDG IN BOSTON. OUR COMPANY AND MAINT BOTH DISAGREED WITH OUR DECISION. THE CAPT AND I EVALUATED THE PROB FURTHERMORE AND AT THAT TIME, WE WERE CLOSER TO OUR DEST THAN BOS. WE HAD SUFFICIENT LNDG DISTANCE AND THE ACFT WAS CONTROLLABLE. SO WE CONTINUED TO ZZZ. ONCE WE GOT HANDED OFF TO ZZZ APCH, THE CAPT ADVISED ME TO DECLARE AN EMER FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES, TO HAVE MEN AND EQUIP STANDING BY. WE CONTINUED, LANDED, TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY WITH NO ASSISTANCE NEEDED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT MAINT HAS NOT RPTED THE ACTION TAKEN OR COMPONENTS REPLACED TO CORRECT THE FAILED STABILIZER TRIM. THE RPT SAID FLT CREWS DO NOT RECEIVE RPTS FROM MAINT ON LOGBOOK WRITE-UPS EVEN WHEN REQUESTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.