Narrative:

Upon being transferred over to aspen approach at approximately transition altitude we requested direct to waslo, a fix on the GPS 15 approach, for positioning for the visual. The controller gave us an initial heading and shortly afterward we identified an area of level 3-4 convective activity on our radar, approximately 8-10 miles ahead. We asked for a deviation to the left for WX. The controller said he was unable due to traffic and asked why we needed a deviation. The copilot informed him WX and advised that we needed an immediate turn to avoid a thunderstorm. There was further delay and penetration of the cell was imminent when the copilot keyed the microphone and advised that we needed to turn or we would have to declare an emergency. Instead of immediately giving us a turn, the controller asked us to state the nature of our emergency. At this time I cancelled the autoplt and began to turn to the right as we entered the fringes of the cell. The copilot again advised WX was the problem by stating 'thunderstorm.' the controller then gave us a turn to the left and I complied, judging that we had just enough room left. During the turn we encountered heavy rain and turbulence. Upon landing we were asked to call the tower. The aircraft owner (copilot) did so and was advised that we inappropriately used the word emergency and that they would be following up. Follow up in this situation would be very useful from a controller training standpoint. The controller had a very lax attitude about the danger of flying into thunderstorms and did nothing to help us after we advised him of the situation at hand. We only said that we would declare an emergency if we weren't able to get a turn, and the controller seemed happier with that option and leaving us flying head-on into a storm, than giving us a deviation. We never did declare the emergency, though the controller may have declared it for us by asking us to state the nature of the emergency. In retrospect, I feel that we, as a crew, acted in the best interest of the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. We violated no regulations that I am aware of, and the outcome of the flight was a success. Supplemental from acn 622910: upon landing, the ground controller asked me to call the tower and gave me the phone number. I phoned after we shut down, and was advised that I had inappropriately used the word 'emergency' because a thunderstorm does not constitute an emergency. He was worked up and argumentative. He asked me if I had any idea how inconvenient it would have been for them to have to move other aircraft in the area had we declared an emergency. I asked him if he has ever flown through the cell of a thunderstorm? He informed that they had no ability to detect WX with the radar they have in aspen (which I already knew), he seemed to be saying that the lack of WX detection equipment meant they didn't need to let aircraft deviation around areas of heavy precipitation. The controller made a number of incorrect assertions about the sequence of events that had just transpired (he was not the same person that handled us on approach control), and I told him that his version of the sequence was incorrect and perhaps he should listen to the tape. He said that he was going to do that and that he was 'going to follow up,' which he said in a threatening way. He assured me that he would listen to the tape and then get back to me, and then 'follow up,' whatever that means. I do not understand why this controller was so upset with us or what he thinks we did wrong. I feel that the crew acted in the best interest of the safety of the flight. Contrary to the implication of the controller, we violated no regulations that I am aware of. We were so disappointed that it was so difficult to get a deviation from the approach controller. In most parts of this country controllers don't hesitate to give WX deviations. Prior to the phone conversation, I felt that a combination of things had conspired to send us through that cell; events unfolded quickly, other traffic apparently reduced the controller's options, and perhaps he didn't hear all of my initial request for deviation. It seemed to be an unlucky set of circumstances with a benign outcome. However after the phone conversation I feel there may have been more to the problem. Obviously these controllers in aspen don't understand the dangers of flying through thunderstorms. Given the large number of fatal accidents caused by thunderstorms, there should be no question that a potentially imminent encounter with a thunderstorm qualifies as an 'emergency' situation. And, if the controllers have no WX radar capability, then they need to depend on the judgement of pilots who do have WX radar and other WX detection equipment (such as their eyeballs). Avoiding the certainty of penetrating a thunderstorm should have higher priority than avoiding the inconvenience of giving vectors to a few other aircraft. After causing us to unnecessarily penetrate a small thunderstorm, ATC did something else that concerns me even more: the controller tried to intimidate me on the phone. His threats to 'follow up' were clearly aimed at scaring me, and the message was that you can get in trouble for using the e-word. That is not a good message to send to pilots. It has been 8 days since the incident, and the controller never phoned me back as he said he would after listening to the tape. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter confirmed that the facility has never called him back, even though they said they would after listening to the tapes. There has been no follow-up either by the flight crew or ATC. Reporter did indicate that the conversation with the ase tower person neither identified himself as a supervisor or a controller in charge. He did find out that the tower has one radar position that he believes is located in the tower. They call the approach control aspect of the tower the 'tracab.' he also confirmed the fact that the tower's radar does not paint the weather that well. The reporter also commented that for the most part, ase tower personnel do a great job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE INBOUND TO ASPEN, A C750 CREW IDENTIFY AN AREA OF LEVEL 3 AND 4 CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY ON RADAR AND HAVE DIFFICULTY RECEIVING A TURN FROM ATC TO AVOID THE WX.

Narrative: UPON BEING TRANSFERRED OVER TO ASPEN APCH AT APPROX TRANSITION ALT WE REQUESTED DIRECT TO WASLO, A FIX ON THE GPS 15 APCH, FOR POSITIONING FOR THE VISUAL. THE CTLR GAVE US AN INITIAL HDG AND SHORTLY AFTERWARD WE IDENTIFIED AN AREA OF LEVEL 3-4 CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY ON OUR RADAR, APPROX 8-10 MILES AHEAD. WE ASKED FOR A DEV TO THE LEFT FOR WX. THE CTLR SAID HE WAS UNABLE DUE TO TFC AND ASKED WHY WE NEEDED A DEV. THE COPLT INFORMED HIM WX AND ADVISED THAT WE NEEDED AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO AVOID A TSTM. THERE WAS FURTHER DELAY AND PENETRATION OF THE CELL WAS IMMINENT WHEN THE COPLT KEYED THE MIC AND ADVISED THAT WE NEEDED TO TURN OR WE WOULD HAVE TO DECLARE AN EMER. INSTEAD OF IMMEDIATELY GIVING US A TURN, THE CTLR ASKED US TO STATE THE NATURE OF OUR EMER. AT THIS TIME I CANCELLED THE AUTOPLT AND BEGAN TO TURN TO THE R AS WE ENTERED THE FRINGES OF THE CELL. THE COPLT AGAIN ADVISED WX WAS THE PROB BY STATING 'TSTM.' THE CTLR THEN GAVE US A TURN TO THE L AND I COMPLIED, JUDGING THAT WE HAD JUST ENOUGH ROOM LEFT. DURING THE TURN WE ENCOUNTERED HEAVY RAIN AND TURB. UPON LNDG WE WERE ASKED TO CALL THE TWR. THE ACFT OWNER (COPLT) DID SO AND WAS ADVISED THAT WE INAPPROPRIATELY USED THE WORD EMER AND THAT THEY WOULD BE FOLLOWING UP. FOLLOW UP IN THIS SIT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL FROM A CTLR TRAINING STANDPOINT. THE CTLR HAD A VERY LAX ATTITUDE ABOUT THE DANGER OF FLYING INTO TSTMS AND DID NOTHING TO HELP US AFTER WE ADVISED HIM OF THE SIT AT HAND. WE ONLY SAID THAT WE WOULD DECLARE AN EMER IF WE WEREN'T ABLE TO GET A TURN, AND THE CTLR SEEMED HAPPIER WITH THAT OPTION AND LEAVING US FLYING HEAD-ON INTO A STORM, THAN GIVING US A DEV. WE NEVER DID DECLARE THE EMER, THOUGH THE CTLR MAY HAVE DECLARED IT FOR US BY ASKING US TO STATE THE NATURE OF THE EMER. IN RETROSPECT, I FEEL THAT WE, AS A CREW, ACTED IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SAFETY OF THE ACFT AND ITS OCCUPANTS. WE VIOLATED NO REGULATIONS THAT I AM AWARE OF, AND THE OUTCOME OF THE FLT WAS A SUCCESS. SUPPLEMENTAL FROM ACN 622910: UPON LNDG, THE GND CTLR ASKED ME TO CALL THE TWR AND GAVE ME THE PHONE NUMBER. I PHONED AFTER WE SHUT DOWN, AND WAS ADVISED THAT I HAD INAPPROPRIATELY USED THE WORD 'EMER' BECAUSE A TSTM DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN EMER. HE WAS WORKED UP AND ARGUMENTATIVE. HE ASKED ME IF I HAD ANY IDEA HOW INCONVENIENT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR THEM TO HAVE TO MOVE OTHER ACFT IN THE AREA HAD WE DECLARED AN EMER. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAS EVER FLOWN THROUGH THE CELL OF A TSTM? HE INFORMED THAT THEY HAD NO ABILITY TO DETECT WX WITH THE RADAR THEY HAVE IN ASPEN (WHICH I ALREADY KNEW), HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT THE LACK OF WX DETECTION EQUIPMENT MEANT THEY DIDN'T NEED TO LET ACFT DEV AROUND AREAS OF HEAVY PRECIPITATION. THE CTLR MADE A NUMBER OF INCORRECT ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT HAD JUST TRANSPIRED (HE WAS NOT THE SAME PERSON THAT HANDLED US ON APCH CTL), AND I TOLD HIM THAT HIS VERSION OF THE SEQUENCE WAS INCORRECT AND PERHAPS HE SHOULD LISTEN TO THE TAPE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO DO THAT AND THAT HE WAS 'GOING TO FOLLOW UP,' WHICH HE SAID IN A THREATENING WAY. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD LISTEN TO THE TAPE AND THEN GET BACK TO ME, AND THEN 'FOLLOW UP,' WHATEVER THAT MEANS. I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THIS CTLR WAS SO UPSET WITH US OR WHAT HE THINKS WE DID WRONG. I FEEL THAT THE CREW ACTED IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. CONTRARY TO THE IMPLICATION OF THE CTLR, WE VIOLATED NO REGULATIONS THAT I AM AWARE OF. WE WERE SO DISAPPOINTED THAT IT WAS SO DIFFICULT TO GET A DEV FROM THE APCH CTLR. IN MOST PARTS OF THIS COUNTRY CTLRS DON'T HESITATE TO GIVE WX DEVIATIONS. PRIOR TO THE PHONE CONVERSATION, I FELT THAT A COMBINATION OF THINGS HAD CONSPIRED TO SEND US THROUGH THAT CELL; EVENTS UNFOLDED QUICKLY, OTHER TFC APPARENTLY REDUCED THE CTLR'S OPTIONS, AND PERHAPS HE DIDN'T HEAR ALL OF MY INITIAL REQUEST FOR DEV. IT SEEMED TO BE AN UNLUCKY SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES WITH A BENIGN OUTCOME. HOWEVER AFTER THE PHONE CONVERSATION I FEEL THERE MAY HAVE BEEN MORE TO THE PROB. OBVIOUSLY THESE CTLRS IN ASPEN DON'T UNDERSTAND THE DANGERS OF FLYING THROUGH TSTMS. GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF FATAL ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY TSTMS, THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION THAT A POTENTIALLY IMMINENT ENCOUNTER WITH A TSTM QUALIFIES AS AN 'EMER' SIT. AND, IF THE CTLRS HAVE NO WX RADAR CAPABILITY, THEN THEY NEED TO DEPEND ON THE JUDGEMENT OF PLTS WHO DO HAVE WX RADAR AND OTHER WX DETECTION EQUIPMENT (SUCH AS THEIR EYEBALLS). AVOIDING THE CERTAINTY OF PENETRATING A TSTM SHOULD HAVE HIGHER PRIORITY THAN AVOIDING THE INCONVENIENCE OF GIVING VECTORS TO A FEW OTHER ACFT. AFTER CAUSING US TO UNNECESSARILY PENETRATE A SMALL TSTM, ATC DID SOMETHING ELSE THAT CONCERNS ME EVEN MORE: THE CTLR TRIED TO INTIMIDATE ME ON THE PHONE. HIS THREATS TO 'FOLLOW UP' WERE CLEARLY AIMED AT SCARING ME, AND THE MESSAGE WAS THAT YOU CAN GET IN TROUBLE FOR USING THE E-WORD. THAT IS NOT A GOOD MESSAGE TO SEND TO PLTS. IT HAS BEEN 8 DAYS SINCE THE INCIDENT, AND THE CTLR NEVER PHONED ME BACK AS HE SAID HE WOULD AFTER LISTENING TO THE TAPE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR CONFIRMED THAT THE FACILITY HAS NEVER CALLED HIM BACK, EVEN THOUGH THEY SAID THEY WOULD AFTER LISTENING TO THE TAPES. THERE HAS BEEN NO FOLLOW-UP EITHER BY THE FLT CREW OR ATC. RPTR DID INDICATE THAT THE CONVERSATION WITH THE ASE TWR PERSON NEITHER IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS A SUPVR OR A CTLR IN CHARGE. HE DID FIND OUT THAT THE TWR HAS ONE RADAR POSITION THAT HE BELIEVES IS LOCATED IN THE TWR. THEY CALL THE APCH CTL ASPECT OF THE TWR THE 'TRACAB.' HE ALSO CONFIRMED THE FACT THAT THE TWR'S RADAR DOES NOT PAINT THE WEATHER THAT WELL. THE RPTR ALSO COMMENTED THAT FOR THE MOST PART, ASE TWR PERSONNEL DO A GREAT JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.