Narrative:

Flying into abq, winds were at limits for runways 8 and 3. We elected to accomplish visual to runway 26. We were north of field when cleared visual runway 26. We over flew field heading south for offset to left downwind/left base. We talked about not going too far east as high terrain was a factor. On our turn to our left base, at about 7000 ft we went from having no terrain cautions to a 'terrain, terrain, pull-up, pull-up.' that got our attention. We began raising our nose for the target of 20 degrees, pushed up our power and began transitioning to the terrain avoidance maneuver. As the nose pitched up through the horizon, our descent rate stopped. As we stopped the descent rate, the warning stopped (this all happened in less than 5 seconds). We were early on in the recovery so the power was not up yet and the pitch was not up yet. We discontinued the escape maneuver and because we were still in the slot for the visual, we continued the approach to an uneventful landing. We were stable at 1000 ft AGL. Bring this up for awareness for other crews. Visual to runway 26 at night, high winds, in hindsight was dangerous when high terrain was not in sight. It was a very tight base as it was and we just met the 1000 ft criteria. We were primed to go into the aggressive terrain avoidance maneuver and the folks would have received quite a ride. Since warning went away so fast, they only felt us level off. Next time I will probably elect to take the tailwind on the other runway. I question whether visuals to runway 26 should be idented as a last resort like runway 7/25 in reno given new requirement to be stable at 1000 ft. If nothing else, maybe a note on the 10-7 page and a mention in our publication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW GOT AN EGPWS TERRAIN WARNING WHILE CONDUCTING A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26, AT NIGHT AT ABQ.

Narrative: FLYING INTO ABQ, WINDS WERE AT LIMITS FOR RWYS 8 AND 3. WE ELECTED TO ACCOMPLISH VISUAL TO RWY 26. WE WERE N OF FIELD WHEN CLRED VISUAL RWY 26. WE OVER FLEW FIELD HDG S FOR OFFSET TO L DOWNWIND/L BASE. WE TALKED ABOUT NOT GOING TOO FAR E AS HIGH TERRAIN WAS A FACTOR. ON OUR TURN TO OUR L BASE, AT ABOUT 7000 FT WE WENT FROM HAVING NO TERRAIN CAUTIONS TO A 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL-UP, PULL-UP.' THAT GOT OUR ATTN. WE BEGAN RAISING OUR NOSE FOR THE TARGET OF 20 DEGS, PUSHED UP OUR PWR AND BEGAN TRANSITIONING TO THE TERRAIN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER. AS THE NOSE PITCHED UP THROUGH THE HORIZON, OUR DSCNT RATE STOPPED. AS WE STOPPED THE DSCNT RATE, THE WARNING STOPPED (THIS ALL HAPPENED IN LESS THAN 5 SECONDS). WE WERE EARLY ON IN THE RECOVERY SO THE PWR WAS NOT UP YET AND THE PITCH WAS NOT UP YET. WE DISCONTINUED THE ESCAPE MANEUVER AND BECAUSE WE WERE STILL IN THE SLOT FOR THE VISUAL, WE CONTINUED THE APCH TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. WE WERE STABLE AT 1000 FT AGL. BRING THIS UP FOR AWARENESS FOR OTHER CREWS. VISUAL TO RWY 26 AT NIGHT, HIGH WINDS, IN HINDSIGHT WAS DANGEROUS WHEN HIGH TERRAIN WAS NOT IN SIGHT. IT WAS A VERY TIGHT BASE AS IT WAS AND WE JUST MET THE 1000 FT CRITERIA. WE WERE PRIMED TO GO INTO THE AGGRESSIVE TERRAIN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER AND THE FOLKS WOULD HAVE RECEIVED QUITE A RIDE. SINCE WARNING WENT AWAY SO FAST, THEY ONLY FELT US LEVEL OFF. NEXT TIME I WILL PROBABLY ELECT TO TAKE THE TAILWIND ON THE OTHER RWY. I QUESTION WHETHER VISUALS TO RWY 26 SHOULD BE IDENTED AS A LAST RESORT LIKE RWY 7/25 IN RENO GIVEN NEW REQUIREMENT TO BE STABLE AT 1000 FT. IF NOTHING ELSE, MAYBE A NOTE ON THE 10-7 PAGE AND A MENTION IN OUR PUB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.