Narrative:

Tfr in effect for yankees stadium (baseball game). 3 mi zone. I was PNF. We were instructed by lga tower to fly southwest from englewood cliffs toward hackensack river to circumvent tfr zone, then turn abeam central park and cross, transitioning to the east river for destination 34TH street, maintain 1500 ft, cleared into class B airspace. Notes: 1) tfr in effect yankee stadium and simultaneously shea stadium tfr also in effect. 2) my experience with yankee stadium's tfr has been to fly this particular route to circumvent, never had I been given clearance to transition any tfr zone (yankee or shea). 3) unknown to myself at the time, other pilot has been allowed to transition tfr's while en route. 4) in our predep briefing, I stated that the routing we would (most likely) receive would be to circumvent via the hackensack river. The other pilot never mentioned his prior experience of transitioning through tfr's. (Other pilot is also captain qualified, similar experience to myself.) upon receiving the clearance, PF continued to englewood cliffs. 2 other helicopters operating outside the zone in close proximity to our aircraft. We had noticed targets on TCASII and simultaneously issued advisory by lga tower control. (Visibility was reported as 4 mi on surface, but typical summer day, hot, humid with poor visibility.) I pointed out our intended route to other pilot (as we approached tfr boundary), but he failed to turn and I attributed that to traffic in our 1-2 O'clock position (direction we needed to turn). Other pilot at this point informed me that he intended to descend to 1400 ft. I responded in the negative and told him 1500 ft was our assigned altitude (he descended to 1400 ft anyway, traffic was not an issue since traffic was at approximately 1000 ft). PF continued straight into tfr boundary and I again pointed out our required route. At this point, lga tower informed us we were in the tfr and to turn immediately to exit. I again (more forcefully/directly) told the PF to turn (at this point) on a westerly heading towards the hackensack river. While doing this and in the ensuing confusion, he descended to approximately 1300 ft and lga tower stated we had been cleared in and were to maintain 1500 ft. (Opposite direction traffic was approaching from 12 O'clock position and 1200 ft). Remainder of flight was uneventful. Upon landing back at home base, we had approximately 1 hour prior to departure. We discussed the event. Also upon completion of our day, we debriefed the incident. PF stated that in his experience he had been successful with lga tower allowing transition through a tfr. He also stated that a 'southwest heading' could be construed as the course he had been flying. He stated he never heard controller issue instructions toward hacksensack river. His reason for descending out of an assigned altitude was that it was the altitude we normally fly while in class B airspace flying to and from the city helicopters. I pointed out we were given a specific clearance, he had no reply. Chain of events. How the problem arose: separate preconceived notion of which clearance was to be received by each pilot. Predep brief obviously was not adequate (by myself) since other pilot did not seem aware that we would receive this clearance (in debrief, he stated he never received this clearance before). Contributing factors: traffic, poor visibility led me to think PF was delaying making his turn, when indeed he had no intention to turn. Poor communication in the cockpit. Human performance considerations: perceptions, judgements, decisions: 2 different preconceived perceptions of what was going to occur. Poor judgement and decision on my part to allow situation to continue as far as it did. Contributing: my long friendship with other pilot, respect for his abilities and experience. Actions or inactions: factors affecting the quality of human performance: I had a similar incident with this same pilot in reference to not following ATC instructions concerning maintaining an assigned altitude approximately 1 month prior in class D airspace. This individual (when in my presence) has been noted to be obstinate, argumentative and unwilling to take directives or criticism of any type. Recently my chief pilot approached me and stated he has noted similar instances while on flts with this individual. At that time I mentioned to him several instances that I have noted. I noted to my chief pilot that this behavior is out of character -- possible personal issues, but that if it continues without intervention an incident may possibly occur.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HELI FLT CREW ENTERED A TFR AND FAILED TO ADHERE TO AN ATC ALT ASSIGNMENT WHILE TRANSITIONING AIRSPACE NEAR LGA ARPT AND YANKEE STADIUM.

Narrative: TFR IN EFFECT FOR YANKEES STADIUM (BASEBALL GAME). 3 MI ZONE. I WAS PNF. WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY LGA TWR TO FLY SW FROM ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS TOWARD HACKENSACK RIVER TO CIRCUMVENT TFR ZONE, THEN TURN ABEAM CENTRAL PARK AND CROSS, TRANSITIONING TO THE EAST RIVER FOR DEST 34TH STREET, MAINTAIN 1500 FT, CLRED INTO CLASS B AIRSPACE. NOTES: 1) TFR IN EFFECT YANKEE STADIUM AND SIMULTANEOUSLY SHEA STADIUM TFR ALSO IN EFFECT. 2) MY EXPERIENCE WITH YANKEE STADIUM'S TFR HAS BEEN TO FLY THIS PARTICULAR RTE TO CIRCUMVENT, NEVER HAD I BEEN GIVEN CLRNC TO TRANSITION ANY TFR ZONE (YANKEE OR SHEA). 3) UNKNOWN TO MYSELF AT THE TIME, OTHER PLT HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO TRANSITION TFR'S WHILE ENRTE. 4) IN OUR PREDEP BRIEFING, I STATED THAT THE ROUTING WE WOULD (MOST LIKELY) RECEIVE WOULD BE TO CIRCUMVENT VIA THE HACKENSACK RIVER. THE OTHER PLT NEVER MENTIONED HIS PRIOR EXPERIENCE OF TRANSITIONING THROUGH TFR'S. (OTHER PLT IS ALSO CAPT QUALIFIED, SIMILAR EXPERIENCE TO MYSELF.) UPON RECEIVING THE CLRNC, PF CONTINUED TO ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS. 2 OTHER HELIS OPERATING OUTSIDE THE ZONE IN CLOSE PROX TO OUR ACFT. WE HAD NOTICED TARGETS ON TCASII AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ISSUED ADVISORY BY LGA TWR CTL. (VISIBILITY WAS RPTED AS 4 MI ON SURFACE, BUT TYPICAL SUMMER DAY, HOT, HUMID WITH POOR VISIBILITY.) I POINTED OUT OUR INTENDED RTE TO OTHER PLT (AS WE APCHED TFR BOUNDARY), BUT HE FAILED TO TURN AND I ATTRIBUTED THAT TO TFC IN OUR 1-2 O'CLOCK POS (DIRECTION WE NEEDED TO TURN). OTHER PLT AT THIS POINT INFORMED ME THAT HE INTENDED TO DSND TO 1400 FT. I RESPONDED IN THE NEGATIVE AND TOLD HIM 1500 FT WAS OUR ASSIGNED ALT (HE DSNDED TO 1400 FT ANYWAY, TFC WAS NOT AN ISSUE SINCE TFC WAS AT APPROX 1000 FT). PF CONTINUED STRAIGHT INTO TFR BOUNDARY AND I AGAIN POINTED OUT OUR REQUIRED RTE. AT THIS POINT, LGA TWR INFORMED US WE WERE IN THE TFR AND TO TURN IMMEDIATELY TO EXIT. I AGAIN (MORE FORCEFULLY/DIRECTLY) TOLD THE PF TO TURN (AT THIS POINT) ON A WESTERLY HDG TOWARDS THE HACKENSACK RIVER. WHILE DOING THIS AND IN THE ENSUING CONFUSION, HE DSNDED TO APPROX 1300 FT AND LGA TWR STATED WE HAD BEEN CLRED IN AND WERE TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT. (OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC WAS APCHING FROM 12 O'CLOCK POS AND 1200 FT). REMAINDER OF FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. UPON LNDG BACK AT HOME BASE, WE HAD APPROX 1 HR PRIOR TO DEP. WE DISCUSSED THE EVENT. ALSO UPON COMPLETION OF OUR DAY, WE DEBRIEFED THE INCIDENT. PF STATED THAT IN HIS EXPERIENCE HE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL WITH LGA TWR ALLOWING TRANSITION THROUGH A TFR. HE ALSO STATED THAT A 'SW HDG' COULD BE CONSTRUED AS THE COURSE HE HAD BEEN FLYING. HE STATED HE NEVER HEARD CTLR ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TOWARD HACKSENSACK RIVER. HIS REASON FOR DSNDING OUT OF AN ASSIGNED ALT WAS THAT IT WAS THE ALT WE NORMALLY FLY WHILE IN CLASS B AIRSPACE FLYING TO AND FROM THE CITY HELIS. I POINTED OUT WE WERE GIVEN A SPECIFIC CLRNC, HE HAD NO REPLY. CHAIN OF EVENTS. HOW THE PROB AROSE: SEPARATE PRECONCEIVED NOTION OF WHICH CLRNC WAS TO BE RECEIVED BY EACH PLT. PREDEP BRIEF OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT ADEQUATE (BY MYSELF) SINCE OTHER PLT DID NOT SEEM AWARE THAT WE WOULD RECEIVE THIS CLRNC (IN DEBRIEF, HE STATED HE NEVER RECEIVED THIS CLRNC BEFORE). CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: TFC, POOR VISIBILITY LED ME TO THINK PF WAS DELAYING MAKING HIS TURN, WHEN INDEED HE HAD NO INTENTION TO TURN. POOR COM IN THE COCKPIT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: PERCEPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS: 2 DIFFERENT PRECONCEIVED PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT WAS GOING TO OCCUR. POOR JUDGEMENT AND DECISION ON MY PART TO ALLOW SIT TO CONTINUE AS FAR AS IT DID. CONTRIBUTING: MY LONG FRIENDSHIP WITH OTHER PLT, RESPECT FOR HIS ABILITIES AND EXPERIENCE. ACTIONS OR INACTIONS: FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE: I HAD A SIMILAR INCIDENT WITH THIS SAME PLT IN REF TO NOT FOLLOWING ATC INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING MAINTAINING AN ASSIGNED ALT APPROX 1 MONTH PRIOR IN CLASS D AIRSPACE. THIS INDIVIDUAL (WHEN IN MY PRESENCE) HAS BEEN NOTED TO BE OBSTINATE, ARGUMENTATIVE AND UNWILLING TO TAKE DIRECTIVES OR CRITICISM OF ANY TYPE. RECENTLY MY CHIEF PLT APCHED ME AND STATED HE HAS NOTED SIMILAR INSTANCES WHILE ON FLTS WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL. AT THAT TIME I MENTIONED TO HIM SEVERAL INSTANCES THAT I HAVE NOTED. I NOTED TO MY CHIEF PLT THAT THIS BEHAVIOR IS OUT OF CHARACTER -- POSSIBLE PERSONAL ISSUES, BUT THAT IF IT CONTINUES WITHOUT INTERVENTION AN INCIDENT MAY POSSIBLY OCCUR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.