Narrative:

On a flight from the east coast to msp, WX was clear (no alternate). Msp approach was holding over eau for traffic saturation and we were given an efc of approximately 35 mins of holding over eau. I, the captain, was flying while my first officer copied down the holding clearance from approach control. Because I was mentally calculating fuel burns and flying the aircraft, I did not hear or copy the clearance myself. My first officer programmed the hold clearance into the FMS hold page as copied down from approach. Prior to executing the hold, my first officer went over the hold with me and we confirmed the inbound course, right turns and the proper leg length and efc. This is where the error was made, somehow we missed that the hold over eau was actually left turns. My first officer assumed that when a hold was brought up in the FMS that it automatically entered the proper turn. Approach asked us if we were in a right turn. We replied that we were, and were informed that the hold was supposed to be left turns. Approach then continued us in a right turn and gave us a heading to hold as an outbound leg. Contributing to this error happening was some complacency on the part of my first officer, thinking the FMS entered hold directions automatically. Also, on my part for trusting the hold was entered correctly and for not looking more closely at the hold entered, as well as both myself and first officer copying down the hold clearance together in order to catch any discrepancy that there might be. Some additional factors affecting our flight was the fact that fuel was a big concern as we did not have an alternate and immediate planning had to be made to determine whether we could accept a hold based on our fuel to land with adequate reserves or if a diversion would be necessary. Contributing were higher than forecast headwinds while flying from the east to the west. This, in part, conflicted with properly copying and entering the hold into the FMS page and verifying the hold correctly. Supplemental information from acn 626345: since the clearance was 'hold as published, I assumed that the FMS database would have in it already the correct entry and direction of turns programmed 'as published.' since the incident, I have pointed out the FMS holding page to a couple of co-workers, and not very surprisingly they assumed the same thing as I did before my incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INBOUND TO MSP, FLT CREW OF CL65 PROGRAMMED HOLDING PATTERN FOR R TURNS VICE L AS CLRED AND PUBLISHED.

Narrative: ON A FLT FROM THE EAST COAST TO MSP, WX WAS CLR (NO ALTERNATE). MSP APCH WAS HOLDING OVER EAU FOR TFC SATURATION AND WE WERE GIVEN AN EFC OF APPROX 35 MINS OF HOLDING OVER EAU. I, THE CAPT, WAS FLYING WHILE MY FO COPIED DOWN THE HOLDING CLRNC FROM APCH CTL. BECAUSE I WAS MENTALLY CALCULATING FUEL BURNS AND FLYING THE ACFT, I DID NOT HEAR OR COPY THE CLRNC MYSELF. MY FO PROGRAMMED THE HOLD CLRNC INTO THE FMS HOLD PAGE AS COPIED DOWN FROM APCH. PRIOR TO EXECUTING THE HOLD, MY FO WENT OVER THE HOLD WITH ME AND WE CONFIRMED THE INBOUND COURSE, R TURNS AND THE PROPER LEG LENGTH AND EFC. THIS IS WHERE THE ERROR WAS MADE, SOMEHOW WE MISSED THAT THE HOLD OVER EAU WAS ACTUALLY L TURNS. MY FO ASSUMED THAT WHEN A HOLD WAS BROUGHT UP IN THE FMS THAT IT AUTOMATICALLY ENTERED THE PROPER TURN. APCH ASKED US IF WE WERE IN A R TURN. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE, AND WERE INFORMED THAT THE HOLD WAS SUPPOSED TO BE L TURNS. APCH THEN CONTINUED US IN A R TURN AND GAVE US A HDG TO HOLD AS AN OUTBOUND LEG. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS ERROR HAPPENING WAS SOME COMPLACENCY ON THE PART OF MY FO, THINKING THE FMS ENTERED HOLD DIRECTIONS AUTOMATICALLY. ALSO, ON MY PART FOR TRUSTING THE HOLD WAS ENTERED CORRECTLY AND FOR NOT LOOKING MORE CLOSELY AT THE HOLD ENTERED, AS WELL AS BOTH MYSELF AND FO COPYING DOWN THE HOLD CLRNC TOGETHER IN ORDER TO CATCH ANY DISCREPANCY THAT THERE MIGHT BE. SOME ADDITIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING OUR FLT WAS THE FACT THAT FUEL WAS A BIG CONCERN AS WE DID NOT HAVE AN ALTERNATE AND IMMEDIATE PLANNING HAD TO BE MADE TO DETERMINE WHETHER WE COULD ACCEPT A HOLD BASED ON OUR FUEL TO LAND WITH ADEQUATE RESERVES OR IF A DIVERSION WOULD BE NECESSARY. CONTRIBUTING WERE HIGHER THAN FORECAST HEADWINDS WHILE FLYING FROM THE E TO THE W. THIS, IN PART, CONFLICTED WITH PROPERLY COPYING AND ENTERING THE HOLD INTO THE FMS PAGE AND VERIFYING THE HOLD CORRECTLY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 626345: SINCE THE CLRNC WAS 'HOLD AS PUBLISHED, I ASSUMED THAT THE FMS DATABASE WOULD HAVE IN IT ALREADY THE CORRECT ENTRY AND DIRECTION OF TURNS PROGRAMMED 'AS PUBLISHED.' SINCE THE INCIDENT, I HAVE POINTED OUT THE FMS HOLDING PAGE TO A COUPLE OF CO-WORKERS, AND NOT VERY SURPRISINGLY THEY ASSUMED THE SAME THING AS I DID BEFORE MY INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.