Narrative:

On pushback from the gate, push crew stopped the aircraft about 150 ft from the jetway. Ground crew asked me to set the brakes, they would disconnect. Told push crew, not to disconnect, we needed the nose of the aircraft on the yellow line. Position from which they wanted to disconnect would require a 70-80 degree hard left turn and aircraft was not near the yellow taxi line. Nose of aircraft was pointing towards the aircraft on other gate. Push crew continued push and stopped after about another 20-30 ft, they had moved the nose about 20 degrees further to the left. Again told me to set brakes, they would disconnect at that point. I set the brakes, looked out, and we were still a great distance from the yellow line and still pointing at an awkward angle towards gate. A conversation ensued with the push crew. I again told them to put the nose of the aircraft on the yellow line. They said the left wing was too close to the blast fence off the left side of the aircraft. It was becoming clear the push crew did not understand the significance of the yellow line and requirements to taxi the aircraft safely. A discussion again occurred between the push crew and myself. I again asked them to put the nose of the aircraft on the yellow line. I could detect irritation on their part due to my continued requests. I was expecting to be pulled forward and to the left with the nose gear on the yellow line prior to disconnect. They started to push the aircraft again without telling me, the brakes were set and it sounded like the towbar broke. Ground crew told me towbar broke it would be a long time before they could get another. I told them I could not taxi the aircraft from its present position as we were still not on the yellow line and I could not see the wings. They said they would provide wing walkers for me to pull forward and left, onto the yellow taxi line. I called company operations and asked maintenance to come to the aircraft. They plugged into the ground intercom. I told them I thought the towbar had hit the aircraft when it broke, I asked them to check the aircraft for damage. They told me they could see no damage. Called ramp tower. They cleared us to move up and call ord ground metering. The ground crew had disconnected and had disappeared. Called the ramp tower again, asked for wing walkers. They arrived after about 5 mins. I started to taxi the aircraft looking at the wing walkers. I slowly increased power to move the aircraft, using about 1.1 EPR to move the aircraft in a hard left turn. I was watching the wing walker off the left side of the aircraft, I looked forward and to the right as we moved and I saw a ramp person running towards the aircraft. He gave me the stop signal, we had moved approximately 100 ft, the aircraft was now on the yellow line pointing towards the taxiway. As I stopped the aircraft, the ramp tower called and told us we had blown over a fence behind the aircraft. When I stopped the aircraft I was looking at the #2 engine of the MD80 at gate out my right window. Ramp tower told us we would have to wait for the police as the fence was blown onto a road and they wanted to take pictures. Called company and asked them to find out what was going on. We sat on the ramp for about 20 mins while whatever was going on behind the aircraft was going on. We could not see from our position in the cockpit. I asked air carrier operations if there were injuries, to have maintenance look at fence and take pictures. Told them fence looked old and rusty from what I was looking at out our left window. Other air carrier ramp told us we were cleared to move up and call metering. We departed. I called in the numbers after departure. Our operations did not have any additional information. Asked them to call station manager and inform. I called dispatch when I arrived at destination to discuss situation. They said they had pictures and it looked like 10 sections of the fence were down.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER A PUSHBACK FROM GATE THE PIC OF AN MD81 INSISTS ON PROPER POSITIONING FOR CONTINUED TAXI ON RAMP. TOWBAR BREAKS IN THE ENSUING NEGATIVE DIALOGUE WITH GND CREW. AFTER AN EVENTFUL PUSHBACK A FENCE IS BLOWN OVER BY THE ACFT'S JETBLAST AT ORD.

Narrative: ON PUSHBACK FROM THE GATE, PUSH CREW STOPPED THE ACFT ABOUT 150 FT FROM THE JETWAY. GND CREW ASKED ME TO SET THE BRAKES, THEY WOULD DISCONNECT. TOLD PUSH CREW, NOT TO DISCONNECT, WE NEEDED THE NOSE OF THE ACFT ON THE YELLOW LINE. POS FROM WHICH THEY WANTED TO DISCONNECT WOULD REQUIRE A 70-80 DEG HARD L TURN AND ACFT WAS NOT NEAR THE YELLOW TAXI LINE. NOSE OF ACFT WAS POINTING TOWARDS THE ACFT ON OTHER GATE. PUSH CREW CONTINUED PUSH AND STOPPED AFTER ABOUT ANOTHER 20-30 FT, THEY HAD MOVED THE NOSE ABOUT 20 DEGS FURTHER TO THE L. AGAIN TOLD ME TO SET BRAKES, THEY WOULD DISCONNECT AT THAT POINT. I SET THE BRAKES, LOOKED OUT, AND WE WERE STILL A GREAT DISTANCE FROM THE YELLOW LINE AND STILL POINTING AT AN AWKWARD ANGLE TOWARDS GATE. A CONVERSATION ENSUED WITH THE PUSH CREW. I AGAIN TOLD THEM TO PUT THE NOSE OF THE ACFT ON THE YELLOW LINE. THEY SAID THE L WING WAS TOO CLOSE TO THE BLAST FENCE OFF THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT. IT WAS BECOMING CLR THE PUSH CREW DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE YELLOW LINE AND REQUIREMENTS TO TAXI THE ACFT SAFELY. A DISCUSSION AGAIN OCCURRED BTWN THE PUSH CREW AND MYSELF. I AGAIN ASKED THEM TO PUT THE NOSE OF THE ACFT ON THE YELLOW LINE. I COULD DETECT IRRITATION ON THEIR PART DUE TO MY CONTINUED REQUESTS. I WAS EXPECTING TO BE PULLED FORWARD AND TO THE L WITH THE NOSE GEAR ON THE YELLOW LINE PRIOR TO DISCONNECT. THEY STARTED TO PUSH THE ACFT AGAIN WITHOUT TELLING ME, THE BRAKES WERE SET AND IT SOUNDED LIKE THE TOWBAR BROKE. GND CREW TOLD ME TOWBAR BROKE IT WOULD BE A LONG TIME BEFORE THEY COULD GET ANOTHER. I TOLD THEM I COULD NOT TAXI THE ACFT FROM ITS PRESENT POS AS WE WERE STILL NOT ON THE YELLOW LINE AND I COULD NOT SEE THE WINGS. THEY SAID THEY WOULD PROVIDE WING WALKERS FOR ME TO PULL FORWARD AND L, ONTO THE YELLOW TAXI LINE. I CALLED COMPANY OPS AND ASKED MAINT TO COME TO THE ACFT. THEY PLUGGED INTO THE GND INTERCOM. I TOLD THEM I THOUGHT THE TOWBAR HAD HIT THE ACFT WHEN IT BROKE, I ASKED THEM TO CHK THE ACFT FOR DAMAGE. THEY TOLD ME THEY COULD SEE NO DAMAGE. CALLED RAMP TWR. THEY CLRED US TO MOVE UP AND CALL ORD GND METERING. THE GND CREW HAD DISCONNECTED AND HAD DISAPPEARED. CALLED THE RAMP TWR AGAIN, ASKED FOR WING WALKERS. THEY ARRIVED AFTER ABOUT 5 MINS. I STARTED TO TAXI THE ACFT LOOKING AT THE WING WALKERS. I SLOWLY INCREASED PWR TO MOVE THE ACFT, USING ABOUT 1.1 EPR TO MOVE THE ACFT IN A HARD L TURN. I WAS WATCHING THE WING WALKER OFF THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT, I LOOKED FORWARD AND TO THE R AS WE MOVED AND I SAW A RAMP PERSON RUNNING TOWARDS THE ACFT. HE GAVE ME THE STOP SIGNAL, WE HAD MOVED APPROX 100 FT, THE ACFT WAS NOW ON THE YELLOW LINE POINTING TOWARDS THE TXWY. AS I STOPPED THE ACFT, THE RAMP TWR CALLED AND TOLD US WE HAD BLOWN OVER A FENCE BEHIND THE ACFT. WHEN I STOPPED THE ACFT I WAS LOOKING AT THE #2 ENG OF THE MD80 AT GATE OUT MY R WINDOW. RAMP TWR TOLD US WE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE POLICE AS THE FENCE WAS BLOWN ONTO A ROAD AND THEY WANTED TO TAKE PICTURES. CALLED COMPANY AND ASKED THEM TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. WE SAT ON THE RAMP FOR ABOUT 20 MINS WHILE WHATEVER WAS GOING ON BEHIND THE ACFT WAS GOING ON. WE COULD NOT SEE FROM OUR POS IN THE COCKPIT. I ASKED ACR OPS IF THERE WERE INJURIES, TO HAVE MAINT LOOK AT FENCE AND TAKE PICTURES. TOLD THEM FENCE LOOKED OLD AND RUSTY FROM WHAT I WAS LOOKING AT OUT OUR L WINDOW. OTHER ACR RAMP TOLD US WE WERE CLRED TO MOVE UP AND CALL METERING. WE DEPARTED. I CALLED IN THE NUMBERS AFTER DEP. OUR OPS DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO. ASKED THEM TO CALL STATION MGR AND INFORM. I CALLED DISPATCH WHEN I ARRIVED AT DEST TO DISCUSS SIT. THEY SAID THEY HAD PICTURES AND IT LOOKED LIKE 10 SECTIONS OF THE FENCE WERE DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.