Narrative:

Received my first TCASII master warning today. Although I think that this is a step in the right direction to bring additional attention to a TCASII target alert, I do not believe that leaving out an EICAS text master caution resolves the issue. Please let me explain the situation: upon receiving a TA, we began to look outside to find the traffic. Immediately upon getting our eyes outside the cockpit for increased vigilance, the master caution came on without an associated EICAS message. As there was a clear master caution alert, without a message, both crew members had to bring full attention into the cockpit to confirm the message. This severely detracted from outside scan. Further, it took a while before both of us realized the reason for the caution. We completely missed the traffic outside. By the time we got our heads back out, the target was gone. This is not a safe alternative as it takes the crew completely out of the see and avoid loop and further buries their heads in the cockpit, not safe. There needs to be an associated message with this alert in order for the crew to quickly access the information and associate it with its source, not the vague message that only generally brings the crew's attention to the issue, an issue that is already alerted through the TCASII screen, the vsi and an aural alert. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: EMB135, EMB140, and EMB145 aircraft are involved. There are 3 versions of EICAS software. The latest two have the TCASII warning added to EICAS. The captain reported the problem to the company and was told 'they're working on it.'

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMJ CREW GOT A TCASII TA. THEY ALSO HAD AN EICAS, TCASII WARNING THAT DISTR THEM FROM THE TCASII WARNING.

Narrative: RECEIVED MY FIRST TCASII MASTER WARNING TODAY. ALTHOUGH I THINK THAT THIS IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION TO BRING ADDITIONAL ATTN TO A TCASII TARGET ALERT, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT LEAVING OUT AN EICAS TEXT MASTER CAUTION RESOLVES THE ISSUE. PLEASE LET ME EXPLAIN THE SIT: UPON RECEIVING A TA, WE BEGAN TO LOOK OUTSIDE TO FIND THE TFC. IMMEDIATELY UPON GETTING OUR EYES OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT FOR INCREASED VIGILANCE, THE MASTER CAUTION CAME ON WITHOUT AN ASSOCIATED EICAS MESSAGE. AS THERE WAS A CLR MASTER CAUTION ALERT, WITHOUT A MESSAGE, BOTH CREW MEMBERS HAD TO BRING FULL ATTN INTO THE COCKPIT TO CONFIRM THE MESSAGE. THIS SEVERELY DETRACTED FROM OUTSIDE SCAN. FURTHER, IT TOOK A WHILE BEFORE BOTH OF US REALIZED THE REASON FOR THE CAUTION. WE COMPLETELY MISSED THE TFC OUTSIDE. BY THE TIME WE GOT OUR HEADS BACK OUT, THE TARGET WAS GONE. THIS IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE AS IT TAKES THE CREW COMPLETELY OUT OF THE SEE AND AVOID LOOP AND FURTHER BURIES THEIR HEADS IN THE COCKPIT, NOT SAFE. THERE NEEDS TO BE AN ASSOCIATED MESSAGE WITH THIS ALERT IN ORDER FOR THE CREW TO QUICKLY ACCESS THE INFO AND ASSOCIATE IT WITH ITS SOURCE, NOT THE VAGUE MESSAGE THAT ONLY GENERALLY BRINGS THE CREW'S ATTN TO THE ISSUE, AN ISSUE THAT IS ALREADY ALERTED THROUGH THE TCASII SCREEN, THE VSI AND AN AURAL ALERT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: EMB135, EMB140, AND EMB145 ACFT ARE INVOLVED. THERE ARE 3 VERSIONS OF EICAS SOFTWARE. THE LATEST TWO HAVE THE TCASII WARNING ADDED TO EICAS. THE CAPT RPTED THE PROB TO THE COMPANY AND WAS TOLD 'THEY'RE WORKING ON IT.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.