Narrative:

I was sent to service engine oil. Logbook entry said 11 quarts, aircraft left with open logbook entry. Captain and first officer did willfully depart with an open item in logbook. Low engine oil. When called on radio to come back, captain said he signed off the item. How can he sign off a logbook item that captain put in the logbook and sent an 'arm' message at XD55? Captain's omnipotent attitude, and unprofessional behavior and lack of concern for passenger safety and inability to accept FAA certified maintenance technician's experience and knowledge in matters requiring company aircraft maintenance policies are gpm procedures, and far's. Supplemental information from acn 627695: logbook problem. This report is being submitted because I was called by the union safety committee at approximately XA15 last night, informing me that the FAA was looking into a possible violation action due to logbook entries on flight xxy and xxz. My actions, from logbook entries to in-flight decisions, were guided by special message bulletin. B737 oil service requests, from the captain and this document should be reviewed during any consideration of the matters in question. The purpose of this bulletin was to enhance on-time departure reliability by reducing the number of delays caused by routine oil servicing. It was written in a manner to preclude being the cause of delays. Specifically, while an 'information to maintenance' was to be entered whenever oil quantity indicated less than 12 quarts during cruise specifies that these entries 'may be signed off by the outbound flight crew member,' the operating manual limitations of 'preflight and postflt minimum oil requirements remain at 12 quarts.' regarding flight xxz, ZZZ1-ZZZ2, the inbound captain had made an 'information to maintenance' logbook entry stating that engine #1 oil quantity was 11 quarts during cruise. Oil quantity at the gate indicated 13 quarts, which was legal for departure. Maintenance did not arrive at the aircraft until approximately 5 mins before scheduled departure. He said that the engine would need to be started, shut down, and the oil quantity checked again prior to any addition of oil. That would have resulted in a delayed departure for no logical reason. The aircraft was legal and safe to fly. It was clear to me that the intent of the captain's message was to provide a method to assist maintenance with routine (versus required) oil servicing. Equally clear was his intent to not create a program that would cause delays. I decided to 'sign off' the inbound captain's 'information to maintenance' message, noting the oil quantity of 13 quarts permitted dispatch. During the flight to ZZZ2 the oil quantity varied between 12 and 13 quarts during taxi out, cruise, and taxi in. Quantity at the ZZZ2 gate was 13 quarts upon arrival and prior to departure for the return to ZZZ1. During the return flight xxy to ZZZ1, the quantity went to 11 quarts during the latter part of cruise. I then decided to send an oil service request and make an 'information to maintenance' logbook entry in accordance with captain XXX the hope that this time, maintenance would make a timely appearance at the aircraft, so that the next captain would not have the same unnecessary hassles that I had. Safety was not compromised and operating limits were not violated during any part of this scenario. I believe that I performed within the intent and letter of captain XXX. It is a good program, and I sincerely hope that technical questions about how logbook entries are made do not sabotage a worthy effort to enhance on-time performance. Supplemental information from acn 627247: engine oil signoff. After review of the logbook for flight XXX, captain noticed that the previous crew had written an 'information to maintenance' that the #1 engine oil quantity was showing below the 12 quart minimum in-flight. Approximately 10 mins prior to scheduled departure time maintenance showed up and said that, although the indicator in the cockpit showed 12 quarts, he had checked the oil level on the engine itself and it showed approximately 11.3 quarts. He also stated that after more than 15 mins after engine shutdown, the engine oil quantity in the cockpit is no longer accurate. He informed the captain of the required procedure to add oil to the engine, and the captain elected to take theacft as is. The captain showed me the procedure in the flight paperwork that states that a crew member has the authority/authorized to sign off an 'information to maintenance' for this reason. After taking the runway for takeoff, tower informed us that we needed to vacate the runway and contact the company. We did so, and captain explained the situation to operations and they were satisfied. We then took the runway and took off. After starting the #1 engine and letting it warm up, it showed a quantity of 13 quarts in the cockpit prior to taking the runway for takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 CAPT SIGNED OFF OIL SVC IN THE MAINT LOGBOOK, IN ACCORDANCE WITH A CHIEF PLT BULLETIN. HOWEVER, A MAINT TECHNICIAN BELIEVES THE PROB SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED BEFORE TKOF.

Narrative: I WAS SENT TO SVC ENG OIL. LOGBOOK ENTRY SAID 11 QUARTS, ACFT LEFT WITH OPEN LOGBOOK ENTRY. CAPT AND FO DID WILLFULLY DEPART WITH AN OPEN ITEM IN LOGBOOK. LOW ENG OIL. WHEN CALLED ON RADIO TO COME BACK, CAPT SAID HE SIGNED OFF THE ITEM. HOW CAN HE SIGN OFF A LOGBOOK ITEM THAT CAPT PUT IN THE LOGBOOK AND SENT AN 'ARM' MESSAGE AT XD55? CAPT'S OMNIPOTENT ATTITUDE, AND UNPROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND LACK OF CONCERN FOR PAX SAFETY AND INABILITY TO ACCEPT FAA CERTIFIED MAINT TECHNICIAN'S EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE IN MATTERS REQUIRING COMPANY ACFT MAINT POLICIES ARE GPM PROCS, AND FAR'S. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 627695: LOGBOOK PROB. THIS RPT IS BEING SUBMITTED BECAUSE I WAS CALLED BY THE UNION SAFETY COMMITTEE AT APPROX XA15 LAST NIGHT, INFORMING ME THAT THE FAA WAS LOOKING INTO A POSSIBLE VIOLATION ACTION DUE TO LOGBOOK ENTRIES ON FLT XXY AND XXZ. MY ACTIONS, FROM LOGBOOK ENTRIES TO INFLT DECISIONS, WERE GUIDED BY SPECIAL MESSAGE BULLETIN. B737 OIL SVC REQUESTS, FROM THE CAPT AND THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE REVIEWED DURING ANY CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTERS IN QUESTION. THE PURPOSE OF THIS BULLETIN WAS TO ENHANCE ON-TIME DEP RELIABILITY BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF DELAYS CAUSED BY ROUTINE OIL SVCING. IT WAS WRITTEN IN A MANNER TO PRECLUDE BEING THE CAUSE OF DELAYS. SPECIFICALLY, WHILE AN 'INFO TO MAINT' WAS TO BE ENTERED WHENEVER OIL QUANTITY INDICATED LESS THAN 12 QUARTS DURING CRUISE SPECIFIES THAT THESE ENTRIES 'MAY BE SIGNED OFF BY THE OUTBOUND FLT CREW MEMBER,' THE OPERATING MANUAL LIMITATIONS OF 'PREFLT AND POSTFLT MINIMUM OIL REQUIREMENTS REMAIN AT 12 QUARTS.' REGARDING FLT XXZ, ZZZ1-ZZZ2, THE INBOUND CAPT HAD MADE AN 'INFO TO MAINT' LOGBOOK ENTRY STATING THAT ENG #1 OIL QUANTITY WAS 11 QUARTS DURING CRUISE. OIL QUANTITY AT THE GATE INDICATED 13 QUARTS, WHICH WAS LEGAL FOR DEP. MAINT DID NOT ARRIVE AT THE ACFT UNTIL APPROX 5 MINS BEFORE SCHEDULED DEP. HE SAID THAT THE ENG WOULD NEED TO BE STARTED, SHUT DOWN, AND THE OIL QUANTITY CHKED AGAIN PRIOR TO ANY ADDITION OF OIL. THAT WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A DELAYED DEP FOR NO LOGICAL REASON. THE ACFT WAS LEGAL AND SAFE TO FLY. IT WAS CLR TO ME THAT THE INTENT OF THE CAPT'S MESSAGE WAS TO PROVIDE A METHOD TO ASSIST MAINT WITH ROUTINE (VERSUS REQUIRED) OIL SVCING. EQUALLY CLR WAS HIS INTENT TO NOT CREATE A PROGRAM THAT WOULD CAUSE DELAYS. I DECIDED TO 'SIGN OFF' THE INBOUND CAPT'S 'INFO TO MAINT' MESSAGE, NOTING THE OIL QUANTITY OF 13 QUARTS PERMITTED DISPATCH. DURING THE FLT TO ZZZ2 THE OIL QUANTITY VARIED BTWN 12 AND 13 QUARTS DURING TAXI OUT, CRUISE, AND TAXI IN. QUANTITY AT THE ZZZ2 GATE WAS 13 QUARTS UPON ARR AND PRIOR TO DEP FOR THE RETURN TO ZZZ1. DURING THE RETURN FLT XXY TO ZZZ1, THE QUANTITY WENT TO 11 QUARTS DURING THE LATTER PART OF CRUISE. I THEN DECIDED TO SEND AN OIL SVC REQUEST AND MAKE AN 'INFO TO MAINT' LOGBOOK ENTRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH CAPT XXX THE HOPE THAT THIS TIME, MAINT WOULD MAKE A TIMELY APPEARANCE AT THE ACFT, SO THAT THE NEXT CAPT WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME UNNECESSARY HASSLES THAT I HAD. SAFETY WAS NOT COMPROMISED AND OPERATING LIMITS WERE NOT VIOLATED DURING ANY PART OF THIS SCENARIO. I BELIEVE THAT I PERFORMED WITHIN THE INTENT AND LETTER OF CAPT XXX. IT IS A GOOD PROGRAM, AND I SINCERELY HOPE THAT TECHNICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW LOGBOOK ENTRIES ARE MADE DO NOT SABOTAGE A WORTHY EFFORT TO ENHANCE ON-TIME PERFORMANCE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 627247: ENG OIL SIGNOFF. AFTER REVIEW OF THE LOGBOOK FOR FLT XXX, CAPT NOTICED THAT THE PREVIOUS CREW HAD WRITTEN AN 'INFO TO MAINT' THAT THE #1 ENG OIL QUANTITY WAS SHOWING BELOW THE 12 QUART MINIMUM INFLT. APPROX 10 MINS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED DEP TIME MAINT SHOWED UP AND SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE INDICATOR IN THE COCKPIT SHOWED 12 QUARTS, HE HAD CHKED THE OIL LEVEL ON THE ENG ITSELF AND IT SHOWED APPROX 11.3 QUARTS. HE ALSO STATED THAT AFTER MORE THAN 15 MINS AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN, THE ENG OIL QUANTITY IN THE COCKPIT IS NO LONGER ACCURATE. HE INFORMED THE CAPT OF THE REQUIRED PROC TO ADD OIL TO THE ENG, AND THE CAPT ELECTED TO TAKE THEACFT AS IS. THE CAPT SHOWED ME THE PROC IN THE FLT PAPERWORK THAT STATES THAT A CREW MEMBER HAS THE AUTH TO SIGN OFF AN 'INFO TO MAINT' FOR THIS REASON. AFTER TAKING THE RWY FOR TKOF, TWR INFORMED US THAT WE NEEDED TO VACATE THE RWY AND CONTACT THE COMPANY. WE DID SO, AND CAPT EXPLAINED THE SIT TO OPS AND THEY WERE SATISFIED. WE THEN TOOK THE RWY AND TOOK OFF. AFTER STARTING THE #1 ENG AND LETTING IT WARM UP, IT SHOWED A QUANTITY OF 13 QUARTS IN THE COCKPIT PRIOR TO TAKING THE RWY FOR TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.