Narrative:

Normal takeoff and initial departure. On potomac departure frequency 128.7 we were given a climb to 17000 ft on an initial heading of 330 degrees. We were then turned to heading 300 degrees. A short time later, we were instructed to turn to a heading of 260 degrees. A heading of 260 degrees would have turned us directly into a red/magenta radar return with lots of visible lightning. We advised the controller that we were unable to turn to that heading but could maintain about a 270 degree heading. The controller stated that our current heading would take us into a sector not under his control. He then told us to turn to a heading of 180 degrees. We again told him we could not turn left at that time. The controller then stated, 'there is no WX there, turn left to 180 degrees now.' we again stated that we could not turn. He then terminated radar service. We offered to make a 360 degree turn or do anything other than turn into the storm. He again stated that radar service was terminated. We maintained 17000 ft and a heading to stay clear of the WX. The first officer wisely asked him to give us the frequency of the sector into which we were headed. We went to that frequency (I believe 121.05) where we received a climb clearance to climb to FL190 and proceed direct to linden. There were no assigned deviations or known traffic conflicts. We then proceeded on course without further incident. There are a couple of key points in this incident. Had the controller turned us 40-60 seconds earlier, we could have complied with his instructions with minor deviations. Both pilots were astounded that the controller insisted there was no WX while we were looking at magenta/red radar returns and looking outside at the frequent lightning. We are well aware of the sensitivity of complying with instructions in the washington dc area (even though we were headed west away from the capitol region). The safety of our passenger and aircraft was our primary concern. That safety would definitely have been compromised by following the controller's instructions. Supplemental information from acn 627929: the clearance for departure called for runway heading, radar vectors to linden VOR, route as filed. After switching to our assigned departure frequency, we were initially vectored to a heading of 330 degrees, and then subsequently vectored to a heading of 300 degrees, with a climb to 17000 ft. This kept us clear of a thunderstorm we were painting on radar, with red centers and magenta contours. We could also observe heavy lightning within this storm. Potomac departure then issued a heading of 260 degrees, which would have taken us into the center of the storm. We replied that we were unable to turn to this heading, but we could turn as much as 270 degrees to avoid a thunderstorm. Departure told us there was no WX, and now told us to turn to a heading of 180. We repeated that we were unable to turn in this direction because of the storm in front and abeam of our position, but could also give him a right 360 degrees if needed. Departure then informed us that our current heading would take us into the neighboring sector, and again insisted on a heading of 180 degrees. Not seeing any aircraft in the vicinity, visually, as well as on TCAS, we maintained our heading to stay clear of the WX, and told him we did not want to turn into the storm. Potomac departure then told us that radar service was terminated, and that this was all that he could do for us. We then asked him if he could hand us off to the next sector, which he did a few moments later. After switching to washington center, we were cleared direct linden and climb to FL190. The captain and I were amazed, that for one, potomac was not aware of the WX in this area. We were even more amazed, when we informed the controller of the presence of the storm in our vicinity, and he still insisted on turning us into the WX. We were simply speechless, continuing on our present heading to avoid the thunderstorm when he told us that radar service was terminated. Apparently he did not want to coordinate a handover to the neighboring sector. I was also astonished, that only after suggesting a handover to the next sector, we were able to solve the situation by climbing to FL190 direct linden VOR. Callback conversation with reporter acn 627485 revealed the following information: reporter said he was astounded when the controller said radar service was terminated. He said when they switched frequencys, the new controller did not indicate there was a problem or ask us to call on the telephone.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PCT DEP CTLR TERMINATED RADAR SVC ON A B737 AIR CARRIER CREW THAT REFUSED TO MAKE A L TURN INTO A TSTM WITH VISIBLE LIGHTNING.

Narrative: NORMAL TKOF AND INITIAL DEP. ON POTOMAC DEP FREQ 128.7 WE WERE GIVEN A CLB TO 17000 FT ON AN INITIAL HDG OF 330 DEGS. WE WERE THEN TURNED TO HDG 300 DEGS. A SHORT TIME LATER, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN TO A HDG OF 260 DEGS. A HDG OF 260 DEGS WOULD HAVE TURNED US DIRECTLY INTO A RED/MAGENTA RADAR RETURN WITH LOTS OF VISIBLE LIGHTNING. WE ADVISED THE CTLR THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO TURN TO THAT HDG BUT COULD MAINTAIN ABOUT A 270 DEG HDG. THE CTLR STATED THAT OUR CURRENT HDG WOULD TAKE US INTO A SECTOR NOT UNDER HIS CTL. HE THEN TOLD US TO TURN TO A HDG OF 180 DEGS. WE AGAIN TOLD HIM WE COULD NOT TURN L AT THAT TIME. THE CTLR THEN STATED, 'THERE IS NO WX THERE, TURN L TO 180 DEGS NOW.' WE AGAIN STATED THAT WE COULD NOT TURN. HE THEN TERMINATED RADAR SVC. WE OFFERED TO MAKE A 360 DEG TURN OR DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN TURN INTO THE STORM. HE AGAIN STATED THAT RADAR SVC WAS TERMINATED. WE MAINTAINED 17000 FT AND A HDG TO STAY CLEAR OF THE WX. THE FO WISELY ASKED HIM TO GIVE US THE FREQ OF THE SECTOR INTO WHICH WE WERE HEADED. WE WENT TO THAT FREQ (I BELIEVE 121.05) WHERE WE RECEIVED A CLB CLRNC TO CLB TO FL190 AND PROCEED DIRECT TO LINDEN. THERE WERE NO ASSIGNED DEVIATIONS OR KNOWN TFC CONFLICTS. WE THEN PROCEEDED ON COURSE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THERE ARE A COUPLE OF KEY POINTS IN THIS INCIDENT. HAD THE CTLR TURNED US 40-60 SECONDS EARLIER, WE COULD HAVE COMPLIED WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS WITH MINOR DEVIATIONS. BOTH PLTS WERE ASTOUNDED THAT THE CTLR INSISTED THERE WAS NO WX WHILE WE WERE LOOKING AT MAGENTA/RED RADAR RETURNS AND LOOKING OUTSIDE AT THE FREQUENT LIGHTNING. WE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF COMPLYING WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN THE WASHINGTON DC AREA (EVEN THOUGH WE WERE HEADED W AWAY FROM THE CAPITOL REGION). THE SAFETY OF OUR PAX AND ACFT WAS OUR PRIMARY CONCERN. THAT SAFETY WOULD DEFINITELY HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED BY FOLLOWING THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 627929: THE CLRNC FOR DEP CALLED FOR RWY HDG, RADAR VECTORS TO LINDEN VOR, RTE AS FILED. AFTER SWITCHING TO OUR ASSIGNED DEP FREQ, WE WERE INITIALLY VECTORED TO A HDG OF 330 DEGS, AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY VECTORED TO A HDG OF 300 DEGS, WITH A CLB TO 17000 FT. THIS KEPT US CLEAR OF A TSTM WE WERE PAINTING ON RADAR, WITH RED CENTERS AND MAGENTA CONTOURS. WE COULD ALSO OBSERVE HEAVY LIGHTNING WITHIN THIS STORM. POTOMAC DEP THEN ISSUED A HDG OF 260 DEGS, WHICH WOULD HAVE TAKEN US INTO THE CENTER OF THE STORM. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO TURN TO THIS HDG, BUT WE COULD TURN AS MUCH AS 270 DEGS TO AVOID A TSTM. DEP TOLD US THERE WAS NO WX, AND NOW TOLD US TO TURN TO A HDG OF 180. WE REPEATED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO TURN IN THIS DIRECTION BECAUSE OF THE STORM IN FRONT AND ABEAM OF OUR POSITION, BUT COULD ALSO GIVE HIM A R 360 DEGS IF NEEDED. DEP THEN INFORMED US THAT OUR CURRENT HDG WOULD TAKE US INTO THE NEIGHBORING SECTOR, AND AGAIN INSISTED ON A HDG OF 180 DEGS. NOT SEEING ANY ACFT IN THE VICINITY, VISUALLY, AS WELL AS ON TCAS, WE MAINTAINED OUR HDG TO STAY CLEAR OF THE WX, AND TOLD HIM WE DID NOT WANT TO TURN INTO THE STORM. POTOMAC DEP THEN TOLD US THAT RADAR SVC WAS TERMINATED, AND THAT THIS WAS ALL THAT HE COULD DO FOR US. WE THEN ASKED HIM IF HE COULD HAND US OFF TO THE NEXT SECTOR, WHICH HE DID A FEW MOMENTS LATER. AFTER SWITCHING TO WASHINGTON CTR, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT LINDEN AND CLB TO FL190. THE CAPT AND I WERE AMAZED, THAT FOR ONE, POTOMAC WAS NOT AWARE OF THE WX IN THIS AREA. WE WERE EVEN MORE AMAZED, WHEN WE INFORMED THE CTLR OF THE PRESENCE OF THE STORM IN OUR VICINITY, AND HE STILL INSISTED ON TURNING US INTO THE WX. WE WERE SIMPLY SPEECHLESS, CONTINUING ON OUR PRESENT HDG TO AVOID THE TSTM WHEN HE TOLD US THAT RADAR SVC WAS TERMINATED. APPARENTLY HE DID NOT WANT TO COORDINATE A HANDOVER TO THE NEIGHBORING SECTOR. I WAS ALSO ASTONISHED, THAT ONLY AFTER SUGGESTING A HANDOVER TO THE NEXT SECTOR, WE WERE ABLE TO SOLVE THE SIT BY CLBING TO FL190 DIRECT LINDEN VOR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 627485 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAID HE WAS ASTOUNDED WHEN THE CTLR SAID RADAR SVC WAS TERMINATED. HE SAID WHEN THEY SWITCHED FREQS, THE NEW CTLR DID NOT INDICATE THERE WAS A PROB OR ASK US TO CALL ON THE TELEPHONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.