Narrative:

I've been meaning to write for a while but haven't been able to determine the proper format since this report is not flight specific. I have noticed in myself and among the capts that I have flown with lately an increase in procedural mistakes that, when isolated, are relatively benign. These mistakes include missed radio calls (more than usual), errors when reading checklists, reaching for the wrong control (example: flap handle versus gear handle), missing items on flows, etc. When combined, these mistakes lead to others and have the potential to lead to damaging an aircraft or a hull loss. I believe that the cause of the above is fatigue. In most cases, the pilot has slept well in the preceding days but has not had enough time off to effectively decompress. As you know, there are many stressors out there right now. Many times, fatigue is not recognized by the individual until it is too late (cruise or approach phase). Unless more days off are built into the lines, this problem will continue. Air carrier X is destined for liquidation if a hull loss is suffered, especially if pilot error/fatigue is cited. If we were trying to determine the limit in scheduling work rules, we have found it. We are fatigued. Please help us. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first officer flies for a company that unilaterally took all protection out of the contract. The reporter said flight crews have to work 4 or 5 days more a month. They have extended duty time. The reporter says there are many more mistakes being made in the cockpit. He says flight crew cumulative fatigue is in evidence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FO IS CONCERNED ABOUT FATIGUE IN THE COCKPIT.

Narrative: I'VE BEEN MEANING TO WRITE FOR A WHILE BUT HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE THE PROPER FORMAT SINCE THIS RPT IS NOT FLT SPECIFIC. I HAVE NOTICED IN MYSELF AND AMONG THE CAPTS THAT I HAVE FLOWN WITH LATELY AN INCREASE IN PROCEDURAL MISTAKES THAT, WHEN ISOLATED, ARE RELATIVELY BENIGN. THESE MISTAKES INCLUDE MISSED RADIO CALLS (MORE THAN USUAL), ERRORS WHEN READING CHKLISTS, REACHING FOR THE WRONG CTL (EXAMPLE: FLAP HANDLE VERSUS GEAR HANDLE), MISSING ITEMS ON FLOWS, ETC. WHEN COMBINED, THESE MISTAKES LEAD TO OTHERS AND HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO LEAD TO DAMAGING AN ACFT OR A HULL LOSS. I BELIEVE THAT THE CAUSE OF THE ABOVE IS FATIGUE. IN MOST CASES, THE PLT HAS SLEPT WELL IN THE PRECEDING DAYS BUT HAS NOT HAD ENOUGH TIME OFF TO EFFECTIVELY DECOMPRESS. AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE MANY STRESSORS OUT THERE RIGHT NOW. MANY TIMES, FATIGUE IS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE INDIVIDUAL UNTIL IT IS TOO LATE (CRUISE OR APCH PHASE). UNLESS MORE DAYS OFF ARE BUILT INTO THE LINES, THIS PROB WILL CONTINUE. ACR X IS DESTINED FOR LIQUIDATION IF A HULL LOSS IS SUFFERED, ESPECIALLY IF PLT ERROR/FATIGUE IS CITED. IF WE WERE TRYING TO DETERMINE THE LIMIT IN SCHEDULING WORK RULES, WE HAVE FOUND IT. WE ARE FATIGUED. PLEASE HELP US. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO FLIES FOR A COMPANY THAT UNILATERALLY TOOK ALL PROTECTION OUT OF THE CONTRACT. THE RPTR SAID FLT CREWS HAVE TO WORK 4 OR 5 DAYS MORE A MONTH. THEY HAVE EXTENDED DUTY TIME. THE RPTR SAYS THERE ARE MANY MORE MISTAKES BEING MADE IN THE COCKPIT. HE SAYS FLT CREW CUMULATIVE FATIGUE IS IN EVIDENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.