Narrative:

After being switched over to roa approach on descent to roa, we were told by the approach controller to expect vectors for a visual approach to runway 24 in roa. As the PF, I began to configure the aircraft early and slow in anticipation of a rapid descent which is fairly common while on approach to roa. The controller vectored us for the visual approach and we descended through an overcast layer at approximately 3500 ft MSL. We had briefed the VOR DME-a approach to runway 24 (circle to land), but the first officer and myself agreed that due to the steep descent rate required on the approach and the lack of vertical guidance for this runway, that the controller may be able to vector us more appropriately for a suitable approach. We briefed the suitable step down altitudes on the approach and discussed where the appropriate altitudes were on the approach so we could be well away from terrain on the approach. The controller vectored us for an approximately 4.8 mi final to runway 24 on a tight right base. I was assured I had the runway in sight and began a tight descent on final. The first officer and I agreed we were inside the terrain on final approach. We extended the gear and final flaps and started to settle in for a stabilized approach to the runway. Soon after we heard the GPWS -- terrain guidance annunciate, we executed a go around and terrain avoidance procedure. We notified the controller of what occurred and he told us he would vector us to the southeast and back around to the north for another visual approach. The controller told us he would keep us away from all terrain on the approach. The controller kept us at 3700 ft MSL and provided vectors for our approach on a left base for runway 24. The controller asked if we had the runway in sight. We did and at approximately 3000 ft determined we were clear of terrain approximately 4.5 mi from the runway. We were cleared for the visual approach and again began our descent and configured for landing. Seconds later we received another GPWS-terrain warning. We executed a second go around and notified ATC. ATC told us no matter what we do we were going to receive a warning because it happens all the time. We received vectors for the full VOR DME-a approach to runway 24, executed the approach and landed with no GPWS warnings or alerts and landed without incident. After debriefing the event with my first officer we agreed that we should have requested vectors for the VOR DME-a in the beginning stages instead of attempting a visual approach even though the descent rate is high on the instrument approach it turned out to be less of a higher rate in proximity to terrain than the controller was giving us for a visual approach. ILS approachs were OTS. Lda approachs not in use at time. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the crew was flying with enhanced GPWS. Reporter said flying into roa at night is a black hole. There were 2 TRACON controllers in the cabin. They wanted to know why reporter went around twice. The crew explained they had 2 egpws terrain warnings. The controller said it happens all the time. When the captain talked to the approach controller, he indicated they also got an MSAW. The captain thinks the controller should not issue visual approachs at night into this airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 CREW HAD 2 EGPWS TERRAIN WARNINGS, AT NIGHT, WHILE FLYING THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24 AT ROA.

Narrative: AFTER BEING SWITCHED OVER TO ROA APCH ON DSCNT TO ROA, WE WERE TOLD BY THE APCH CTLR TO EXPECT VECTORS FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24 IN ROA. AS THE PF, I BEGAN TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT EARLY AND SLOW IN ANTICIPATION OF A RAPID DSCNT WHICH IS FAIRLY COMMON WHILE ON APCH TO ROA. THE CTLR VECTORED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH AND WE DSNDED THROUGH AN OVCST LAYER AT APPROX 3500 FT MSL. WE HAD BRIEFED THE VOR DME-A APCH TO RWY 24 (CIRCLE TO LAND), BUT THE FO AND MYSELF AGREED THAT DUE TO THE STEEP DSCNT RATE REQUIRED ON THE APCH AND THE LACK OF VERT GUIDANCE FOR THIS RWY, THAT THE CTLR MAY BE ABLE TO VECTOR US MORE APPROPRIATELY FOR A SUITABLE APCH. WE BRIEFED THE SUITABLE STEP DOWN ALTS ON THE APCH AND DISCUSSED WHERE THE APPROPRIATE ALTS WERE ON THE APCH SO WE COULD BE WELL AWAY FROM TERRAIN ON THE APCH. THE CTLR VECTORED US FOR AN APPROX 4.8 MI FINAL TO RWY 24 ON A TIGHT R BASE. I WAS ASSURED I HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT AND BEGAN A TIGHT DSCNT ON FINAL. THE FO AND I AGREED WE WERE INSIDE THE TERRAIN ON FINAL APCH. WE EXTENDED THE GEAR AND FINAL FLAPS AND STARTED TO SETTLE IN FOR A STABILIZED APCH TO THE RWY. SOON AFTER WE HEARD THE GPWS -- TERRAIN GUIDANCE ANNUNCIATE, WE EXECUTED A GAR AND TERRAIN AVOIDANCE PROC. WE NOTIFIED THE CTLR OF WHAT OCCURRED AND HE TOLD US HE WOULD VECTOR US TO THE SE AND BACK AROUND TO THE N FOR ANOTHER VISUAL APCH. THE CTLR TOLD US HE WOULD KEEP US AWAY FROM ALL TERRAIN ON THE APCH. THE CTLR KEPT US AT 3700 FT MSL AND PROVIDED VECTORS FOR OUR APCH ON A L BASE FOR RWY 24. THE CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. WE DID AND AT APPROX 3000 FT DETERMINED WE WERE CLR OF TERRAIN APPROX 4.5 MI FROM THE RWY. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH AND AGAIN BEGAN OUR DSCNT AND CONFIGURED FOR LNDG. SECONDS LATER WE RECEIVED ANOTHER GPWS-TERRAIN WARNING. WE EXECUTED A SECOND GAR AND NOTIFIED ATC. ATC TOLD US NO MATTER WHAT WE DO WE WERE GOING TO RECEIVE A WARNING BECAUSE IT HAPPENS ALL THE TIME. WE RECEIVED VECTORS FOR THE FULL VOR DME-A APCH TO RWY 24, EXECUTED THE APCH AND LANDED WITH NO GPWS WARNINGS OR ALERTS AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER DEBRIEFING THE EVENT WITH MY FO WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED VECTORS FOR THE VOR DME-A IN THE BEGINNING STAGES INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING A VISUAL APCH EVEN THOUGH THE DSCNT RATE IS HIGH ON THE INST APCH IT TURNED OUT TO BE LESS OF A HIGHER RATE IN PROX TO TERRAIN THAN THE CTLR WAS GIVING US FOR A VISUAL APCH. ILS APCHS WERE OTS. LDA APCHS NOT IN USE AT TIME. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CREW WAS FLYING WITH ENHANCED GPWS. RPTR SAID FLYING INTO ROA AT NIGHT IS A BLACK HOLE. THERE WERE 2 TRACON CTLRS IN THE CABIN. THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHY RPTR WENT AROUND TWICE. THE CREW EXPLAINED THEY HAD 2 EGPWS TERRAIN WARNINGS. THE CTLR SAID IT HAPPENS ALL THE TIME. WHEN THE CAPT TALKED TO THE APCH CTLR, HE INDICATED THEY ALSO GOT AN MSAW. THE CAPT THINKS THE CTLR SHOULD NOT ISSUE VISUAL APCHS AT NIGHT INTO THIS ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.