Narrative:

Takeoff on runway 6 was normal until about 100 KTS when a momentary pull was felt accompanied by a barely audible 'pop.' I aborted the takeoff at about 110 KTS. Suspecting a tire problem, I maximized reverser thrust and used moderate braking. The first officer called the tower with the abort and the tower reported seeing a puff of smoke but no further sign of a problem. I elected to pull off the runway and park away from the gate to allow the brakes to cool. The first officer made a PA for the passenger to remain seated. Once parked, I talked with the flight attendant and looked at the main gear. Seeing that the right inboard main tire was flat, I called operations for assistance. Crash fire rescue equipment was dispatched automatically and after being consulted, was dismissed. The passenger were informed and bused to the terminal. Maintenance performed the appropriate inspections and replaced both tires on the right main gear. The mechanics noted that the right main inboard hydraulic line attach fitting was found loose and that this was known to lock up the brake. Crew was debriefed. The tire failure was very innocuous. Company policy is to continue the takeoff when above 100 KTS unless the airplane is deemed unsafe to fly. My decision to abort was based on the possibility of not reaching the V speeds (V1 equals 129 KTS), having about 7000 ft remaining to affect a safe abort (10000 ft runway) and a relatively light airplane (48000 pounds). Supplemental information from acn 628563: the aircraft very slightly pulled to the right, much like a small brake application. I looked down and noted the engines were normal and no messages. The aircraft seemed to decelerate momentarily then resume acceleration. Runway alignment was perfect. The captain called 'abort' and accomplished a flawless procedure with appropriate braking (moderate) and full thrust reverse. Considering the runway is 10000 ft long, he used excellent judgement using just the correct amount of braking for great directional control. Upon questioning tower, they informed us they observed 'white smoke' well into the takeoff roll (prior to the abort). The flight attendant informed the captain she had heard a loud 'bang' after which we aborted. No brake temperature monitor went above 9 degrees. The simulator teaches tire failure as a loud noise (I heard none) with a 'bumping' aircraft and a strong pull. This failure was a 'pull.' I have had numerous tire failures in the USAF and this one was very insidious. I think the captain did an outstanding job with minimum time to ascertain whether the aircraft was airworthy or not. This situation is the split second decision we all dread. As the tire failure proved, I congratulated the captain for his sound decision, airmanship, and professionalism. I fully support his abort decision.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CARJ CAPT ABORTED TKOF BECAUSE OF A TIRE PROB.

Narrative: TKOF ON RWY 6 WAS NORMAL UNTIL ABOUT 100 KTS WHEN A MOMENTARY PULL WAS FELT ACCOMPANIED BY A BARELY AUDIBLE 'POP.' I ABORTED THE TKOF AT ABOUT 110 KTS. SUSPECTING A TIRE PROB, I MAXIMIZED REVERSER THRUST AND USED MODERATE BRAKING. THE FO CALLED THE TWR WITH THE ABORT AND THE TWR RPTED SEEING A PUFF OF SMOKE BUT NO FURTHER SIGN OF A PROB. I ELECTED TO PULL OFF THE RWY AND PARK AWAY FROM THE GATE TO ALLOW THE BRAKES TO COOL. THE FO MADE A PA FOR THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED. ONCE PARKED, I TALKED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT AND LOOKED AT THE MAIN GEAR. SEEING THAT THE R INBOARD MAIN TIRE WAS FLAT, I CALLED OPS FOR ASSISTANCE. CFR WAS DISPATCHED AUTOMATICALLY AND AFTER BEING CONSULTED, WAS DISMISSED. THE PAX WERE INFORMED AND BUSED TO THE TERMINAL. MAINT PERFORMED THE APPROPRIATE INSPECTIONS AND REPLACED BOTH TIRES ON THE R MAIN GEAR. THE MECHS NOTED THAT THE R MAIN INBOARD HYD LINE ATTACH FITTING WAS FOUND LOOSE AND THAT THIS WAS KNOWN TO LOCK UP THE BRAKE. CREW WAS DEBRIEFED. THE TIRE FAILURE WAS VERY INNOCUOUS. COMPANY POLICY IS TO CONTINUE THE TKOF WHEN ABOVE 100 KTS UNLESS THE AIRPLANE IS DEEMED UNSAFE TO FLY. MY DECISION TO ABORT WAS BASED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF NOT REACHING THE V SPDS (V1 EQUALS 129 KTS), HAVING ABOUT 7000 FT REMAINING TO AFFECT A SAFE ABORT (10000 FT RWY) AND A RELATIVELY LIGHT AIRPLANE (48000 LBS). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 628563: THE ACFT VERY SLIGHTLY PULLED TO THE R, MUCH LIKE A SMALL BRAKE APPLICATION. I LOOKED DOWN AND NOTED THE ENGS WERE NORMAL AND NO MESSAGES. THE ACFT SEEMED TO DECELERATE MOMENTARILY THEN RESUME ACCELERATION. RWY ALIGNMENT WAS PERFECT. THE CAPT CALLED 'ABORT' AND ACCOMPLISHED A FLAWLESS PROC WITH APPROPRIATE BRAKING (MODERATE) AND FULL THRUST REVERSE. CONSIDERING THE RWY IS 10000 FT LONG, HE USED EXCELLENT JUDGEMENT USING JUST THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF BRAKING FOR GREAT DIRECTIONAL CTL. UPON QUESTIONING TWR, THEY INFORMED US THEY OBSERVED 'WHITE SMOKE' WELL INTO THE TKOF ROLL (PRIOR TO THE ABORT). THE FLT ATTENDANT INFORMED THE CAPT SHE HAD HEARD A LOUD 'BANG' AFTER WHICH WE ABORTED. NO BRAKE TEMP MONITOR WENT ABOVE 9 DEGS. THE SIMULATOR TEACHES TIRE FAILURE AS A LOUD NOISE (I HEARD NONE) WITH A 'BUMPING' ACFT AND A STRONG PULL. THIS FAILURE WAS A 'PULL.' I HAVE HAD NUMEROUS TIRE FAILURES IN THE USAF AND THIS ONE WAS VERY INSIDIOUS. I THINK THE CAPT DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB WITH MINIMUM TIME TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY OR NOT. THIS SIT IS THE SPLIT SECOND DECISION WE ALL DREAD. AS THE TIRE FAILURE PROVED, I CONGRATULATED THE CAPT FOR HIS SOUND DECISION, AIRMANSHIP, AND PROFESSIONALISM. I FULLY SUPPORT HIS ABORT DECISION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.