Narrative:

We were dispatched to sdq from sju, into very questionable/marginal conditions to land at a marginal airport. Tropical storm was moving into the island from hispaniola northeast of the santo domingo area when we were dispatched to sdq. The journey from sju to sdq, to say the least, was very challenging. By the time we arrived, the hurricane had formed into a CAT I. Surface winds were reported at 280 degrees at 20 KTS. Ceiling was ragged at 1000 ft and visibility was fairly good and ranged from 3-5 mi. Rain bands from the storm were building and passing through from time-to-time, adding unpredictability to the mix. Everything was very fluid leading up to the approach to landing. We established ourselves on the VOR DME 35 approach on the 10 DME arc. We had visual contact with the runway about 3-4 mi out and around 1000 ft. At that altitude we were experiencing a 45+ KT crosswind. The tower was reporting surface winds 280 degrees at 20 KTS. We had a stable approach until just about 20 ft afl. At that time we experienced some kind of gust or vortex that severely rolled the aircraft to the left then seemed to push us forward and to the right. When the aircraft rolled left, my first thought was that we had struck the wingtip or caught an engine and was surprised when other indications (feel and sound) indicated otherwise. (I think the main gear prevented this from happening and later wondered what might have happened had we been 20 ft higher.) after the roll to the left, we were buffeted and felt like we were pushed. The thought of a go around was quickly dismissed due to the unknown ctlability/condition of the aircraft, nor did I feel the escape maneuver would be successful for the same reasons. It was very difficult to tell if we were still flying or on the ground. When I felt we were on the ground, I initiated reverse thrust. The spoilers deployed. I then realized we were hydroplaning. I had very little, if any, control of the aircraft until the spoilers fully deployed and the airplane settled onto the runway. My feeling, after the initial shock of the left wing dropping, and the buffeting, was that we were going to exit the runway go the right. This all happened between about 100-150 KTS, I'd say. It is hard to put it all together with things happening so furiously and fast. We were literally seconds from being a serious incident (read significant hull damage and loss of life). This begs the question: why were we dispatched to an area that was experiencing a major WX event? This is an airport in a third world country with a runway of questionable surface integrity, and a tower reporting winds of questionable accuracy. (No gusts were ever reported and wind reports were all in 5 KT increments.) what in my company's culture brings one to a point that they have to try to convince someone that flying in the vicinity of a hurricane, or 'would-be' hurricane, is not an optimum situation? Why do we at my company feel the need to fly airplanes into areas that leave little margin left for safety because the 'numbers' say we are 'legal,' just to keep a schedule? I truly feel that the reality, or concept, that we fly people (human beings), not boxes or military sorties, gets lost to some in dispatch and to some on the line. The focus to get the 'mission accomplished' does, at times, overshadow the realities of the situation. It is disingenuous to say, as a captain, that I have the last word and it is up to me whether to fly a flight or not. When the numbers say you are legal, but the situation and/or events indicate otherwise, the numbers win. So you go with the numbers and head toward your destination, evaluating and re-evaluating your situation as you progress. Other pilots may have flown into the area you are uncomfortable with and get away with it, leading to a perception that you're the problem, not the events and/or undesirable sits you are being led towards. Sure it is said that the captain has the final authority/authorized. We situation in training every 9 months with a school house instructor telling us of all the 'near' disasters on the line and how we as PIC's should not accept questionable flying sits. But, on the line, we all know what that reality is. Within my company's 'culture of confrontation,' either your pay is cut or you situation in operations till your duty day runs out if you choose not to go. You are also guaranteed a 'chat' with your chief pilot. At times you are forced to make these decisions, with hesitation, due to impending second-guessing and criticism. Your only redemption is if something bad happens to someone else, which you are trying to mitigate. The choice of taking a flight or not becomes a 'hobson's choice.' if we choose to dispatch airplanes into areas where your margin for safety is extremely narrow, diluted and possibly compromised by environmental and infrastructure conditions, we will have another 'serious incident.' my flight was just seconds away from being the next. It was 20 ft from its destination and almost didn't make it to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 CAPT MOMENTARILY LOST CTL OF HIS ACFT DURING THE LNDG FLARE AT MDSD, DUE TO THE CLOSE PROX OF A HURRICANE, DURING WHICH HE QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF HIS COMPANY TO DISPATCH THE FLT.

Narrative: WE WERE DISPATCHED TO SDQ FROM SJU, INTO VERY QUESTIONABLE/MARGINAL CONDITIONS TO LAND AT A MARGINAL ARPT. TROPICAL STORM WAS MOVING INTO THE ISLAND FROM HISPANIOLA NE OF THE SANTO DOMINGO AREA WHEN WE WERE DISPATCHED TO SDQ. THE JOURNEY FROM SJU TO SDQ, TO SAY THE LEAST, WAS VERY CHALLENGING. BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED, THE HURRICANE HAD FORMED INTO A CAT I. SURFACE WINDS WERE RPTED AT 280 DEGS AT 20 KTS. CEILING WAS RAGGED AT 1000 FT AND VISIBILITY WAS FAIRLY GOOD AND RANGED FROM 3-5 MI. RAIN BANDS FROM THE STORM WERE BUILDING AND PASSING THROUGH FROM TIME-TO-TIME, ADDING UNPREDICTABILITY TO THE MIX. EVERYTHING WAS VERY FLUID LEADING UP TO THE APCH TO LNDG. WE ESTABLISHED OURSELVES ON THE VOR DME 35 APCH ON THE 10 DME ARC. WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE RWY ABOUT 3-4 MI OUT AND AROUND 1000 FT. AT THAT ALT WE WERE EXPERIENCING A 45+ KT XWIND. THE TWR WAS RPTING SURFACE WINDS 280 DEGS AT 20 KTS. WE HAD A STABLE APCH UNTIL JUST ABOUT 20 FT AFL. AT THAT TIME WE EXPERIENCED SOME KIND OF GUST OR VORTEX THAT SEVERELY ROLLED THE ACFT TO THE L THEN SEEMED TO PUSH US FORWARD AND TO THE R. WHEN THE ACFT ROLLED L, MY FIRST THOUGHT WAS THAT WE HAD STRUCK THE WINGTIP OR CAUGHT AN ENG AND WAS SURPRISED WHEN OTHER INDICATIONS (FEEL AND SOUND) INDICATED OTHERWISE. (I THINK THE MAIN GEAR PREVENTED THIS FROM HAPPENING AND LATER WONDERED WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED HAD WE BEEN 20 FT HIGHER.) AFTER THE ROLL TO THE L, WE WERE BUFFETED AND FELT LIKE WE WERE PUSHED. THE THOUGHT OF A GAR WAS QUICKLY DISMISSED DUE TO THE UNKNOWN CTLABILITY/CONDITION OF THE ACFT, NOR DID I FEEL THE ESCAPE MANEUVER WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL FOR THE SAME REASONS. IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO TELL IF WE WERE STILL FLYING OR ON THE GND. WHEN I FELT WE WERE ON THE GND, I INITIATED REVERSE THRUST. THE SPOILERS DEPLOYED. I THEN REALIZED WE WERE HYDROPLANING. I HAD VERY LITTLE, IF ANY, CTL OF THE ACFT UNTIL THE SPOILERS FULLY DEPLOYED AND THE AIRPLANE SETTLED ONTO THE RWY. MY FEELING, AFTER THE INITIAL SHOCK OF THE L WING DROPPING, AND THE BUFFETING, WAS THAT WE WERE GOING TO EXIT THE RWY GO THE R. THIS ALL HAPPENED BTWN ABOUT 100-150 KTS, I'D SAY. IT IS HARD TO PUT IT ALL TOGETHER WITH THINGS HAPPENING SO FURIOUSLY AND FAST. WE WERE LITERALLY SECONDS FROM BEING A SERIOUS INCIDENT (READ SIGNIFICANT HULL DAMAGE AND LOSS OF LIFE). THIS BEGS THE QUESTION: WHY WERE WE DISPATCHED TO AN AREA THAT WAS EXPERIENCING A MAJOR WX EVENT? THIS IS AN ARPT IN A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY WITH A RWY OF QUESTIONABLE SURFACE INTEGRITY, AND A TWR RPTING WINDS OF QUESTIONABLE ACCURACY. (NO GUSTS WERE EVER RPTED AND WIND RPTS WERE ALL IN 5 KT INCREMENTS.) WHAT IN MY COMPANY'S CULTURE BRINGS ONE TO A POINT THAT THEY HAVE TO TRY TO CONVINCE SOMEONE THAT FLYING IN THE VICINITY OF A HURRICANE, OR 'WOULD-BE' HURRICANE, IS NOT AN OPTIMUM SIT? WHY DO WE AT MY COMPANY FEEL THE NEED TO FLY AIRPLANES INTO AREAS THAT LEAVE LITTLE MARGIN LEFT FOR SAFETY BECAUSE THE 'NUMBERS' SAY WE ARE 'LEGAL,' JUST TO KEEP A SCHEDULE? I TRULY FEEL THAT THE REALITY, OR CONCEPT, THAT WE FLY PEOPLE (HUMAN BEINGS), NOT BOXES OR MIL SORTIES, GETS LOST TO SOME IN DISPATCH AND TO SOME ON THE LINE. THE FOCUS TO GET THE 'MISSION ACCOMPLISHED' DOES, AT TIMES, OVERSHADOW THE REALITIES OF THE SIT. IT IS DISINGENUOUS TO SAY, AS A CAPT, THAT I HAVE THE LAST WORD AND IT IS UP TO ME WHETHER TO FLY A FLT OR NOT. WHEN THE NUMBERS SAY YOU ARE LEGAL, BUT THE SIT AND/OR EVENTS INDICATE OTHERWISE, THE NUMBERS WIN. SO YOU GO WITH THE NUMBERS AND HEAD TOWARD YOUR DEST, EVALUATING AND RE-EVALUATING YOUR SIT AS YOU PROGRESS. OTHER PLTS MAY HAVE FLOWN INTO THE AREA YOU ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH AND GET AWAY WITH IT, LEADING TO A PERCEPTION THAT YOU'RE THE PROB, NOT THE EVENTS AND/OR UNDESIRABLE SITS YOU ARE BEING LED TOWARDS. SURE IT IS SAID THAT THE CAPT HAS THE FINAL AUTH. WE SIT IN TRAINING EVERY 9 MONTHS WITH A SCHOOL HOUSE INSTRUCTOR TELLING US OF ALL THE 'NEAR' DISASTERS ON THE LINE AND HOW WE AS PIC'S SHOULD NOT ACCEPT QUESTIONABLE FLYING SITS. BUT, ON THE LINE, WE ALL KNOW WHAT THAT REALITY IS. WITHIN MY COMPANY'S 'CULTURE OF CONFRONTATION,' EITHER YOUR PAY IS CUT OR YOU SIT IN OPS TILL YOUR DUTY DAY RUNS OUT IF YOU CHOOSE NOT TO GO. YOU ARE ALSO GUARANTEED A 'CHAT' WITH YOUR CHIEF PLT. AT TIMES YOU ARE FORCED TO MAKE THESE DECISIONS, WITH HESITATION, DUE TO IMPENDING SECOND-GUESSING AND CRITICISM. YOUR ONLY REDEMPTION IS IF SOMETHING BAD HAPPENS TO SOMEONE ELSE, WHICH YOU ARE TRYING TO MITIGATE. THE CHOICE OF TAKING A FLT OR NOT BECOMES A 'HOBSON'S CHOICE.' IF WE CHOOSE TO DISPATCH AIRPLANES INTO AREAS WHERE YOUR MARGIN FOR SAFETY IS EXTREMELY NARROW, DILUTED AND POSSIBLY COMPROMISED BY ENVIRONMENTAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE CONDITIONS, WE WILL HAVE ANOTHER 'SERIOUS INCIDENT.' MY FLT WAS JUST SECONDS AWAY FROM BEING THE NEXT. IT WAS 20 FT FROM ITS DEST AND ALMOST DIDN'T MAKE IT TO THE GATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.