Narrative:

There were long delays in departing las vegas this date. We asked for clearance and were advised that there would be a 50 min delay until engine start would be approved. There were approximately 40 aircraft in front of us. Our clearance was cleared to vny via the boach 1 departure, climb to and maintain 7000 ft, expect FL220 as a final, squawk XXXX. The clearance was read back and confirmed to be correct. After delays in finding a slot for us in the departing line-up of aircraft, we finally made our way to runway 19L, our FMS recorded our wheels up. (I was the PIC for this flight, however, the co-pilot was flying from the left seat.) in flying the published SID, and shortly after takeoff, we encountered moderate, bordering on severe turbulence. We expected this as the winds were from the south at 20 KTS, gusting to as much as 35 KTS. My SID chart, which was clipped to the yoke, flew off, as well as pens and other nonsecured items. At this time, las ATC called with the instructions to climb to and maintain FL190 and comply with restrs. I read back 'climb to FL190 and will comply with restrs.' I was attempting to gather up my displaced items while all the time the aircraft was getting beat up pretty good by the ensuing turbulence. In resetting the altitude selector to FL190, I read the SID where it said to cross boach at or above 13000 ft and felt we were in compliance with the restrs. The SID was folded over from being dislodged and I failed to see that there was mandatory level off point at 7000 ft at roppr which was prior to boach. Although I was not physically flying the aircraft, the co-pilot was following the directions that I had given him. In retrospect, although I committed the error, ATC in its effort to get the maximum amount of aircraft into the air, should have let the initial departure clearance stand, as that was what we, as pilots, briefed prior to departure. And that would have ensured a level off at the required altitude. Before being handed off to ZLA, las departure gave me a telephone number to call when we landed. I spoke with las TRACON. We discussed the events that I previously wrote. He asked for my address and certificate number, which I gave him. After our discussion, I got the distinct feeling that this was not the first time that this had occurred over this intersection. I strongly feel that had ATC not altered our clearance, at a critical point in the flight, with not only the turbulence, navigating the act, I was performing the after takeoff checklist as well. As pilots, we briefed the departure together, as is normally done. To be given something other than what was briefed in this phase of flight set up this incident. Had he given the amended clearance on the ground, both of us would have taken the necessary time to go over the departure, and brief each other on the amended procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL601 CAPT MISUNDERSTOOD HIS CLRNC FROM L30 TRACON, DURING DEP FROM LAS, WHICH CAUSED HIM TO OVERSHOOT AN ALT RESTR.

Narrative: THERE WERE LONG DELAYS IN DEPARTING LAS VEGAS THIS DATE. WE ASKED FOR CLRNC AND WERE ADVISED THAT THERE WOULD BE A 50 MIN DELAY UNTIL ENG START WOULD BE APPROVED. THERE WERE APPROX 40 ACFT IN FRONT OF US. OUR CLRNC WAS CLRED TO VNY VIA THE BOACH 1 DEP, CLB TO AND MAINTAIN 7000 FT, EXPECT FL220 AS A FINAL, SQUAWK XXXX. THE CLRNC WAS READ BACK AND CONFIRMED TO BE CORRECT. AFTER DELAYS IN FINDING A SLOT FOR US IN THE DEPARTING LINE-UP OF ACFT, WE FINALLY MADE OUR WAY TO RWY 19L, OUR FMS RECORDED OUR WHEELS UP. (I WAS THE PIC FOR THIS FLT, HOWEVER, THE CO-PLT WAS FLYING FROM THE L SEAT.) IN FLYING THE PUBLISHED SID, AND SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, WE ENCOUNTERED MODERATE, BORDERING ON SEVERE TURB. WE EXPECTED THIS AS THE WINDS WERE FROM THE S AT 20 KTS, GUSTING TO AS MUCH AS 35 KTS. MY SID CHART, WHICH WAS CLIPPED TO THE YOKE, FLEW OFF, AS WELL AS PENS AND OTHER NONSECURED ITEMS. AT THIS TIME, LAS ATC CALLED WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS TO CLB TO AND MAINTAIN FL190 AND COMPLY WITH RESTRS. I READ BACK 'CLB TO FL190 AND WILL COMPLY WITH RESTRS.' I WAS ATTEMPTING TO GATHER UP MY DISPLACED ITEMS WHILE ALL THE TIME THE ACFT WAS GETTING BEAT UP PRETTY GOOD BY THE ENSUING TURB. IN RESETTING THE ALT SELECTOR TO FL190, I READ THE SID WHERE IT SAID TO CROSS BOACH AT OR ABOVE 13000 FT AND FELT WE WERE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESTRS. THE SID WAS FOLDED OVER FROM BEING DISLODGED AND I FAILED TO SEE THAT THERE WAS MANDATORY LEVEL OFF POINT AT 7000 FT AT ROPPR WHICH WAS PRIOR TO BOACH. ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT PHYSICALLY FLYING THE ACFT, THE CO-PLT WAS FOLLOWING THE DIRECTIONS THAT I HAD GIVEN HIM. IN RETROSPECT, ALTHOUGH I COMMITTED THE ERROR, ATC IN ITS EFFORT TO GET THE MAX AMOUNT OF ACFT INTO THE AIR, SHOULD HAVE LET THE INITIAL DEP CLRNC STAND, AS THAT WAS WHAT WE, AS PLTS, BRIEFED PRIOR TO DEP. AND THAT WOULD HAVE ENSURED A LEVEL OFF AT THE REQUIRED ALT. BEFORE BEING HANDED OFF TO ZLA, LAS DEP GAVE ME A TELEPHONE NUMBER TO CALL WHEN WE LANDED. I SPOKE WITH LAS TRACON. WE DISCUSSED THE EVENTS THAT I PREVIOUSLY WROTE. HE ASKED FOR MY ADDRESS AND CERTIFICATE NUMBER, WHICH I GAVE HIM. AFTER OUR DISCUSSION, I GOT THE DISTINCT FEELING THAT THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THIS HAD OCCURRED OVER THIS INTXN. I STRONGLY FEEL THAT HAD ATC NOT ALTERED OUR CLRNC, AT A CRITICAL POINT IN THE FLT, WITH NOT ONLY THE TURB, NAVING THE ACT, I WAS PERFORMING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AS WELL. AS PLTS, WE BRIEFED THE DEP TOGETHER, AS IS NORMALLY DONE. TO BE GIVEN SOMETHING OTHER THAN WHAT WAS BRIEFED IN THIS PHASE OF FLT SET UP THIS INCIDENT. HAD HE GIVEN THE AMENDED CLRNC ON THE GND, BOTH OF US WOULD HAVE TAKEN THE NECESSARY TIME TO GO OVER THE DEP, AND BRIEF EACH OTHER ON THE AMENDED PROC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.