Narrative:

B737 was departed from full length runway 30R after approximately 1 1/2 min hold for departure spacing. H25B ready for departure at taxiway C while B737 holding in position. After B737 departed, H25B put into position for spacing and was cleared for takeoff 2 mins after B737 departed. Required hold was 3 mins regardless of mileage unless pilot requested wake turbulence waiver. With waiver, required separation is as low as 6000 ft. Actual spacing was 2 mins and approximately 6 mi. I was unaware of the error and was not advised by anyone at the time of occurrence. Supervisor reported for work in tower approximately 20 mins after incident. Error was reported to supervisor 4 hours later by ground controller. Both myself and the controller in charge (controller in charge) had left for the day by this time. Ground controller alleges that he advised the controller in charge of the error at the time of occurrence. Controller in charge disputes and I heard no conversation of any kind during the time surrounding the incident. Ground controllers at no time advised me of developing incident such that it could be avoided or mitigated. His statement supports this. This is the 2ND time this individual has observed and failed to alert another employee of a developing incident and then reported later. Human factors: 45 mins prior to this incident, I was forced to issue evasive maneuvers to an arriving MD80 due to an operational error by norcal approach involving an IFR BE35 which departed rhv. Closest point of approach between these aircraft was less than 1 mi/same altitude. I was somewhat shaken by the event and should have asked to be relieved. This error is ultimately my responsibility. Teamwork did not occur in this situation. I believe the ground controller's failure to alert me was deliberate. This is the 2ND time this individual has done this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SJC LCL CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR WHEN RELEASING ACFT FROM INTXN WITHOUT PROPER TIME INTERVAL.

Narrative: B737 WAS DEPARTED FROM FULL LENGTH RWY 30R AFTER APPROX 1 1/2 MIN HOLD FOR DEP SPACING. H25B READY FOR DEP AT TXWY C WHILE B737 HOLDING IN POS. AFTER B737 DEPARTED, H25B PUT INTO POS FOR SPACING AND WAS CLRED FOR TKOF 2 MINS AFTER B737 DEPARTED. REQUIRED HOLD WAS 3 MINS REGARDLESS OF MILEAGE UNLESS PLT REQUESTED WAKE TURB WAIVER. WITH WAIVER, REQUIRED SEPARATION IS AS LOW AS 6000 FT. ACTUAL SPACING WAS 2 MINS AND APPROX 6 MI. I WAS UNAWARE OF THE ERROR AND WAS NOT ADVISED BY ANYONE AT THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE. SUPVR RPTED FOR WORK IN TWR APPROX 20 MINS AFTER INCIDENT. ERROR WAS RPTED TO SUPVR 4 HRS LATER BY GND CTLR. BOTH MYSELF AND THE CTLR IN CHARGE (CIC) HAD LEFT FOR THE DAY BY THIS TIME. GND CTLR ALLEGES THAT HE ADVISED THE CIC OF THE ERROR AT THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE. CIC DISPUTES AND I HEARD NO CONVERSATION OF ANY KIND DURING THE TIME SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT. GND CTLRS AT NO TIME ADVISED ME OF DEVELOPING INCIDENT SUCH THAT IT COULD BE AVOIDED OR MITIGATED. HIS STATEMENT SUPPORTS THIS. THIS IS THE 2ND TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS OBSERVED AND FAILED TO ALERT ANOTHER EMPLOYEE OF A DEVELOPING INCIDENT AND THEN RPTED LATER. HUMAN FACTORS: 45 MINS PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT, I WAS FORCED TO ISSUE EVASIVE MANEUVERS TO AN ARRIVING MD80 DUE TO AN OPERROR BY NORCAL APCH INVOLVING AN IFR BE35 WHICH DEPARTED RHV. CLOSEST POINT OF APCH BTWN THESE ACFT WAS LESS THAN 1 MI/SAME ALT. I WAS SOMEWHAT SHAKEN BY THE EVENT AND SHOULD HAVE ASKED TO BE RELIEVED. THIS ERROR IS ULTIMATELY MY RESPONSIBILITY. TEAMWORK DID NOT OCCUR IN THIS SIT. I BELIEVE THE GND CTLR'S FAILURE TO ALERT ME WAS DELIBERATE. THIS IS THE 2ND TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS DONE THIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.